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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

HOW MEN REBEL: AN ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL FOR INSURGENCY

by
William Bender
and
Craig L. Johnson

December, 1995

Thesis Advisor:

Gordon McCormick

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19960402 141

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 1995		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE HOW MEN REBEL: AN ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL FOR INSURGENCY			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Bender, William Johnson, Craig L.				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USSOCOM, 7701 Tampa Blvd., MacDill, AFB, FL			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Internal conflict is steadily increasing in importance. Whether it is called low intensity conflict or operations other than war, current conflict theories do not adequately explain the dynamics of internal conflict nor provide clear prescriptive policy guidance. This thesis serves two purposes. The first is to provide a model to analyze and describe internal conflict dynamics. The second is to provide decision makers with a strategic, systemic framework to successfully conduct internal war. The thesis is divided into four sections. The first examines internal conflict theories and develops a model. The second tests the model in 3 case studies demonstrating the explanatory effectiveness of the model. The third looks at the theoretical and practical implications of the model for an external actor such as the United States. The fourth section concludes the study and highlights policy prescriptions. A systemic approach to internal war provides policy makers at the NSC, DOD and DOS with a useful and objective decision making tool.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Insurgency, Revolution, Low-Intensity Conflict, Organization Theory, Social Revolution, Revolutionary Theory, Intervention, Political Violence, Internal War, Internal Conflict, Counterinsurgency, Malayan Emergency, Irish Republican Army, IRA, Algeria, Islamism, Islamic Fundamentalism, Powell Doctrine, United States Intervention, Weinberger Doctrine, Army Doctrine, Foreign Policy, Department of Defense, National Command Authority, Policy and Planning			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 246	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

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**HOW MEN REBEL:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL
FOR INSURGENCY**

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MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

Internal conflict is steadily increasing in importance. Whether it is called low intensity conflict or operations other than war, current conflict theories do not adequately explain the dynamics of internal conflict nor provide clear prescriptive policy guidance. This thesis serves two purposes. The first is to provide a model to analyze and describe internal conflict dynamics. The second is to provide decision makers with a strategic, systemic framework to successfully conduct internal war. The thesis is divided into four sections. The first examines internal conflict theories and develops a model. The second tests the model in 3 case studies demonstrating the explanatory effectiveness of the model. The third looks at the theoretical and practical implications of the model for an external actor such as the United States. The fourth section concludes the study and highlights policy prescriptions. A systemic approach to internal war provides policy makers at the NSC, DOD and DOS with a useful and objective decision making tool.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the dynamic process of internal conflicts. Many theorists have stated that internal war is different than conventional war. The primacy of political over military factors, local domestic factors, international ramifications and US domestic politics limit the ability of the US to intervene. This does not mean that the US can not intervene, but that the US must carefully review its organizational and operational methods.

This study seeks to examine the dynamics of internal conflict to determine what factors lead to long term stability in a given state faced with an internal conflict. The first step in developing a solution to internal wars is to define the system, identify system dynamics and identify the key variables for systemic stability. The key level of analysis is the organization. Internal war involves an organizational struggle between the state and opposing organizations and a mobilizational struggle as organizations seek to expand their own resource base and interfere with the resource base of their opponents.

Theories of insurgency and political violence serve as a base line to establish the overall contextual environment of internal conflict. Organization theory is used to outline the task environment of the interaction between organizations. The contextual environment forms the base for the mobilizational struggle. It is here that the organization builds links with local supporters and resources. The task environment contains the specific actions and reactions of organizations against each other and their support base.

A theory must address both the mobilizational and organizational aspects of the struggle. There is a tendency in military doctrine to look at tactics, techniques and procedures suitable to the struggle with opposing organizations and to pay only superficial attention to political, economic and social factors in the mobilizational struggle. Conversely, political agencies such as the Department of State and US Agency for International Development focus on the mobilizational aspect and underestimate the organizational struggle. This study develops an integrated model to aid decision makers integrating effort and developing

comprehensive, systemic level plans. Plans that operate below the system level lead to unexpected systemic interactions that cause plans to fail.

Restructuring host nation organizations take time. US planning in Haiti, Panama and currently Bosnia greatly underestimate how long it takes to reorganize and train host nation organizations. The US intent to rapidly withdraw is complicated by this problem. This leads to an unwanted extended commitment of US forces. Organizational change during and after internal conflicts is explicitly examined to determine more effective methods to allow US disengagement.

An organizational model of the process of internal war is developed and tested to determine its descriptive and prescriptive explanatory power. Three case studies are used to test the model: the Malayan insurgency from 1948 to 1960, the Northern Ireland insurgency from 1969 to 1995 and the current Algerian insurgency from 1992 to 1995. Long term stability depends on contextual and organizational factors within the local environment. The study is taken from the perspective of the challenged state and its opponents to determine what factors led to the eventual outcome.

Chapter VI examines a second perspective. The model is used from the viewpoint of the external intervenor. The Powell doctrine is used theoretically to examine its impact on the local state and society. The Powell doctrine can create counterproductive long term problems for both the host nation and the US. Alternative strategies are considered to expand the US ability to intervene. The model serves as a tool to determine both the short and long term implications of US strategic courses of action.

The findings of this study are that the organizational model serves as a useful tool to analyze internal wars. The model can assist in developing and implementing policies for an organization operating within the state or for an external actor seeking to influence the outcome. This work is a preliminary work and suggests the need for further research into the organizational role in internal conflict. Existing theory has only just started to examine this field.

I. INTRODUCTION.

A. BACKGROUND.

This thesis focuses on organizations and the process of internal conflict. Internal conflict is defined as the use of violence by organizations that challenge the policies or political structure of a ruling regime. Unorganized violence such as riots, high crime rates and individual acts are not included. These events have marginal long term impact on the status quo of a government unless they are used by an organization.

The origins, process and outcome of internal conflict are examined in relation to the interaction of organizations. A dynamic relationship between the environment, organizational structure and decision making, this thesis explains the role that the organization plays in shaping both the process and the outcome. A systemic model of internal conflict is presented that depicts interaction as a cyclic process, rather than a linear cause and effect relationship. The hypotheses from this model are tested against three case studies: the 1948 to 1960 Malayan Insurgency, the 1969 to 1995 Northern Ireland Insurgency and the current conflict in Algeria from 1988 to 1995.

B. THEORY.

There are two major schools in insurgency theory. A macro approach focuses on insurgency as a societal phenomenon. Broad historical and social forces create an insurgency and determine the outcome. In this type of approach, the revolution itself is an event. What matters is the forces that occurred before the onset of the insurgency, those that predetermined the outcome. The second approach is a micro view. It examines why individuals revolt. The individual approach focuses on relative deprivation and rational choice theories to determine why individuals choose political violence.

A third approach is to use the organization as a level of analysis between the macro and micro views. The societal and individual schools attempt to explain why rebellion occurs. The organizational approach focuses on how rebellions occur. There is value in describing the origins of revolutions. Yet, a descriptive theory only states what already occurred and can not serve as a basis for policy and action to influence a conflict in

progress. The organizational approach serves as an effort to examine the strategic methods best suited to favorably influence the conflict.

1. Macro Approaches.

The premise of the macro approach is that broad social and historical forces drive change. The level of analysis is on broad social segments such as "state", "class", "ethnic group" or "social movement". Three major schools of thought are the systems disequilibrium approach, the Marxist structural approach and the opportunity/resource approach.

a. Systems Disequilibrium Approach.

Chalmers Johnson developed a theory stating that revolution is caused by change within societies. "Rapid change leads to systems disequilibrium which produces individual pathologies as well as collective movements."¹ Samuel Huntington argued that revolutions are a byproduct of socioeconomic modernization. Revolutions are progressive in that they lead to "the creation and institutionalization of a new political order."² Modernization changes social and economic power in society which creates a political disparity which can lead to violence. Political violence stabilizes society and allows for further growth. De Toqueville and Weber also believed that "revolutions usually led to stronger, more centralized and more bureaucratic states."³

b. Structural Approach.

The structural approach maintains that the social structure of a state determines the path of its development. Marx, Moore and Skocpol are the three best known structural theorists. Marx believed that the inherent contradictions between the

¹ Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence" in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict, (New York: The Free Press, 1983), pp. 135-166. p. 146.

² Samuel P. Huntington, "Revolution and Political Order" in Jack A. Goldstone, ed., Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies, 2nd edition, (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), pp. 37-44. p. 38.

³ Goldstone, p. 37.

economic classes of those who produced and those who controlled production was deterministic. The socioeconomic structure of feudalism led to capitalism which would inevitably lead to communism.⁴

Barrington Moore broadened the range of outcomes from communism to include democracy and feudalism. For Moore, class structure determined political outcome such as his belief that democracy was not possible without a middle class.⁵ Skocpol supported the social historical determinism of the structural school. She added the role of the state as a factor in preventing the outbreak of revolution. As soon as world historical forces weakened the state, the inevitable revolution would occur.⁶

c. Opportunity/Resource Approach.

Charles Tilly modified the macro approach. He looked at broad aggregate groups in society as having collective interests in common and competing with other groups. The systems and structural approach held that these groups are created by world historical forces. Tilly allows for other factors such as political, regional and ethnic factors to create cleavages in society.⁷ Collective interests lead to competing polities struggling to control the state. The opposition gains power only through taking advantage of opportunities and resources to compete with the regime.

2. Micro Approaches.

The micro theorists take a very different approach. They hold that the aggregate sum of individual preferences shape social forces as opposed to the macro view that social

⁴ Peter C. Sederberg, Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change, (New York: HarperCollins, 1994, pp. 176-9.

⁵ Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

⁶ Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). See James DeNardo, Power In Numbers, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp.28-32 for a thorough discussion and critique of Skocpol's theory.

⁷ Sederberg, p. 189. Gurr, 1983, p. 147.

forces shape individual preferences. The two major micro schools of thought are the relative deprivation approach and the rational choice approach.

a. Relative Deprivation.

Relative deprivation theory was developed by Gurr to explain why individuals resorted to political violence. His theory states that social, economic and political forces cause individual frustration which results in collective violence. Gurr developed a highly complicated model to determine what led individuals to join in collective political violence.⁸ He relies on individual, cultural and structural variables in his model.

The problem with a detailed, comprehensive model is that it is difficult to use. How do you measure the individual preferences of every person in an entire society? "Empirical studies question whether variations in relative deprivation account for the occurrences of violent outbreaks."⁹

b. Rational Choice.

Rational choice regards the individual as a rational actor who bases his decisions on a cost-benefit analysis. The weakness in this theory is that individuals benefit by free riding. Free riding is allowing others to bear the burden of taking collective violent action and benefitting from the future changes. The problem is that if everyone free rides, no one benefits.¹⁰ Leites and Wolf posit that the revolutionary organization can offer assisted preferences to overcome free riding behavior.¹¹

⁸ Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

⁹ Sederberg, p. 127.

¹⁰ See Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995).

¹¹ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflict, (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1970).

3. Origins of Conflict.

The problem with macro and micro theories is that they seek to explain the origins of an internal conflict. They do not explain the process by which the conflict occurs or the ultimate outcome. Whether armed organizations are formed by macro social forces or micro individual efforts does not explain who wins. Some organizations are more effective than other organizations of the same relative size. Structural approaches attempt to predict outcomes from origins. These theories have proven to be empirically false. The former Soviet Union was not the vanguard of the future, but a broken remnant of the past.

4. Organization as Level of Analysis.

The true problem in internal conflict is in studying the process in order to determine policies to effect the outcome. The macro and micro theories provide a tool to examine the roots of conflict but have nothing to say on how to win. Tilly, Leites and Wolf, DeNardo and Gurr all touch upon the role of organizations in the process without focusing on the organization itself as the level of analysis.¹² Social and individual explanations are important to studying origins, but the organization is the level of analysis for the process of internal conflict.

Macro and micro theories are event models of internal conflict. Revolution occurs when certain conditions are met. This is empirically not true. Revolutions take time and the decision to join revolutions is not spontaneous. The organization plays a key role. Organizational growth is gradual and revolutionary outcome is determined in a protracted interaction between the regime, society and the organization. Therefore revolution is a process, not an event.

The organization exists between the macro political, economic and social structures and the individual. What are the links between the organization, its environment and individuals? The macro theories identify the many political, economic and social forces that divide society. These forces form distinct social movements within society. The

¹² Leites and Wolf use economic theory to examine the market for insurgency. DeNardo uses revolutionary strategy as a level of analysis. The organization itself functions within the market of insurgency and one of its outputs is strategy.

organization recruits from one or more social movements. At the micro level, the organization uses selective incentives to recruit individuals from the social movement preference base into the organization.

Thus, the organization exists between the macro and micro perspective. The organizational model presented in this thesis provides several advantages. First, a social movement is difficult to measure. It is formed by preferences and it is difficult to measure the contents of people's minds. Organizational membership requires action and is observable. Second, a social movement is a collection of people with common preferences. It does not have articulated goals or strategies. Organizations have fixed goals and use strategies and tactics to achieve them. Third, organizations exist between social movements and individuals. Yet, they also exist in relationship with other organizations. It is rare for only one organization to exist within a given social movement. Normally, a social movement consists of several different organizations. The existence of multiple organizations reveals the incoherence of a social movement. If the macro theories are correct, the social movement should determine the success of an organization. In reality, the organization is independent from a social movement and succeeds or fails on its own actions. For example, after 1917, the Bolsheviks successfully seized power in Russia over the larger Mensheviks. If the preferences of the social movement were deterministic, the Mensheviks would have won.

C. AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH.

1. Problem Statement.

What is the process of internal conflict? What role do organizations play in the process and outcomes of internal conflict?

2. Definitions and Limitations.

Internal conflict is defined as the use of political violence by organizations to change the policies or political structure of a regime. Internal means within a state. Internal conflict occurs in many cases across national boundaries. For the sake of conceptual clarity, this study will focus on the state as the field of conflict so as to clearly identify the role of participants.

Further, the thesis will study organizations that are not part of the existing regime. Coups and power conflicts within the ruling elites occur within the ruling social movement. Organizations outside the existing power structure are components of different social movements with different preferences for the distribution of political, economic and political power.

3. Significance of the Study.

The study of the process of internal conflict facilitates examination of the type of organizations and organizational actions that lead to success or failure. Developing a process model provides a prescriptive approach to determine the organizational actions to be taken by either the regime or its challengers. An understanding of the process an external actor such as the United States to develop prescriptive policies. Current United States doctrine does not include organizations and strategies that lead to success in internal conflict.

D. OVERVIEW OF THESIS.

1. Theoretical Support.

The thesis examines the relationship of the organization to its environment, the relationship between the organization and individuals and the relationship between organizations and other organizations. The level of analysis is the organization. The organization is studied within the context of a state. The state is used as a systems boundary containing the population of society divided into a variety of cooperating and competing social movements.

Organization theory is used to examine the organization itself. Organization theory contains a classical structural approach and an individual human relations approach that parallels the macro and micro theories of internal conflict. Contingency theory is used

because it describes various types of organizations and links the organization to its environment. This theory states that the optimal organizational design is contingent on its environment.¹³

Organization theory also distinguishes between the political, economic and social forces that form the contextual environment of the state and the separate task environment formed by the size, location and activities of all of the organizations that operate within the state.

Resource Mobilization theory is used to clarify the way divisions within society form social movements. Organization theory is designed for firms in an economic environment. Resource Mobilization theory is used to convert organization theory from an economic focus to a political focus.

Political network theory focuses on the relationship between organizations and individuals. It is a variation of rational choice theory. The individual level of analysis is not the focus of this study. Nevertheless, social networks help explain the method by which organizations recruit and maintain membership. The Appendix explains the implications of political network theory on how organizations survive and grow and the actions organizations use that lead to growth.

2. Thesis Outline.

Chapter II presents the process model of internal conflict. This model locates the organization between macro social forces and the individual. It establishes the nature of the relationship between an insurgent organization and the regime and other organizations in the state. Three hypotheses drawn from the theory are tested in case studies.

Chapters III, IV and V test the hypotheses from the model in separate case studies. Malaya was selected as it is regarded as a classic model of a successful counter insurgency

¹³This is not to be confused with Eckstein's use of contingent-inherent theory, used to explain political violence as structural phenomenon. The authors focus is on the organization and its environment. See Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence," in Ted R. Gurr, ed. Handbook of Political Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1983), pp. 135-166.

and there are many different theories that attempt to explain outcomes. It provides a comparative case against other theories. Northern Ireland was selected as a tough test for the theory. The explosion of violence in 1969 appeared to many observers as a spontaneous event that resembled the macro theories of environment determining outcome. This resembles a revolution as an event. It provides a test of the null hypothesis which states that organizations do not matter because environment determines outcome. The last case study is the current crisis in Algeria. An efficient theory should not only describes past events, but helps predict future events. Algeria is a current internal conflict of great interest to the United States.

All three case are characterized by a minimum of external intervention. This enhances the focus on factors within the state that lead to success and failure. The impact of external factors is assessed in the case studies and broadened in Chapter VI. Chapter VI focuses on external intervention from the perspective of the United States. The Powell doctrine is analyzed using the organizational model. The strategies and options of the external actor are reviewed providing a frame for future doctrine development.

Chapter VII summarizes the conclusions of the study. It examines the empirical support for the model in the case studies, evaluates the hypotheses and compares the theory to existing macro and micro theories.

II. THE THEORY AND AN ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL.

A. INTRODUCTION.

This chapter examines the relationship between the organization and its environment. Three issues will be examined. The first is to determine the opportunities and constraints the environment frames for the organization. The second issue is determining the optimal strategy given a certain environment. The third issue is to determine the optimal organizational design of the organization given its environment and intended goals and strategy.

A model is developed that relates the process of internal conflict to the organization embedded in its environment. Three hypotheses and ten propositions from the model are framed so that the theory may be tested. Finally, the final section outlines the case study selection and design in which the hypotheses will be examined.

This study will use the state in which the internal conflict takes place as a system. The political, economic, social structures of that state and its own unique history, geography and demographics define systems parameters. Systemic behavior complicates macro and micro theories. The conditions that create divisions and grievances in society lead to unexpected outcomes in a systems environment. The system itself can reinforce or balance against the impact of a given variable. Systemic reactions can reinforce the magnitude of the action by increasing its effect. Conversely, balancing reactions counteract the effect of the action to preserve the status quo. Systemic reactions can lead to varying consequences in time and space.

An action can have a beneficial effect in one part of the system and a harmful impact in another. For example, organizational actions may produce a beneficial impact on the organization's own social movement increasing recruitment and resources to the organization. The same action may lead to an increase in the recruitment and resources available to opposing organizations. Thus, the organization increases in strength, but so do its opponents. This is a common result of violent acts in internal conflict.

An action may produce a beneficial effect in the short run and harmful effects in the long run. Violent acts can increase the prestige of the organization but over time cost the organization the support of its own social movement. Movements lead to countermovements in society.¹⁴

Systemic reactions may involve a time lag between action and outcome. The organization may take the most appropriate action possible, but if the organization is eliminated before the action can have effect nothing is accomplished. Members may become frustrated at the lack of results in the short cycle and take action that eliminates the benefit of the original action. The organization must be persistent and avoid impatience as it seeks to accomplish its objectives.

B. A CONTINGENCY MODEL OF INTERNAL CONFLICT.

Contingency theory is based on the premise that the appropriate structure for an organization is contingent on a number of internal and external variables that shape the organization's operational environment. It is part of organization theory and was developed by the work of Lawrence and Lorsch.¹⁵ There are two different environments that together form the system in which the organization operates. One is formed by the aggregate of all the individuals that exist in the state. The other is formed by the aggregate of all of the organizations within the state.

1. Contextual and Task Environments.

The organization exists within two types of environment: a contextual environment and a task environment.

¹⁴ See Mayer N. Zald and Bert Useem, "Movement and Countermovement Interaction: Mobilization, Tactics and State Involvement", in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, ed., Social Movements in an Organizational Society, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 247-272.

¹⁵ Paul Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organizations and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, 1967).

The distinction between organization and environment highlights the key boundary transactions that sustain an organization on a day to day basis and influence its long run survival.¹⁶

In its daily operations, the organization interacts with its customers, competitors, government agencies and other elements that directly affect the organization. Dill called this the *task environment*.¹⁷ This concept is a narrow view of the total environment that faces the organization. The task environment represents the system where the organization acquires its inputs, takes actions and conducts its production and markets its outputs. The organization attempts to take action and achieve its goals in this environment.¹⁸

The firm also operates in the broader *contextual environment*. This represents the political, economic, social, cultural and demographic factors that shape the organization's overall environment.¹⁹ The overall viability of the organization is shaped by the contextual environment. The contextual environment is less dynamic than the task environment in that the nature of society changes slower than that of an individual market. Nevertheless, it is the interaction of the contextual and task environments that form the degree of stability and certainty in which the firm operates.

Traditional macro and micro theories focus on the contextual environment to explain internal conflicts. Broad social forces and individual preferences and decisions are important in determining the potential scope and intensity of a conflict. Yet they do not explain organizational behavior and it is the ability and actions of organizations that determine the process of an internal conflict. The task environment is the field of organizations that operate within the broader contextual environment. Organizational behavior is affected by

¹⁶ Gareth Morgan, Creative Organization Theory, (London: SAGE Publications, 1989), p. 72.

¹⁷ William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy", Administrative Science Quarterly, 2, 1958, pp. 409-443.

¹⁸ W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), pp. 133-4.

¹⁹ Morgan, p. 72.

forces within the contextual environment and by interaction with other organizations within the task environment.

2. The Process of Organization and Environment.

Contingency theory shifts the focus from the structural perspective to a process perspective. "A process view is taken not only of the internal operations of the organization but of the organization itself as a system persisting over time."²⁰ Figure 2-1 shows the relationship between the contextual and task environments for a political organization. The contextual environment does not cause internal conflict. It creates conditions that an organization can exploit to grow.

Environments are created by drawing a border at some level within a system to separate some element from the rest of the system.²¹ The borders of the contextual environment are those of society. The borders of the state form the geographic boundaries and the vertical and horizontal cleavages of society form the contextual environment.

The organization develops from an associational base of leaders and followers that form groups in politically or socially defined openings in society. These openings can be a political party, a trade union, religious or cultural groups or family and social groups. These groups form over various issues and recruit members from within the horizontal and vertical cleavages in society. Over time, these groups unite to form a larger functionally differentiated organization with a structure and goals. The organization develops a strategy to attain these goals. The contextual environment is the arena where an organization develops within a society.

The task environment is the arena where the organization seeks to achieve its goals. The political organization, the regime, and society form the task environment. The regime, its opposing organizations and society form a triangular interactive system. Actions taken by one actor causes interaction with the other two components. This interactive process

²⁰ Scott, p. 93.

²¹ Morgan, p. 72.




Figure 2-1. Organizational Model of Internal Conflict.

creates a unique task environment that is favorable or unfavorable to the organization. The organization responds to this environment by new action (or inaction) as its strategy contributes to perceived organizational success or failure.

Time dynamics serve to form the boundary between the contextual and task environment. The task environment operates in a *short cycle*. This action-interaction process operates in the near term. The contextual environment operates in a *long cycle*. The political, economic and social characteristics of society take more time to develop and change than the nature of a specific market.

The border between the contextual and task environments is permeable. Changes in the political, economic and social structure of society will be reflected in the triangular relationship between the regime, the opposition and society.²² In turn, the process of action and interaction can have a long cycle effect that changes the political, economic and social structure. Thus, there is a gradual interaction between the task and contextual environments as well as the immediate interaction of regime, counter regime and society.

The overall environment for internal war is the state and the society it contains. The counter regime organization mobilizes resources and uses violence in an effort to change regime policies or to change the government of the state. The organization designs a structure to operate within the contextual and task environments. The organization takes action within the short cycle of the task environment. An interaction process occurs between the regime, counter regime and society that affects the munificence, complexity and dynamism of the environment. The outcome of the short and long cycle process is the increase or decrease in the size of the organization.

3. The Environment.

The contextual and task environments frame the system for the organization. Socioeconomic divisions frame preference groups in the contextual environment. The organization has little impact on the contextual environment and must take advantage of

²²Gordon McCormick, Naval Postgraduate School Class Lecture, Monterey, California (Spring, 1995). Dr. McCormick used the triangle in classes he teaches on revolution.

existing opportunities and constraints. The organization's own actions help shape the task environment, and it is here that organizations have the most leverage. The task environment also forms the largest threat, as actions of other organizational actors can limit or destroy the organization.

a. Internal Conflict is a System.

The environment of internal conflict is the system that contains the regime, counter regime and society. The borders of this system vary with the specific case, but normally are the borders of the state itself. A specific case may contain a society split between states such as the Kurds or numerous other variations. International law and the UN Charter differentiate between the rights of states and those of nonstate actors. The state forms the unit of analysis for the system. Thus, the Kurdish struggle is different if viewed from the state perspective of Turkey, Iran or Iraq.

Within the boundaries of the state, the system consists of the regime, counter regime and society. Many theorists analyze the interaction of the regime and counter regime and fail to analyze the interaction of both with society. As parts of a system, actions taken by one causes reactions in the other two. These actions can be reinforcing when the system works to increase the impact of the action. These actions also serve as balances when the system counteracts the action to maintain a status quo.²³ The total membership of both the regime and its opponents is a minority of the total population of society. The system itself must be analyzed, not just some of its component parts.

The system of regime, counter regime and society can be analyzed though its environmental structure. The environment is divided into a contextual environment and a task environment. The contextual environment consists of the structural factors that change slowly or not at all. These factors include geography, the political, economic, and social structure of state and society. The task environment is formed by the interactions of the state

²³ Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994), p. 79.

and non state organizations that exist within the system. The task environment can change rapidly since it is driven by the actions and reactions of organizations and events.

From the perspective of the organization, the environment shapes the opportunities and constraints for action and growth. The contextual environment shapes the size and nature of the potential supporters of the organization. The task environment shapes the ability of the organization to conduct actions, recruit and survive.

b. Contextual Environment and Market Size.

The contextual environment forms common preference groups within a broader society. These preference groups become the *market* for organizations that seek their support. *Market size* represents the elements of the horizontal and vertical cleavages in society where the organization hopes to recruit members. The market represents the demand side for an organization. The contextual environment consists of a number of markets, based on the unique set of vertical and horizontal cleavages in a given state.²⁴

For example, in a hypothetical example, the organization might consist of urban intellectuals and rural Chinese peasants. Together these groups form 10 percent of society. The organization's market size 10 percent. Under these conditions, if they recruited every possible supporter, they could gain no more than 10 percent of the total population. The organization would have to shift goals and policies to reach out to additional groups to expand to other markets. The firm may adapt itself to suit the market, but it does not create a market. The preferences of individuals within society are a function of structural factors, many of which are beyond the reach of any organization.

The existence of several markets within the same system allows market interaction. The mobilization of one preference group trying to change the system normally leads to the

²⁴ Leites and Wolf regard all of society as part of the same market. When the cost is low enough, all will join. However, in a system the organized rebellion of one group causes other groups to mobilize to protect the status quo. This means that as demand rises in one market, it increases demand in others. A differentiated view of several markets in society is a more empirical view of the actual systemic behavior of societies. See Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1970), p. 28.

countermobilization of other groups to protect the system.²⁵ These preference shifts influence demand, but preferences alone do not determine supply. Organizations must act to convert preferences into membership. Leites and Wolf called this assisted preferences.²⁶ Organizations try to use preferences and the contextual environment to their best advantage. Organizational actions to manipulate preferences are influenced by the actions of other organizations in the task environment.

c. Task Environment and Space.

The task environment represents the organizational component of the regime, counter regime and society. At a given point in time, the system contains a variety of organizations that are part of the regime or counter regime or are neutral to both. These organizations interact with each other. The task environment is influenced by the interactions of these organizations.

Mobilization space represents the human and geographic space within the system where the organization attempts to influence preferences and recruit new members. An organization operates in an open space when there is no competition from or constraints caused by other organizations in a given space. Competition from other organizations through legal and illegal means limits the space available to the organization.

Mobilization space originates in the contextual environment. At a given point in time the organization exists in legal and cultural space. Legal space exists in the political structure. Political parties, labor unions and other associations are examples of legal spaces. Cultural space arises from religious groups and institutions, ethnic associations, social associations and other groups and organizations in society.

Once internal conflict starts mobilization space becomes dominated by the task environment. Organizations use legal and illegal means to deny space to their opponents. The regime will create new laws to limit the legal and cultural space of the insurgents. The

²⁵ Useem and Zald, pp. 247-272.

²⁶ Leites and Wolf, p. 42.

insurgents seek to disrupt the government and can even try to create a parallel government, or dual power situation, where the insurgents control the space in a given area.

Mobilization space is best defined through presence. Space is the area where an organization *could* operate, and presence is where an organization *does* operate. In a given space such as a village or a province, an organization has presence if members of the organization are permanently present. A regime can declare its opposition illegal. The governments proclamations are mere rhetoric, if the government has no presence in a given area. A given area can have one organization present, organizations competing for presence, or no presence for either side.²⁷

To grow, the organization must have presence in an area that contains mobilization space and a market. Presence in an area with denied space means that the organization is underground and not capable of action. Presence and space without a market means the organization has a product that no one desires. It can interfere with the efforts of opposing organizations but at best can only coerce the local inhabitants. Space and a market without presence may lead to unorganized actions and sympathizers but the organization must create presence and organize its supporters if the organization is to be sustained over time.

Given a fixed market size and space, recruitment still requires *presence*. Presence is the location of organizational elements within society. For example, if there are no legal barriers to the organization and it is using labor unions for recruitment, the organization must still be able to send elements into the space and potential of society to reach, influence and recruit members. The urban Malayan Communist Party had initial difficulties sending urban intellectuals to recruit rural squatters simply due to geography. They lacked presence in the rural communities and it took years plus the fortuitous occurrence of World War II to build an initial presence in the rural squatter community.

²⁷ G. C. Alroy examines why underdeveloped rural areas so frequently participate in insurgencies. The absence of government presence in rural areas creates a political vacuum that allows insurgents free room to develop and organize. See G. C. Alroy, "Insurgency in the Countryside of Underdeveloped Countries", in Sam C. Sarkesian, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1975). pp. 257-266.

d. The Nature of Organizational Competition.

The organization seeks to gain support within its own market. It competes with other organizations within the same market. This group of organizations within a given market forms an industry. It is very rare for an insurgency to have only one organization. Most have a variety of organizations. Some of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan spent as much effort fighting each other as they did the regime. This means that while the contextual environment forms markets, the task environment consists of competing industries. An organization competes with competitors within its own industry as well as against all the organizations in competing industries.²⁸

For simplicity, three industries will be examined: the regime industry, the counterregime industry and the neutral society industry. The regime and counter regime industries contain the market of individuals whose preferences support one side or the other as well as the organizations that recruit from this base. The society industry is not as cohesive as either the regime or counter regime. It includes individuals or groups not involved in either side of the conflict. In internal war, the society industry normally contains the majority of society. Internal wars are fought by minority groups. A counter regime of one or 2 percent of the population may fight a regime with support from 5 percent.²⁹

The size of the society industry compared to both the regime and counter regime is significant. In conventional war, armies wage war on other armies. They do not recruit personnel and resources from the opposing society. Internal war is unconventional in that both organizations recruit from and operate within the same society. The society industry of both organizations and individuals often forms the center of gravity in internal war.

²⁸ Resource Mobilization (RM) Theory develops the relationships between preference groups, organizations and industry using the terms Social Movement, Social Movement Organization and Social Movement Industry. The authors use RM theory to examine the competition within and between organizations. See Zald and McCarthy, pp. 20-21.

²⁹ Leites and Wolf discuss Malaya and Vietnam as examples where only 1% actively supported the insurgents with tacit sympathy from society. Leites and Wolf, pp. 9-10.

e. The Security Dilemma.

The role of violence provides the key characteristic of internal conflict that differentiates insurgency from social movement theory. The organization is not simply competing for preferences but also for survival. The organization must balance its actions and recruitment against the need to survive. Organizational action leads to reactions. Violent reactions threaten the organization and constrain activity. Growth also must be balanced with survival. Growing quickly increases the ability of opponents to infiltrate and break up the organization.

The environmental interaction of market size and space frame the opportunities and risks available to an organization. The contextual environment provides a larger or smaller market size. This represents the population which prefers the organization but has not joined it. Mobilization space varies from opened to closed based on the efforts of opposing organizations and the existing presence of the organization. Figure 2-3 illustrates the four situations that arise from these interactions.

		SPACE	
		OPEN	CLOSED
M A R K E T	LARGE	FAVORABLE FOR GROWTH FAVORABLE FOR SECURITY	FAVORABLE FOR GROWTH UNFAVORABLE FOR SECURITY
	SMALL	UNFAVORABLE FOR GROWTH FAVORABLE FOR SECURITY	UNFAVORABLE FOR GROWTH UNFAVORABLE FOR SECURITY

Figure 2-2. Relationship between Space and Market Size and Effect on Organization Growth and Security.

Large market size allows the organization to grow. If mobilization space is available the organization can conduct recruitment and take action to create expectations and selective incentives favorable to growth. If mobilization space is closed then the organization can take

action to open mobilization space. Acts of violence can kill or intimidate government supporters allowing the organization to expand.

Small market size means that the organization has little prospect of growth. The main issue facing the organization is survival. Open mobilization space allows the organization to survive. Closed space makes survival a critical issue. With a low potential market, the organization uses violence to survive hoping to increase its support base. Violence that leads to government atrocity such as Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland can alter unfavorable market size by forcing previously neutral individuals to become involved in the conflict.

C. HOW TO ACT.

Organizational actions are not determined by the environment. The organization designs goals and strategies to maximize its advantages and limit its constraints in the contextual and task environment. The two dimensions of organizational interaction are with individuals in the contextual environment and organizations in the task environment. These dimensions define the two types of struggles an organization must wage to be successful and grow. The organization wages a *mobilizational struggle* to gain recruits and resources from the contextual environment. The organization is also engaged in an *organizational struggle* with other organizations in the task environment. Figure 2-2 illustrates the two types of struggle.

Organizational choice must balance the need to grow along the mobilizational axis and survive along the organizational axis. The balance between growth and survival also represents the organization's strategy. The organization selects goals and strategy to achieve some mixture of one or both types of struggle. The organization's strategy leads to an interaction and response from both individuals on the mobilizational side and other organizations. A strategy that would work in a task environment with no organized competitors may completely backfire in a task environment with many rivals who counteract every strategy. It is the task environment that complicates organizational choice. Other organizations actively seek to disrupt both the plan and the organization.




Figure 2-3. Dynamics between regime, counter regime and society.

1. Optimal Decisions.

Given environmental factors, what are the optimal decisions for an organization? Contingency theory states that the successful organization has an organizational structure in harmony with its contextual and task environment. The organization develops an organizational design to carry out its strategy. The organizational structure is designed to carry out certain mobilizational or organizational tasks. Organization design represents a strategic weight between acting or mobilizing. The organization ideally wants to do both, but some organizational structures are more suited to operating along one axis than the other.

Organizational structure is a necessary but not sufficient characteristic of the competent organization. Changes in the environment can leave an organization with an inappropriate structure. Since it takes months or years to change organizational structure, the competent organization must overcome a handicap in structure while still achieving its goals. The initial structure selected optimizes the organization toward certain types of actions and away from others. Changing strategies will be constrained by the last organizational decision on organizational structure.

A competent organization must be efficient and effective. Organizational *efficiency* is defined as the organizations ability to use minimum resources to produce maximum

output. Organizational *effectiveness* is the degree to which the organization achieves its goals. Short cycle decisions stress efficiency. In the short cycle, current resources and the contextual environment are a given. The organization seeks to make most efficient use of available resources. Long cycle decisions stress effectiveness. In the long run, the organization strives to overcome environmental and organizational constraints to allow the organization to grow and achieve organizational goals.

2. Cyclic behavior.

The organization balances the need to grow with the need for security. Over time, organizations show cyclic behavior. Periods of growth are followed by periods of consolidation. A large and rapid influx of new members creates instability in the organization. The new members have lower commitment than the established membership. A consolidation period allows commitment to be raised in the new members. The organization can absorb the new members into the existing structure or expand the organizational structure. This process of growth and consolidation occurs is common to the organizational development process.

In insurgency theory, these periods of growth and consolidation are reflected in stage concepts of development. Mao's three stage theory starts with an organizational development phase, shifts to a guerrilla war phase and ends in a conventional war of movement. Each phase contains a different organizational structure. The initial stage requires the establishment of political networks and extensive organization development in local communities. "Before the first stage is begun, there must be penetration of the target social system by the revolutionary cadre...conditioned by the particular characteristics of the population and territory."³⁰ The second stage requires an extensive political and military organization capable of waging war on both the political and military fronts. In the final stage, the organizational development process is complete. The insurgents have established their own government structure in its base areas and the military structure has developed into

³⁰ See the discussion on the revolutionary stages in Sam C. Sarkesian, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1975), pp. 8-10.

a conventional army. The insurgents wage a conventional offensive and consolidate power. The organization changes and adapts as the insurgency becomes successful and grows. Success is aided by a parallel development and adaptation by the organization.³¹

Organizational presence contributes to cyclic behavior. It takes time to establish presence in new areas. The organizational members are vulnerable until they have consolidated their position in the community within existing social networks. Once established, presence allows selected incentives to help form sympathizers and active supporters. Presence serves the same function as dust particles to rain. Dust particles accumulate microscopic moisture. Over time, the moisture reaches a critical mass, growth accelerates and the drop becomes so heavy it falls from the sky. The time taken to establish presence within a community is often unobserved until it is reflected in organizational actions. Nevertheless, it takes time and effort to establish the initial links that have a high payoff later. Establishing presence is an investment for future growth.

3. Short and Long Cycle Decisions.

The organization faces opportunities and constraints from the contextual environment formed by state and society, the task environment formed by the interaction of organizations within the state and society and by the internal structure and membership of the organization itself. These forces are not deterministic: they influence what the organization can and cannot do, yet the organization retains free choice. Systemic influences go both ways. The organization is capable of influencing the contextual and task environments and its own structure. It is this ability to influence its environment that makes organizational actions and decisions crucial to the process of internal conflict.

The competent organization can overcome external and internal constraints and still be successful, the incompetent organization cannot. There are situations that so favor one side or the other that the organization either cannot win or cannot lose. Castro's victory in Cuba saw an incompetent insurgent beat an incompetent regime. Yet, most internal conflict

³¹ DeNardo states that revolutions require years of political organization to be effective. See DeNardo, pp. 254-7.

situations are not so clear cut. The competence of the competing organizations becomes a crucial variable in prolonged internal conflict.

Organizational structure has an influence on the decision making process of the organization. Decision making in an organization is a function of the interrelationships between leaders, followers and organizational structure.³² The organization decides its actions based on changing goals, organizational structure, strategy or tactics.³³ The nature of the organizational decision is reflected in actions which have a short cycle impact in the task environment and a long cycle impact in the contextual environment.

Short and long cycle decisions result from a crucial organizational choice. The organization chooses between a strategy that relies on taking action now or a strategy of preparation and organization for future action later. A short cycle decision focuses on current actions while a long cycle decision prepares the future. The organization must do both to be successful. The strategic dilemma is in choosing how much of each to do under different conditions.

A strategy of all action and no organizing leads to failure. The failure to invest effort in the future growth of the organization means that no growth occurs. The organization cannot receive the benefit of future growth that results from successful short run actions. The *foco* theory in Latin America is an action strategy that expects the actions of a small group to create massive mobilization potential. *Foco* theory failed consistently in all of its applications since the organization lacked the presence and organizational infrastructure to mobilize and organize this potential into organizational strength. *Foco* theory assumed that potential alone would lead to victory. This conceptual failure is reflected in operational failure.

³² H. Wayland Cummings, Larry W. Long, Michael L. Lewis, Managing Communication in Organizations: An Introduction, (Scottsdale, AZ: Gorsuch Scarisbrick Publishers, 1987), pp. 47-8.

³³ Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism", in Orbis, 29 (3), Fall 1985), p. 477.

A strategy of organizing without action also leads to failure. The organization becomes a group of coffee house intellectual revolutionaries who always plan and never act. The Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States had a very sophisticated organizational chart and elaborate plans that led nowhere due to the very small membership.³⁴ A shift to action led to the elimination of the organization since it lacked organizational depth. Preparation alone is not enough. A few highly committed ideological members can sustain a small group. Yet for an organization to grow it must use selective incentives and presence to reach out and recruit members.

The organization must balance its acts and its organizing activities so that they build on one another. Short cycle actions include acts of violence and acts of recruitment. Long cycle actions include creating presence in new areas, forming coalitions with other groups, and acts to increase mobilization potential and space. There is an interaction between short and long cycle actions where actions now create space and potential for actions later. For example, violence now can create space. The organization can create presence and recruit later in this space through future short cycle actions.

D. HOW TO ORGANIZE.

Structural design is a strategic choice that requires time to implement and change.³⁵ When an organization selects a strategy, it must adopt a structure tailored toward accomplishing stated goals within the parameters of the environment. Structure defines the internal limitations and constraints of the organization and consequently, influences internal and external competitors. Regardless of the opportunity existing in the environment, structure can reduce or enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of a selected course of

³⁴ John B. Wolf, "Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist Groups", in Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1978, pp. 169-186. p. 175.

³⁵ Another similarity between resource mobilization theory and contingency theory is the focus on two types of organizational structures. Resource mobilization theory uses inclusive and exclusive structures to describe organizations. Contingency theory uses mechanistic and organic structures.

action. Structural design choice influences an organization's ability to compete in the mobilizational and organizational struggle.

Once a given structure is implemented the organization tends to conduct operations that focus either on mobilizing support or fighting the organizational struggle. The competent organization makes adjustments in strategy to accommodate changes in the environment. When an organization determines that the structure is unsatisfactory, the leaders can choose to modify the structure. But changes take from a few months time to several years, depending on the specific organization and environmental situation.³⁶ An organizational design that facilitates rapid adaptation to the changing environment can improve efficiency and effectiveness. The critical implication of structural design lies in the extended time period required to change it. Organizations must select strategies that accurately meet the requirements of the environment.

1. Two Types of Design.

There are two types of structures: open and closed.³⁷ Closed structure is exclusive and open structure is inclusive. These two categories exist in a bipolar relationship. No organization is strictly open or closed. However, organizational behavior demonstrates a tendency to favor one or the other. Organizations are characterized by traits associated with the open, inclusive and the closed, exclusive structural designs.

In the absence of a violent, organizational struggle, open organizations are best suited for dynamic environments. Open structure facilitates the rapid growth. However, this type of organization is vulnerable to violent interaction with the state and with other organizations in society. The optimum structure is a blend of the two types adapted to the environment.

³⁶The dynamics of internal war are distinctly different from the base assumptions of contingency theory and resource mobilization theory. The presence and use of violence creates pressure to force more rapid change than the 3 to 5 years of organization theory. The case studies will examine the time required for organizational change in a threat environment.

³⁷Bard O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Modern Revolutionary Warfare, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc, 1990) p. . O'Neill uses the terms selective and mobilizational structures to describe the two ideal type structures for internal conflict.

a. Closed Structure.

The closed structure is exclusive and is characterized by its small, highly committed, clandestine membership. Closed organizations have several advantages. These include: its high level of security, differentiation, specialization, and decentralized execution. Exclusive membership policies enhance security and provide highly committed members. Differentiated subelements perform specific tasks such as recruitment, political actions, logistics, propaganda, armed action and other specific tasks.

High levels of commitment to organizational goals compensate for the inefficient command and control mechanisms associated with closed organizations. The subelements work independently towards group objectives with little guidance from a central command.³⁸ Differentiation and specialization decrease the efficiency of command and control. Hierarchical command structure and a distinct gap between leaders and followers are characteristics of a closed organization.³⁹

The closed organization uses indoctrination to inculcate organizational goals during the initiation of new members. This increases their security. High organizational cohesion and unity of effort toward common goals facilitates decentralized operation, even in high risk environments. Closed organizations use indoctrination and coercion to instill organizational values. Coercion is also used to prevent defection from the organization. Yet, the use of these techniques, combined with the adverse consequences of compromise, makes the closed

³⁸This organization structure displays several characteristics of Burns and Stalker's organic organization.

³⁹ Edward E. Rice, Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 52-9. Shultz and Slater, pp. 37-9, Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), pp. 68-72., James C. Scott, "Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars", in Theory and Society, (January - March, 1979, pp.97-133). pp. 100-101. There is a well documented tendency for the leaders to be from an urban intellectual middle class background while the followers are from an urban or rural background. However, this is not universal. Exact demographic composition varies with the individual case.

organization less adaptable to changes in structure or goals. Dissent is met with expulsion or punishment, not organizational change.⁴⁰

The closed organization experiences disadvantages associated with its security and decentralized structure. Command, control, and communications are a serious problem created by this type of organizational design. Security measures require duplication of effort. Time is critical to secure communications systems. Decisions made at central command reach take time to filter down to subelements. The cumbersome communications problem can result in subelements conducting activities that damage the size of the market. Organizations constantly search for a balance between centralized and decentralized control.

Control must be either too centralized, imposing rigidity on strategy and tactics; or too loose, allowing a dangerous flexibility to those on the fighting periphery.⁴¹

The communication problem and commitment to organizational goals make internal dissent very difficult to resolve within the organization. Closed organizations often resort to internal repression and become riddled with schisms.⁴²

b. Open Structure.

Open structures are inclusive. The open structure is less secure than the closed, but more capable of growth. The open model is used by political parties. It is less tied to goals and therefore more flexible and open to attracting support from a wider mobilization base. Lower initial costs and wider appeal creates opportunities with fewer constraints. As a result these organization types are less homogeneous than the closed

⁴⁰ Garner and Zald, p. 127.

⁴¹ J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground", in Terrorism and Political Violence, (Spring 1990, pp. 194-211). p. 202.

⁴² Crenshaw, pp. 482-4. Wolf, p. 181. Kent Layne Oots, "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups", in Terrorism, (Vol. 12, No. 3, 1989, pp. 139-152), pp. 148-9.

organization.⁴³ The open organization's greater heterogeneity results in less cohesion and lower member commitment.⁴⁴

Open structures tend to be larger than closed structures and have better communication systems. These organizations recruit individuals and form of coalitions with other organizations or associational networks. In contrast to closed organizations, members can defect relatively easily in a non munificent environment. High levels of commitment are difficult to achieve in open organizations due to the tendency to compromise.⁴⁵ The willingness of inclusive groups to compromise leads to faster growth than in an exclusive organization.

The primary weakness in the open organizational design is its vulnerability to counter organizations. Open structures provide little protection in a violent environment. Violent and nonviolent countermeasures taken by competing organizations can curb growth by limiting or closing the mobilization space.

Environment and organizational strategy force organizations to balance the need for growth and the need for survival. This requires blending the characteristics of open and closed organizations to meet the demands of the environment. Organizations tend toward either an open or closed structure. Activities conducted by organizations exhibit inherent structural strengths and weaknesses and members assume certain levels of risk in an effort to balance growth and survival.

⁴³ Kent Lane Oots, "Bargaining with Terrorist Organizations", in Terrorism, (Vol. 13, No. 2, 1990, pp. 145-158.), p. 148.

⁴⁴ Michael A. Berger and Mayer N. Zald, Social Movements in Organizations: Coup D'Etat, Bureaucratic Insurgency and Mass Movement", in McCarthy and Zald,(pp. 185-222.) pp. 204-7.

⁴⁵ Zald and Garner, pp. 133-5.

2. Environment and Structure.

Environment and structure influence decisions.⁴⁶ The environment defines market size, space, base levels of organizational presence and resources of the organization. Organizational structure sets constraints and limitations that affect the organizational survival and growth.

The structure of each revolutionary organization is as likely to determine the choice of strategy of national liberation as to be determined by it.⁴⁷

Environment influences structure and both environment and structure interact to influence decision making. The relationship between market size and space creates four different situations for open and closed organizations (See Figures 2-4 and 2-5).

a. Large Market and Open Space.

In this situation popular sentiment favors opposition organizations. Many would like to join and the regime and countermovements are not interfering in the organizations mobilization efforts (either due to no legal blockages which means implicit consent or due to lack of presence in the area of opposition operations). This situation allows rapid growth with a low survival threat. The closed organization survives, but is not capable of efficiently taking advantage of high growth rates due to its exclusive membership process.

b. Large Market and Closed Space.

When a large market exists, but space is closed, popular sentiment favors mobilization. But the lack of legal and geographic space prevents the organization's contact nets from recruiting. The closed organization is better suited for survival and growth in a

⁴⁶ Thomas J. Peters, "Strategy Follows Structure: Developing Distinctive Skills", in Henry Mintzberg and James Brian Quinn, ed., The Strategy Process: Concepts and Contexts, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice - Hall, 1992, pp. 443-8), p. 443. Peter C. Sederberg, Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change, (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 261. DeNardo, pp. 144-150.

⁴⁷ J. Bowyer Bell, On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 186.

		SPACE	
		OPEN	CLOSED
M A R K E T	LARGE	BEST	POOR, FOCUS ON SURVIVAL
	SMALL	ORGANIZATION IS MARGINALIZED	WORST ENVIRONMENT FOR MOBILIZATION ORGANIZATION

Figure 2-4. Effects of Market Size and Space on Open Organizations.

hostile environment than an open organization. It can use violence to expand its market and use the regime's efforts to close space as leverage for recruiting. Open organizations are less capable of overcoming closed space and are more vulnerable to repression and counter organizational efforts.

c. Small Market and Open Space.

In this environment, popular sentiments do not favor joining the organization even though open opportunity exists for the organization. Open organizations maintain stability in this environment. It is capable of sustaining itself due to its lower initiation and commitment costs. Since the transaction costs of membership have less appeal in an open space environment, the organization is vulnerable to defections and factions. These factions may have lower transaction costs.

d. Small Potential and Closed Space.

In this situation, popular sentiments do not favor the organization and the regime and counter organizations are containing the organization. The higher costs imposed by the regime encourage members to remain in the closed organization, while they cause defections in the mobilizational organization. Festinger's concept posits that higher initiation and defection costs lead to greater commitment for members to remain in closed

		SPACE	
		OPEN	CLOSED
M A R K E T	LARGE	POOR	BEST
	SMALL	WORST	SURVIVAL

Figure 2-5. Effects of Market Size and Space on Closed Organizations.

organizations. Less member commitment combined with higher security costs are weaknesses of the open organization.

Both types of structures are better off with popular support. The open structure has an advantage in open space. Closed structure has an advantage in closed space. A blend is required to make the structure adaptable to the environment. The exact combination of closed and open characteristics is contingent on the situation. When sentiment is low and popular support wanes, the closed organization is more capable of retaining existing membership than the open organization.

3. Environment, Structure and Future Decisions.

The counter regime organization begins the conflict from a position of weakness relative to the regime. If successful, it passes through several stages of development. Success depends on the ability of the organization to adapt organization structure to the changes in the environment associated with each phase. The organization must adjust itself to conduct operations in the short cycle. If it is successful, it must adapt its organization to allow a shift to the next phase of the conflict. This creates a unique paradox. An organization that is completely optimized to operate in the short cycle may be less capable of changing itself to take advantage of the new opportunities for success caused by its own actions.

There exists tension between an organization optimized for action in the current conditions of the short cycle and its ability to be successful in the long cycle. In the short cycle, the contextual environment is a constant. The organization acts and reacts to actions by other organizations. In a stable environment, the optimal organizational design specializes and differentiates its subsections around set tasks and procedures. It develops standard operating procedures to support a given tempo of operations. However, if environmental conditions change the previously optimized organization may find its tempo of activity counterproductive. For example, an organization can use a bombing campaign to bring the government to negotiate. If the government negotiates and the organization can not shut off its bombs, it can give a serious political advantage to the regime.

The organization can change its task environment by successful operations relative to the regime. Organizational success in the short cycle creates the conditions for new strategies and organizational growth and development. The organization must be capable of taking advantage of its own success. Adaptation may also be required due to changes in the task or contextual environment caused by factors beyond the organization's ability to influence. The task environment can change due to actions by the regime or other counter regime organizations. The contextual environmental can change due to external events such as a war or economic booms from an event like the 1973 oil crisis. Since the

organization can not control the cause of environmental change, the organization must be capable of reacting to change.

A closed organization is more efficient than an open organization. Highly specialized, differentiated cells use high commitment and standard procedures to achieve the highest return from its available resources. For example, 1,000 terrorists can influence society more than 1,000 members of an open political party. This is based on the dynamic that violence produces in the environment. Higher commitment facilitates the organization planning and execution of violent operations. These activities become very efficient in order to maintain members and protect the organization.

The open organization is less efficient and more effective than closed organizations. Its structure places fewer demands on the members and makes less efficient use of available resources. This decrease in costs results in less short run efficiency, but over time encourages growth. Closed structures give the organization a comparative advantage in the short cycle and the open organization has an advantage in the long cycle. Hence, the closed organization is more efficient and the open organization is more effective.

Strategic choice determines the organizational design. This strategy is reflected in the associated structure. Structural strengths and weaknesses are determined by choices between emphasizing survival or growth. As stated previously, closed organizations are survivable and efficient in short cycle interaction while open organizations are less survivable but more effective in long cycle dynamics. Weaknesses in closed structures lie in the tendency to focus on short cycle action and reaction in the organizational struggle. This hurts the closed organization in the mobilizational struggle.

Organizations can choose to resist the tendency to allow the structure to pull it along a predesignated path. The environment is influential but deterministic. Leaders must consider the best options available for action, in relation to the environment and organizational structure. Changing structure takes time, effort and especially the ability to recognize the need to change. The organization must balance its organizational design and strategy between the need to be efficient in the short cycle and the need to be effective in the long cycle. Efficiency in the short cycle requires specialization, training and standard

operations. Effectiveness in the long cycle requires the ability to restructure tasks and procedures to adjust to changing conditions.

4. Summary.

The tension between survival and growth creates an organizational design dilemma.⁴⁸ Each structure is characterized by strengths and weaknesses based on whether space is opened or closed. Closed organizations provide more security in a hostile environment and their members have higher levels of commitment. High levels of member commitment results in more efficient operations, particularly in the organizational struggle. Superior efficiency is offset by the closed organization's smaller size, which hinders its efforts to compete with the open organization in the mobilizational struggle. The closed organization's homogeneity and higher level of security, in contrast to that of the open organization, reduces its potential for growth. Contrary, to the closed structure, an open organization offers potential for greater growth in the mobilizational struggle. However, in a hostile environment, the open structure can be easily defeated by coercive, counter organizations.⁴⁹

E. HYPOTHESES.

1. Theoretical Support.

This section provides a summary of the theory. The authors use ten propositions to support three hypotheses. These propositions define the parameters used to develop the hypotheses. This thesis project tested the hypothesis in the case studies. The null hypothesis is that the environment determines outcome and organization creation and behavior is determined by broad social forces that precede the conflict.

Proposition #1. Internal conflict is a system. The internal conflict system parameters consist of the geographical and demographic boundaries of the state. The process model (Figure 2-1) depicts the theory.

⁴⁸ DeNardo, p. 151.

⁴⁹ Lichbach, p. 97.

Proposition #2. There is no single optimal organizational design that fits all internal conflicts. Optimal design is contingent on environment factors. This proposition represents the central tenet of the contingency theorists--Lawrence and Lorsch.

Proposition #3. Optimal organizational action is influenced by environment and organizational design. However, this influence is not deterministic. Organizations are independent actors capable of free choice.

Hypothesis #1. Optimal organizational strategy is contingent on organizational structure and the contextual and task environment. Successful organizations grow by aligning strategy and organizational design with environment.

Proposition #4. The environment is defined by the contextual and task levels of analysis. The contextual environment is defined by the boundaries of the system. It consists of the dynamic relationships between existing political, economic, and social structures in a given state. The contextual environment includes all individuals living in the society. The task environment constitutes the dynamic relationships between all organizations operating within the contextual environment. It includes all individuals that participate in organizations within the society.

Proposition #5. There are two broad types of organizational designs: closed and open. Once a specific organizational structure is established, it optimizes an organization between a balance of growth and security. This design adds to the opportunities and constraints available to the organization in the short cycle. Internally, it influences organizational behavior. Closed and open organizations exist in a bipolar relationship between one tendency and the other.⁵⁰

Proposition #6. Organizations make decisions that result in short and/or long cycle system dynamics. Short cycle decisions are intended to produce a short term effect within

⁵⁰ These typologies are derived from RM and contingency theory. The authors combine the two concepts in order to build a model more suited to organizations involved in violent conflict, rather than business or social movements.

the limitations of existing resources. Long cycle decisions are intended to achieve long term organizational development goals.⁵¹

Proposition #7. Organizational growth provides the best measurement of the outcome in an internal conflict. Organizations act to survive, conduct maintenance functions and grow. Growth is an indicator of success.

Hypothesis #2. Growth is a function of market size, mobilization space and organizational presence. Given these three conditions an organization can take short cycle actions to recruit and grow.

Proposition #8. Market size represents the preferences of the subelements of society. This mobilization potential is formed by the contextual environment.⁵²

Proposition #9. Mobilization space is defined by the space within the contextual environment available for organizational growth. Organizational presence and activities of organizations within the task environment form the determine the size and nature of mobilizational space.⁵³

Proposition #10. Presence is defined as the actual location of organization members within the existing social networks of society. The organization may not necessarily have members in mobilization potential and space. Presence amplifies the abilities of an organization to recruit, maintain security, and gain information to support growth.⁵⁴

⁵¹Organizational design changes generally take 18 months to five years (short cycle) while organizational development may take five to 15 years. The introduction of violence makes existing organizational theory on the dimension of organizations difficult to predict.

⁵²RM theory uses the term social movements to represent preference blocks.

⁵³Derived from RM theory, this definition of mobilization space is formed by the task environment and represents the areas available to social movement organizations (SMO) and social movement industries (SMI).

⁵⁴David Knoke, Political Networks: The Structural Perspective, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 69-74. Political network theory supports the role and function of organization presence.

Hypothesis #3. Adaptation provides a crucial advantage to an organization both within its own industry and in competition with organizations in other industries.

Contingency theory rests on the assumption that the best organization design depends on the nature of the environment. In internal war the process of conflict changes the environment over time. The successful organization must adapt to a changing environment. There are two variables that reflect the organizations ability to adapt.⁵⁵

First, the ability to test reality reflects the organizations perspective on their environment. When the organization conducts a strategic reassessment, it assesses its success or failure to factors within its overall environment. This reveals the organization's ability to perceive all three levels of analysis. Organizations will identify constraints and opportunities offered by their current activity and environment. This can be compared to a historical analysis of their actual situation to see if the organization has identified all three levels and how accurately they have assessed the situation.

Second, the organization develops a strategy to meet the constraints and opportunities it identified in its assessment. This strategy reflects the level to which the organization adapts. The organization may perceive problems in the contextual environment and choose only to take action at the level of events. For example, the organization can decide to make no changes to current goals, structure or strategy but simply increase operations tempo: the fight harder approach. A competent organization plans for both short and long cycle effects. Both types of organizations must balance short and long cycle effects to be successful. In an internal war this ability becomes crucial whether for the regime or its opposition.

The adaptable organization is most capable of growth in the long cycle. The adaptable organization perceives changes in all three levels of environment and is capable of adapting to all three levels. All other factors being equal, closed organizations have more trouble changing goals and structure than open organizations. Nevertheless,

⁵⁵ This section is adapted from Edgar F. Huse and James L. Bowditch, Behavior in Organizations, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1973), pp. 310-312.

organizations are better off if they can use characteristics of both types and if they can shift relative weights between the two types in response to changing environmental conditions.

Changing structure involves change to the internal power relationships within the organization. It requires effective leadership and internal cohesion. Organizations not capable of changing goals and structures are limited in their ability to adapt. In the long cycle, this leads to lack of growth and creates opportunities for more adaptable organizations to compete with the existing organization.

2. Outcome and the Dependent Variable.

The model shows the relationship of the environment, organizational structure and decisions on the size of the organization over time. The dependent variable is the membership of the organization. DeNardo's proposition is relevant in that there is power in numbers.⁵⁶ The question remains: how much growth is necessary to win?

The amount of growth required is unique to each case due to the different contextual and task environments. There is no magic number or percentage of population recruited that guarantees success. The variable that is common across cases is the process of growth, not the quantity. No revolution has ever succeeded where the government is increasing in mobilization numbers while the opposition is decreasing in its membership numbers. Castro won with two to 3,000 members whereas Batista even at the end had larger forces. The expectation of victory led to mass defections from Batista and a bandwagoning effect of support for Castro.

Most revolutionary theorists assume a zero sum approach to internal war. If the regime loses something, the insurgents gain. Yet the environment is not zero sum. In geographic space, government presence and control are not universal. There are outlying areas with little or no presence from either the regime or counter regime organizations. Both sides seek to increase their support and control in these areas.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ DeNardo, p. 43.

⁵⁷ Sam C. Sarkesian, The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 84.

In the human dimension, social movements to change the status quo generate countermovements to preserve the status quo. Over the duration of internal conflict, many participants are activated who were previously neutral.⁵⁸ The increased polarization and mobilization of society over time create a culture of conflict. Development of this culture is simply the institutionalization of the greater mobilized content of society versus the previous neutrality. A zero sum focus only on the interaction between the regime and the insurgents overlooks the non zero sum relationship between the regime, insurgents and society.

Efforts to predict victory have consistently failed. The conditions that breed success and failures vary with each case based on its unique contextual and task environment. Yet, while the environments change, the organizational characteristics of regimes and opposition organizations remain similar. The opposition seeks to grow and the regime seeks to eliminate or neutralize the opposition organization. Both sides measure their success in terms of the size and growth of the insurgent organization. This provides a measurable dependent variable that serves as a measure of relative success for both sides.

There are four possible results of insurgent growth. First, the insurgents can grow continuously until the regime collapses such as in Mao's third stage. Second, the insurgents can be reduced to zero through internal disintegration or physical elimination. Third, insurgents can achieve stability within the system where they continue to exist within a fixed mobilizational potential. The fourth possible result is a negotiated solution. The difference between the third and fourth outcome is the presence of violence. A stable insurgent movement means that protracted war continues without end. Negotiations produce non zero sum solutions where both sides gain and lose.

F. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY.

1. Case Study Selection.

The Malayan insurrection from 1948 to 1960 formed one of the major test beds for insurgency and counterinsurgency theorists. Malaya formed one of the few cases where

⁵⁸ Garner and Zald, pp. 121-4.

a regime successfully defeated an insurgency. Malaya forms a useful case study since both the government and many captured insurgents cooperated to write the history of the struggle. Both sides are in agreement on the major facts and processes that occurred.

Northern Ireland forms the next case as it appears to contradict the British success in Malaya. The United Kingdom has proved incapable of defeating the IRA despite their previous experience in Malaya. Together, Northern Ireland and Malaya provide a robust examination of the organizational model.

Algeria is the final case study. The current crisis in Algeria from 1989 to 1995 forms an additional test of the organizational model. It does not involve the United Kingdom so that the model will not become only applicable to UK colonies. Algeria is primarily indigenous with little external involvement. Its isolated nature allows the insurgency process to be clearly examined without being tainted to any great extent by external actors.

2. Case Study Analysis.

The case studies will be examined through cross sectional and longitudinal analysis. The effectiveness of the organization will be examined at a specific point of time. The times chosen for this cross sectional approach are points in the struggle where the overall dynamism and munificence of the environment change and those specific periods where organizations conducted reassessments of their strategies. These reassessments lead to either long cycle changes of goals or structure or short cycle shifts in strategy and tactics.

The longitudinal analysis examines the interaction of the regime, opposition and society over time. In the long cycle, the contextual environment changes. The cross sectional analysis reveals insight into the short cycle effectiveness of the competing organizations. The longitudinal analysis will examine the overall competence of the organizations. The case studies will be examined in the following format:

a. Origins of Conflict.

The contextual and task environments that shaped the conflict will be examined. The organizational development phase will be reviewed. The point of departure

into the dynamic model will be the initial decision to accomplish organizational goals through the use of force.

b. Decision Points.

Establish key decision points in the internal conflict. These decision points are self defined by the organizations. Organizations change routine decision making procedures when they conduct reassessments. For example, the IRA reassessment is the Ard Fleis which is a convention of the entire leadership and has occurred twice since 1970. The Briggs Plan in Malaya was a government sponsored reassessment of the conflict.

c. Cross Sectional Analysis.

This portion of the analysis examines several aspects of the organization at decision points.

(1) The relationship between the environment and the organizational structure will be examined to determine what function they played in the nature of the organizational decision.

(2) The environment will be analyzed to ascertain the levels of munificence, dynamism and complexity.

(3) Mobilization potential will be measured as being high or low compared to the current mobilized membership of the organization versus the degree of popular support.

(4) Mobilization space will be examined to see how much freedom the organization has to act.

(5) The organizational structure will be examined as to its closed or open nature.

(6) Decisions made by the organization will be compared to its ability to implement the decision in the short and/or long cycle.

(7) Determine the relative effectiveness and efficiency of the organization in the short cycle.

d. Longitudinal analysis.

The long cycle effect on the organization, regime and society will be examined as to their effect on the contextual and task environment. The overall competence of the organization will be examined to see the cohesion, coordination, ability to test reality and adaptability of the organization. The strength of the organization over time will be examined as well as its relative efficiency. How much utility does it get from a given number of members?

e. Variables.

(1) Market Size. This represents the social strata the organization is seeking to recruit. This group represents a percentage of total population. The degree of support from this group varies over time and will be indirectly measured through an analysis of the contextual and task environment.

(2) Mobilizational Space. This is the amount of legal and geographic space allowed the organization by the contextual environment and the regime. The location and degree of space will be examined over time. Mobilization space in rural areas is of little value if the market is in urban areas.

(3) Presence. This is the location of organizational infrastructure at the level of village and local communities. The location of presence within the potential market and space is crucial to recruitment. A covert presence cannot recruit, it must have space to conduct organizational functions.

(4) Closed and Open organizational structure. The characteristics of the organizational structure will be examined and compared to Table 2-1 to determine the degree to which it is closed or open.

(5) Examination of Organizational Decisions. Short cycle decisions use existing resources to achieve maximum efficiency. Short cycle decisions focus on current actions to achieve goals. Long cycle decisions seek to expand market size, space and presence to allow further organizational growth and development. Long cycle changes may involve changes to goals and structure whereas short cycle decisions always leave goals and structure constant.

(6) Measurement of Organizational Growth. The dependent variable is organizational growth of the opposition. This will be measured as best as possible from current government and opposition estimates. Cases were selected based on reasonably reliable data with a consensus from regime and opposition as to approximate numbers. In decentralized situations, even the opposition leadership were unsure of membership numbers. Data on growth trends have more consensus and are more reliable than exact quantity. Both sides normally are in agreement on whether opposition membership is growing or declining.

(7) Adaptation. Adaptability is the ability of the organization to perceive and react to changes in its environment. The organization will be analyzed at its decision points to identify at what level the organization perceives its opportunities or constraints and at what level it takes corrective action. An adaptable organization reacts to changes in the contextual and task environment as well as responding to specific events.

III. THE MALAYAN INSURGENCY.

A. INTRODUCTION.

The insurgency in Malaya illustrates the failure of an insurgent organization to adapt to its environment and its defeat by the regime. Nevertheless, it took 12 years for the regime to consolidate control. The initial lack of competence exhibited by the regime exacerbated the situation. Malaya allows the process of the insurgency model and the abilities of the competing organizations to be clearly examined.

B. CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT.

1. Geography and History.

Malaya is dominated by inhabitable mountains and jungle. In 1947, 72% of the population lived along a 90 mile strip along the western coast.⁵⁹ The Malaccan Straits are a natural choke point between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The strategic location of Malaya caused European powers to fight for control of the area so as to dominate trade. The Dutch and Portuguese had an early presence that was eliminated by the British in 1818. The United Kingdom controlled the three major ports of Singapore, Malacca and Penang. These ports were called the Straits Settlements and became British Protectorates ruled by a British Governor.

The economic success of the Straits Settlements led to the rapid introduction of a large Chinese population to the Settlements and the rest of Malaya. The native Malaya population was too small to support the British need for labor. The British brought in labor from southern China to serve as workers on the rubber plantations and tin mines and as merchants to support the economic boom. In 1921 the Chinese population in Malaya was 855,000. By 1947 the number was 1.8 million.⁶⁰ The Chinese population was concentrated in the urban areas. The Chinese constituted 62% of the urban population and reached 80%

⁵⁹N. Ginsburg and C. F. Roberts, Malaya, (University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1958). p. 48.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 58.

in the port of Singapore. As numbers increased, the Chinese expanded from the Straits Settlements to the Malayan peninsula to work in the tin mines and rubber plantations and surrounding areas.

2. Politics.

In the 1870s, the wealth generated by the tin mines led to conflict. The Chinese kongsi communities fought each other over jobs while the Malay sultans fought to control the tin regions. The British intervened to control the situation and created the Federated Malay States. The Federated States retained sovereignty of the Malay sultans, but with more centralized control. State councils contained a British Resident, the Malay chiefs and leading Chinese businessmen. Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan formed the Federated States, while the other unfederated states retained the traditional decentralized Malay political structure.

British policy led to a mutually profitable alliance with the Malay ruling class. They developed a modern extractive economy in western Malaya using immigrant labor. The British maintained the Malay rulers in political power and protected the traditional Malay society.⁶¹ As a result of importing immigrants, the Malays became a minority in their own country. The political power of the Malays did not reflect the economic power of the immigrants.

During World War II, Malaya was occupied by the Japanese. The Japanese used Malay collaborators to rule and used great repression against the Chinese community. After the war, the British Colonial Office developed a new political plan for Malaya. The Malayan Union formed a centralized government over the federated and unfederated states. This reduced the authority of the Malay rulers and was bitterly resented in the Malay community. The Malayan Union was never fully implemented during its existence from April 1946 to February, 1948 due to Malay opposition. Singapore was omitted from the Union due to its large Chinese population. Finally, in February, 1948 the Federation of

⁶¹ David J. Steinberg, ed., In Search of Southeast Asia, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 322.

Malaya was created ruled by a British High Commissioner and the Malay sultans. The Federation restored some of the rights of the Malays and offered concessions to the Chinese and Indian communities.

3. Economics.

The ethnic communities in Malaya worked in different occupations in separate areas. The Malays formed a peasant society based on rice agriculture. The Malays formed the army, police and administration of the states. The non elite Malay population remained rural and poor.⁶² The elite Malays filled the government positions not reserved for the British.

The Chinese and Indian communities dominated the country's wealth and economic power. First, they provided the labor for the plantations and mines. Second, they formed the merchant and artisan class that supported the workers and became a thriving urban commercial enterprise.

4. Social Factors.

In 1948, the Malay, Chinese and Indian populations formed separate communities within Malayan society. They lived apart from each other, spoke different languages, worked at different occupations, followed separate religions and customs and had different political organizations. The Malays regarded themselves as citizens of Malaya, while many Chinese and Indians worked in Malaya to earn enough wealth to return to their native countries. In 1947 the estimated population of Malaya was 2.6 million Chinese, 2.5 million Malay and 600,000 Indians. From 1947 to 1960 the population was assessed as about 6.3 million, with 50% Malay, 37-8% Chinese, 10-11% Indian and 2% other.⁶³ The changes between the 1947 estimate and the later estimate reflects emigration of some Chinese back to China and the higher birth rate of the Malays.

⁶² Nena Vreeland, Area Handbook For Malaysia, (Washington: HQDA, 1982), p. 275.

⁶³ Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 63.

a. Malays.

The Malaysians lived in a rice oriented peasant society. The majority of Malaysians subsisted at minimum levels by growing rice. In 1913 and 1933, the Malays passed laws which granted themselves sole authority to grow rice. This prevented Chinese expansion into agriculture and encouraged the majority of the Chinese to live in urban areas. The British favored the Malays and relied on them to ensure stability and legitimacy of the British imposed political system. Urban Malays filled the administration, police, military and teaching positions. The Malay standard of living improved under the British. Their favorable political status enhanced their loyalty to the British throughout the Emergency.

b. Chinese.

The composition and dynamics of Chinese society provided both the origins and ultimate defeat of the insurgency. Malaysian Chinese came from Southern China. The culture in this area is family oriented. Government provides little or no services to local communities. Chinese relied on their own family and local community to provide order and communal services. The extended family unit of the clan became the most important institution in their society. Entire villages are made up of clans. In the mountainous areas of Southern China, clan elements that are geographically separated from the main clan form a subclan. The subclan is empowered to take on the responsibilities of the primary clan. Subclans retain strong social and economic ties to the primary clan. Chinese communities in Malaya became subclans of their clans in mainland China.

The clan structure explains the heterogeneity of Chinese society in Malaya. Different clans of Southern China were represented in the different clans in the Chinese in Malaya. The Malaysian Chinese speak nine different, mutually incomprehensible dialects. The Chinese live in dialect groups of villages and neighborhoods. The six major dialects include Hakka, Fuchon, Cantonese, Hokkien, Tiechiu and Hailam.⁶⁴ The dialect communities maintain links with their home region in China and others of their dialect in

⁶⁴ Vreeland, p. 100.

Malaya. These communities remained isolated from their other Chinese, Malay and Indian neighbors.

The local Chinese community is further divided by the benevolent associations. There are over 3,000 corporate associations in Malaya based on family, occupation and dialect. Associations provide economic and social support to its members. A sub group of the benevolent associations are the secret societies, such as the Triad Brotherhood, Wa Kei and An Bin Hoey. The secret societies are more political and more involved in organized crime than the benevolent associations.

The associations indicate the patronage basis of Chinese society. The associations provide credit and is the chief method in providing capital to Chinese entrepreneurs. Between 80 and 90% of all private employers remain Chinese as late as the 1980s.⁶⁵ These employers tend to only employ Chinese of their own dialect group. The associations thus provide jobs, credit, kinship and other social ties for its members.

The credit and economic roles of the associations led to business men becoming the clan leaders of the Chinese community. The business leaders exerted great control in the Chinese society through their political and economic domination.⁶⁶ Local villages called *kongsis* elected their own leaders, who were normally the leader of the local clan and association. The larger businessmen formed the *towkays* who controlled a decentralized network of clans by control of patronage and credit. The government exerted little control in Chinese communities. As rival Chinese leaders struggled for power, the secret societies degenerated into criminal organizations that used coercion to control local populations. Secret societies became underground governments that fought to control the recruitment and immigration of Chinese laborers. Clan leaders exerted power in proportion to the numbers of people they controlled.

WWII disrupted the traditional control of the clans. Chinese persecution forced the leaders to flee. It took years for the traditional power network to be reestablished. The

⁶⁵ Vreeland, p. 128.

⁶⁶ Vreeland, p. 128.

traditional patron-client relationships of the clans and associations were disrupted. Secret societies were also damaged by the Japanese. In the immediate years following the war, the *towkays* took years to reestablish their business and patronage networks.⁶⁷

c. Indians.

Indians were brought into Malaya since they caused fewer control problems than the fractious Chinese. They served as middlemen and money lenders in the cities and provided some of the labor in the plantations and mines. Indian government officials monitored their working conditions and welfare. The Indians were fluent in English and familiar with British policies and administration from experience with the British government in India. The Indians were sympathetic to the British/Malay side throughout the conflict.

C. ORIGINS OF CONFLICT.

The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) developed within the Chinese community from 1922 until the start of the Emergency in 1948. This organization had little appeal outside of the Chinese community. Thus, the social movement's maximum potential was the total Chinese population of Malaya which numbered about 2.6 million and represented about 38% of the total population. Ethnic divisions in Malayan society allowed the MCP to be clearly examined within its Social Movement Industry (SMI) defined by the Chinese community. The competition between the MCP, the government, and organizations in the competing Malay and Indian SMIs form the task environment for the MCP.

1. Organizational Development of the MCP.

The Chinese Communist Party first sent an agent to Singapore in 1925. Initial efforts were under the supervision of the Kuomintang in mainland China until the Kuomintang-Communist split of 1927. These initial efforts in Singapore led to the foundation of the Malayan Communist Party in 1930. Police raids in 1931 nearly eliminated the incipient organization. During the 1930s the party enjoyed a marginal

⁶⁷ Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 52-3.

existence on urban labor action spurred by economic discontent caused by the world wide depression.⁶⁸ The MCP failed to grow because it lacked both mobilization potential and space. "The Communists did not gain much ground, owing to their general unpopularity with the people and to efficient police action."⁶⁹

The MCP represented a threat to the existing Chinese society. It did not recognize the business and clan leaders of the Chinese community. The traditional leadership maintained control of the bulk of the 2.6 million Chinese. The MCP faced opposition from both the regime and preexisting organizations within the Chinese community. Membership of the MCP consisted of disaffected intellectuals, some radical teachers and some youth and labor activists. MCP members were primarily from the Hakka and Hailam clans and had little support in the other dialect groups.⁷⁰

2. World War II.

The Japanese invasion of China created a surge in Chinese preferences for anti Japanese organizations. The MCP had an estimated 12,000 members and 10,000 active sympathizers in 1933.⁷¹ The imminent war with Japan led to regime toleration although struggles with the clans continued. Police pressure eased and the MCP was tolerated although their overall mobilization potential remained low. WWII led to the invasion and occupation of Malaya by Japan. The Japanese repressed the Chinese community and sought to kill all Chinese communists. Repression not only failed to eliminate the MCP, but helped to create a favorable situation for the MCP. Japanese actions removed the British government and disrupted the structure of Chinese society. Chinese business

⁶⁸ Frances L. Starnes, "Communism in Malaysia: A Multifront Struggle", in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 221-255. p. 223.

⁶⁹ Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966), p. 23.

⁷⁰ John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1968-54, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 8.

⁷¹ Coates, p. 9. O'Ballance, p. 24.

leaders were forced to flee. Japanese oppression and the economic pressures of war caused some 400,000 Chinese to leave the urban areas and become squatters along the jungle fringe.

The war transformed the previously weak, urban organization into a stronger, rural movement. The MCP was forced out of the cities by the Japanese and was virtually wiped out in Singapore. Nevertheless, the war gave the MCP potential and space in the rural areas that they had never previously enjoyed. The MCP was the only organization in the rural areas due to the war. This allowed them to monopolize the mobilization potential and space available in the squatter villages. The MCP formed the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in 1942.

As a guerrilla force, MPAJA was incompetent and repeatedly failed in their attacks. The Japanese responded harshly, capturing and killing many Chinese using indiscriminate terror. This increased the number of squatters as more Chinese fled the urban areas to avoid the Japanese. The Japanese retained control in the urban areas, while the MCP existed in the jungle. During the war, MPAJA killed a few hundred Japanese while killing 2,542 Malaysians.⁷² Most of the victims were Chinese opponents of the MCP. The primary focus of the MCP was to build their organization.

The Malay community tolerated and in many cases cooperated with the Japanese. Their motivation was more anti-Chinese than pro-Japanese.⁷³ Malays joined the police and were used to hunt down the MCP and MPAJA. This increased communal tensions. Initial MCP reprisals at the end of the war further increased feelings of hostility between the Chinese and Malay ethnic groups.

3. Post War Period - 1946-1948.

The end of the war left the MCP the only established organization in the country. The MCP and MPAJA enjoyed a fairly stable environment in the jungle for the last two

⁷² J. Bowyer Bell, On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 81.

⁷³ O'Ballance, p. 42.

years of war. The MCP retained a highly selective organization structure with party membership restricted with long initiation periods and many tests of commitment. This structure worked well during the occupation since it was survivable and Japanese oppression drove new recruits into the organization. The relative lack of dynamism in the nevironment from 1942-5 favored the actions of a mechanistic, selective organization.

The end of the war changed the dynamism of the environment. The Japanese government ended, and a badly fractured British government returned. The MCP had a brief opportunity to seize power before the British return. They hesitated, which is not unusual for a selective organization facing a changing environment. "Lai Teck knew that Communist plans for a coup d'etat, if ever there had been one, had passed by."⁷⁴ The British reoccupied Malaya before the MCP could react.

The MCP faced a crucial decision of what to do after the war. It appeared too late for a seizure of power. The environment was unstable and dynamic. The MCP chose to become an open political party and to disband MPAJA. Yet, the selective organization of the MCP remained. The MCP chose to stay selective in its inner core and use front organizations on the periphery to mobilize the Chinese. The MPAJA Old Comrades organization provided a mobilization framework if the MCP decided to recreate its army. The New Democratic Youth League served to recruit students and a variety of trade organizations recruited laborers.⁷⁵

Post war Malaya went through economic and political turmoil from 1946 to 1948. The British reestablished their own administration and then proposed the 1946 constitution. This caused widespread resentment among the Malays and led to the creation of Malay political organizations to preserve the Malay political status quo. The economy was under severe pressure immediately after the war, which led to widespread labor unrest.

The MCP faced open political space and munificent mobilization potential for the first time in its existence. They were a legal political party. The Chinese clans and

⁷⁴ O'Ballance, p. 64.

⁷⁵ Coates, p. 13.

business community were in disarray following the war. The war gave the MCP presence in rural areas. Labor troubles allowed the MCP to establish an extensive presence in the labor movement. Facing no opposition within the SMI, and favorable potential, space and presence the MCP grew rapidly.

The MCP strategy of power through the political process ultimately failed. The explanation involves MCP mistakes in the task environment and the failure to adapt to gradual changes in the contextual environment. In the task environment, the MCP's selective organization prevented growth as a mobilizational organization. The MCP effort to dominate and manipulate the multiracial Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action led to the collapse of multi racial efforts in 1947.⁷⁶ This eliminated the opportunity to take advantage of the massive Malay discontent caused by the British imposed Malayan Union of 1946. The Behavior of the MCP contributed to the mobilization of a Malayan counter movement.

The MCP also lost control of the labor union due to its selective structure and failure to adapt to changes in the contextual environment. The MCP controlled 214 of 277 labor unions in 1947. The improving economy alleviated most of the grievances of the laborers. The MCP abuse of labor union funds and activities for its own political ends led to widespread resentment.⁷⁷ In the task environment, the MCP effort to use labor agitation to disrupt the government led to a government counteraction. The British administration enacted legislation to eliminate the MCP space in the unions. Union membership was alienated by the MCP's actions and supported this effort.

MCP failure in 1946 to 1948 is crucial to understanding their later failure in the rebellion. Its effort to establish a broad political effort failed due to its intransigence with other organizations. The MCP turned to its advantage in the labor unions. This effort failed due to the contextual elimination of labor grievances and the counteraction to close this space by the regime. Use of terror alienated supporters and inflamed a Malay

⁷⁶ Coates, p. 14.

⁷⁷ John Gullick, Malaysia: Economic Expansion and National Unity, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p.86. Coates, p. 14.

countermovement. From October, 1945 until December, 1947 the MCP killed or abducted 191 people.⁷⁸ It faced a situation where its numbers and power would inevitably wane. Its actions alienated its potential Chinese supporters and the British, Malay and Indian communities.

D. THE EMERGENCY.

1. 1948: The Decision to Start an Insurgency.

The contextual environment offered advantages and disadvantages for the MCP. The government administration did not reestablish nationwide presence following the war. Political turmoil caused by the shift from the Malayan Union to the Federation of Malaya inflamed all three ethnic groups against the British and each other. The economy had not yet recovered from the Japanese occupation.⁷⁹ The Chinese community was still in flux. There were few Chinese in the government administration, police or army. Chinese business elites tried to reestablish their control of the urban areas. Meanwhile, the MCP retained presence among the 500,000 Chinese squatters and faced no other organizational rivals in this community.

The MCP drew its support from youth, labor and squatters. Members of the MCP came from the Hakka and Hailam clans, representing only two of the five largest dialect groups. Within the class structure of the Chinese community, the business and middle classes supported the government, the urban and rural labor were coopted or coerced in the labor movement leaving only the squatters and disaffected intellectuals as reliable supporters of the party. The MCP represented the bottom of Chinese society. It challenged the government and the traditional clan leadership of the Chinese ethnic group. Systems

⁷⁸ Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1966), pp. 26-7.

⁷⁹ Komer, p. 6.

theory predicts balancing behavior against the MCP from within the Chinese community, from the Malay community and from the British-Malay government.⁸⁰

The British faced a bleak situation. The Malayan Union led to mobilization of the Malays around a new organization called the United Malays National Organization (UNMO). The decision to placate the Malays anger with the 1946 constitution led to the creation of the Federation of Malaya in February, 1948. The move to the Federation inflamed the Chinese and Indian communities because it lowered their gains from the Union and left the issue of citizenship unresolved. Immigrants feared that if the British handed over Malaya to the Malays they would lose all of their economic and political power. British actions led to dynamic movements and countermovements. This created an opportunity for the MCP.

Conditions in the task environment favored the MCP. Government administration, police and army organizations were in disarray and not prepared to face an insurgency. The British faced severe economic problems at home and could not afford the costs of a war. The Malay UNMO had just been established and was still building its organization. Chinese clans and business leaders were still consolidating their position and feared to risk retaliation from the MCP. A window of opportunity opened for the MCP. The Chinese commercial classes were forming new organizations and fighting the MCP for control and presence in the urban areas.⁸¹

⁸⁰ MPABA contained one Malay regiment in Pahang. This unit attrited away during 1949 to 1950. The Malays and Indians in MPABA were treated poorly so that few remained and no new recruits joined from the immigrant communities. The MCP remained a Chinese organization within the Chinese SMI.

⁸¹ The Kuomintang were reformed in 1946 supported by the paramilitary San Min Chu I Youth Corps. Clashes between the MCP and KMT continued through 1946-8. After the MCP fled the cities, the KMT and secret societies consolidated the urban areas and prevented any MCP return. See Michael Stenson, "The Ethnic and Urban Bases of Communist Revolt in Malaya", in John W. Lewis, ed., Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 125-150. p.139.

The MCP retained a selective organizational structure. It used a Federation level central committee, three regional bureaus, ten state committees and fifty district committees.⁸² The party controlled both the political and military leadership positions. The MPAJA was resurrected as the Malayan People's Anti- British Army, later renamed the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). It was organized into regiments supporting the state committees. An auxiliary organization called the Min Yuen maintained presence in the squatter villages. The Min Yuen provided recruits, logistics and information to the MCP and MRLA. In 1948, the MCP contained about 3,000 members. The new MPAJA/MRLA had about 3,000 guerrillas and the satellite and front organizations contained 50,000 active supporters.

The MCP protected its selective structure by using its hierarchy of organizations to screen out less committed members. The Min Yuen served at the local level using contact nets to recruit members. Following recruitment, the MRLA served as the next point to indoctrinate and test members. Party membership included only those passing an extended testing and vetting process. The associational base of recruitment in the villages changed the urban nature of the MCP. Illiterate peasants became the new members of the MRLA as the old student and labor networks dissolved. An estimated 70% of the MRLA came from the squatters and rural laborers. The leadership of the MCP remained the urban disaffected intellectuals from the Hakka and Hailam clans.

The MCP decision to start an insurgency indicates the organizational problems that plagued the MCP. In 1947 the MCP leader, Lai Teck, stole the party treasury and fled the organization. Chin Peng became the new leader he was only 26 years old, ambitious and inexperienced. The new leadership favored armed revolt as a means of consolidating their own power.⁸³ The new leadership of the MCP was young, highly centralized, insular and intolerant of alternative views after Lai Teck's defection. The MCP had increased its

⁸² Komer, p. 7.

⁸³ Stubbs, p.58.

strength during the war, its efforts to use peaceful agitation failed. Success of the Communist guerrilla war in China increased their expectations of victory in Malaya.

The MCP decided to start an armed insurgency during a Central Executive Committee meeting from March 17-21, 1948.⁸⁴ The plan was naive and beyond the capabilities of the organization. The MCP adopted a three month plan for victory. In April, widespread labor unrest would destabilize the government. In May, large political demonstrations would provide momentum for the MCP against the government and would shift expectations in favor of an MCP victory. In June, an armed insurrection would sweep the party into power.⁸⁵

The armed insurrection itself would follow four stages. The first stage would consist of guerrilla attacks to chase European planters and government and police agents out of the countryside. In the second stage, the MCP would establish its own presence in the rural areas and establish liberated areas. The third stage would expand the rural bases and seize local villages and small towns. The final stage would see an armed attack against the cities to drive out the remaining British presence.⁸⁶

The MCP anticipated no counter reaction. They counted on the fall of Malaya with virtually no British or Malay reaction. The MCP had not reactivated MPAJA since 1945. It also lacked organization and training for conducting an insurgency. The MPAJA tactical performance in WWII had been extremely poor. The MCP plan reflected a rural focus for an urban based organization. The MCP expected no action to be taken against its overt labor activists. The MCP expected that it could rapidly create a new organization structure, expand its presence and conduct operations. The MCP plan expected that immediate action would overcome the need for extensive organizational preparation. The MCP lacked

⁸⁴ Stubbs, p. 60.

⁸⁵ O'Ballance, p. 78.

⁸⁶ Coates, pp. 49-50. O'Ballance, p. 78. Komer, p. 9. Thompson, p. 65.

logistics for insurgency, had poor communications and relied on jungle bases isolated from contact with the population.⁸⁷

2. Systemic Interaction 1948-51.

a. Initial Actions in 1948.

The MCP started interaction in the task environment with a rising tide of violence. 107 terrorist attacks occurred between January and June of 1948.⁸⁸ Insurgents attacked both regime forces and Chinese clan members who opposed the MCP. The government reacted by outlawing the MCP and closing political space. The MCP was caught by surprise. The communist labor effort evaporated. The MCP activists were arrested or fled to the jungle. The preferences of the urban workers were clearly revealed as they went back to work and ignored the plight of the MCP. The MCP front organizational structure of meant that only a few labor activists were party members. Urban presence of the MCP was driven underground or eliminated. The MCP never regained any significant presence in the urban areas.

The urban political organization of the MCP was unprepared to function as a rural military organization. Their communications system that worked well in the cities proved useless in the jungle. Without communications, central control rapidly collapsed in an organizational structure that placed a premium on central command and control. The MCP, MRLA and Min Yuen were poorly coordinated at national, regional and district levels. Militarily, the combat units tended to operate in large units of up to 300 and focused on creating base areas when they should have conducted small guerrilla and propaganda operations. Further, the shift to rural insurgency caused the decline of MCP urban presence and forced the organization to move from the Chinese dominated urban areas to the Malay dominated rural areas.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Coates, p. 50.

⁸⁸ Thompson, p. 27.

⁸⁹ Stenson, p. 146.

The MCP insurgency led to both regime and societal reactions. The regime lacked organizational manpower and presence. Its plan focused on holding actions with an emphasis on reorganizing and preparing the organizational structure to handle the insurgency. Therefore, the insurgents relied on a strategy of current actions, while the regime chose a strategy of organizing for future action. Malay and Indian groups felt equally threatened by the Chinese based insurgency and both groups supported the government. Malays mobilized themselves through UNMO while the regime mobilized many police, administrators and soldiers from Malays.

The regime declared a State of Emergency on 18 June 1948. This closed the legal space of the MCP and increased government power. Initial government reaction reflected an organization not prepared for conflict. This response was ill conceived and poorly implemented.⁹⁰ Government authorities believed that they could crush the MCP through police and military methods. Excessive government use of force alienated the Chinese community and increased sympathy for the MCP. The government regarded all armed Chinese as bandits including the MPAJA, secret societies and Kuomintang elements who supported the Chinese business leaders. Excessive force included the burning of entire villages such as the destruction of 62 homes in Pulau in November 1948.⁹¹

While the short cycle actions of the government produced counterproductive effects, the long cycle organizational effort eventually produced favorable results. The police and military numbered about 10,000 each in 1947. Within two years, the size of the police had tripled through the recruitment of Malays. The reorganization of the administration, army, police and intelligence services would not be effective until 1950. In the short run, the reorganization increased the turbulence and decreased the efficiency and effectiveness of the government. However, in the long run, these efforts created a revitalized and efficient organization. Its effectiveness still depended on how it would be used.

⁹⁰ Stubbs, p. 66.

⁹¹ Stubbs, p. 73.

b. Tactical Adjustments in 1949.

In 1949, short cycle tactical adjustments occurred on both sides. Initial MCP efforts resulted in the loss of their urban organization. The MCP was forced to reorganize as a rural guerrilla army. This led to a dropoff in activity levels which the government incorrectly perceived as a prelude to victory.⁹² The MCP realized that its three month victory plan had failed. The organization kept the plan for rural insurgency, but adjusted tactics for a protracted guerrilla and terrorist campaign. This effort signalled the failure of a Mao phase II campaign and the shift to a Phase I plan of violence to disrupt the government.⁹³

The MCP mobilization potential declined to 500,000 Chinese squatters since the collapse of their urban networks. Two million Chinese in the urban areas remained neutral. The MCP use of violence against Chinese to coerce support meant that the squatters were trapped between government and MCP violence. The MCP had an organizational presence advantage in the villages with the Min Yuen while the government lacked presence in the Chinese villages. This allowed the MCP to discriminately identify and kill informers, while government efforts were indiscriminate. Within the squatter community, the MCP retained space and presence although potential was declining. The lack of any other organization within the squatter communities guaranteed the continued existence of the MCP. "Communist influence can exist largely because of the absence of civil administration and government control in areas concerned."⁹⁴

⁹² Some analysts believe that vigorous regime action could have ended the insurgency in 1949. This ignores the fact that both sides were in a reorganization phase. Neither side was capable of efficient or effective action in 1949. For a typical view that the British should have finished the war in 1949, see Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs, (New York, Bantam Books, 1971), p. 69.

⁹³ Sarkesian, p. 68. The MCP resolution of June, 1949 emphasized the effort to create rural base areas and drive the government back into the cities. The party realized that it faced strong Malay opposition but this led to no change in the political or military plan. See Coates pp. 58-63.

⁹⁴ Sarkesian, p. 70.

The government continued efforts to organize. Government reorganization and integration of political and military strategy appeared ineffective and led to demands for more force from the European planters and Malays. In the long cycle, government patience and persistence proved crucial.

c. The Briggs Plan 1950-1952.

LTG Sir Harold Briggs was assigned from the retired list as the Director of Operations under the High Commissioner in 1950. He developed the Briggs plan which was a combined civil-military scheme that reorganized the government administration, police and army. It created an integrated structure between the administration, police and army from national to state to district levels. The war was made a police responsibility supported by the army.

The plan took advantage of the New Village concept which called for resettlement of the squatters into villages under government control. This created government presence and isolated the guerrillas from their support base. The concept legalized squatter land ownership. The Malay sultans were reluctant to donate land but over time land was provided following negotiations.

The resettlement plan changed the contextual environment. Urbanization of the squatters living in villages eliminated the potential, space and presence of the insurgents. This strategy involved risk since the initial settlements had organizational problems and could potentially have alienate the squatters from the government. A fortuitous change in the contextual environment proved decisive. The Korean War increased the world wide price for rubber and tin. For the regime, this provided the funding to pay for the program. The squatters experienced rising wages which reduced economic disruption caused by resettlement.⁹⁵

The reforms under Briggs improved the efficiency of the government and especially its ability to apply force discriminately. Expansion of police presence in the local villages increased government knowledge of insurgent activities. This improved targeting of the

⁹⁵ Coates, p. 93.

insurgents without negative side effects against Chinese neutrals caused by excessive force. However, increased government efficiency did not increase effectiveness. The political grievances of the Chinese remained unaddressed leaving mobilization potential intact. If the government eased pressure on the insurgents, the insurgents would grow.

d. MCP Reassessment of 1951.

The impact of the Briggs plan, MCP failure to defeat the security forces and establish base areas and terrorism against the Chinese clearly revealed the failure of the MCP plan and waning support. Expectations of victory were decreasing and momentum of the insurgency slowed. This led to internal problems within the MCP and Chin Peng suppressed a power struggle within the MCP in 1950.⁹⁶ The momentum of the insurgency had slowed.

In September, 1951, the MCP conducted a reassessment of their strategy and operations. The MCP Central Executive Committee met in the jungle. The result of the meeting was a new directive issued on 1 October, 1951.⁹⁷ Nearly 100 pages long, it outlined seven directives and provided a thorough analysis of the current situation from the perspective of the MCP. The party acknowledged problems in logistics and use of excessive terror against the population. It decided to shift strategy from a military struggle to an effort to rebuild Min Yuen logistic and support infrastructure. Previously, the Min Yuen existed to support the MRLA, now that situation was reversed.⁹⁸ The army reorganized, eliminating regiments, battalions and companies. Platoon sized forces would support activities at the local district level.

⁹⁶ O'Ballance, p. 111. Coates, pp. 63-4. Senior party officials Lam Swee, Lim Tatt, Siew Lau and Lau Siew objected to the autocratic nature of the Central Committee. The Central Committee appointed themselves and tolerated no questioning of their authority. The objectors questioned the failed military strategy and excessive violence against Chinese. All were purged or shot.

⁹⁷ Coates, pp. 65-69. Stubbs, pp. 148-151.

⁹⁸ Stubbs, p. 149.

Party directives included an effort to increase mobilization potential. Violence and sabotage was to be restricted if it adversely affected the local population. Efforts were made to recruit Indians and Malays. The directives called for reduction of overt racism and increased political activity in the towns. Secret society members were targeted for recruitment efforts. This effort was to be strictly limited to individuals. The MCP feared that coalitions threatened central control.⁹⁹ This fear doomed efforts of the leadership to expand potential. The MCP placed security concerns over growth. Efforts to expand into the towns and to recruit Malays, Indians and Triad members were futile and increased the determination of the other communities to oppose the MCP.

It took up to 18 months for the October Directives to reach outlying units. The communication problems meant that the MCP had no ability to maintain its centralized command procedures. The organizational structure encouraged a continuance of sustained violence. The military organization was incapable of carrying out political agitation. Some units were forced to return to coercion against the Chinese. In the absence of coercion, many squatters stopped supporting the MCP. The MCP failed to address its organizational problem and the contextual problem of trying to operate in the Malay dominated rural area or the jungle.

The MCP directives included many words on a desire to expand potential and space. The actual impact of the directives made the organization more selective and more survivable. Shifting to smaller units and jungle bases made the MCP and MRLA harder to find. Even though the declared aim was to use mobilizational means, the organizational changes made the organization more selective. The MCP increased efficiency, but effectiveness decreased. The new efforts simply increased the rate of decline.

⁹⁹ The MCP feared any coalition would dilute their control and could lead to the organization being coopted by the other coalition members. One document summarized the MCP view on the Triads: "Secret Societies are organizations of robbers... they are capable of being utilized by the British, the Kuomintang or the revolution...we should penetrate them by political methods, and persuade their members to join the revolution." Cited in Wilfred Blythe, The Impact of Secret Societies in Malaya, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 423.

e. Templer Reorganizes the Regime, 1952-1954.

The Briggs plan led to some improvements but most of its directives were not implemented when Briggs left Malaya at the end of 1951. After the High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney was killed in an ambush in October, 1951 the British needed to replace both the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations. On 15 January, 1952, Sir Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner. He decided to assume the duties of the Director of Operations as well. One man now controlled both the civil and military effort in Malaya. Templer used his authority to fully implement the Briggs plan. Templer's leadership was decisive in ending the Emergency.

4. The Counter Mobilization of the Chinese.

Previously, the British efforts focused on recruiting Malays to oppose the MCP. The majority of the Chinese community remained neutral. The 500,000 squatters were placed in the New Villages, guarded by Malays. The 2 million Chinese in the urban areas remained out of the conflict. Templer led the effort to offer the immigrant communities citizenship and a role in the government.¹⁰⁰ Previous efforts to recruit Chinese in the administration, army and police had failed. By changing the political rights of the Chinese, he gave the Chinese positive incentives to take an active role. The key factor in eliminating the mobilization potential of the MCP was this countermobilization effort. New organizations created presence and space in the Chinese community. The political and economic changes in Malaya created the potential that allowed the recruitment of the Chinese.

The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was founded by Tan Cheng Lock in February, 1949. Its membership increased to about 100,000 in its first year. The MCA, founded and led by the Chinese business leaders, recruited through the existing clan and benevolent association social networks. The MCA used the growing wealth of the Chinese upper and middle classes to support the New Village program. Before 1952, the MCA

¹⁰⁰ On September 14, 1952, 1.2 million Chinese and 180,000 Indians became Malayan citizens. Barber, p. 178.

"was very much a businessman's pressure group rather than a mass party. But it did provide a means by which moderate Chinese activists could participate in the evolving political process."¹⁰¹

The MCA from 1949 to 1952 "was a group of leaders in search of followers."¹⁰² The urban business community provided the leaders and membership. This resulted in little organizational presence in the rural areas. The government failed to support the MCA. The government wanted immediate, measurable short cycle results of the MCA's effectiveness against the MCP before they would give more political power to the MCA. The MCA needed power in the short cycle which would increase Chinese expectations and allow growth. The government emphasis on short cycle results prevented a potential long cycle gain.

The MCA was caught in a vicious circle. It could not mobilize Chinese grassroots support until the government gave its leaders some powers, yet the government was unwilling to hand over these powers until the MCA had demonstrated that it fully represented the Chinese community.¹⁰³

The political changes in 1952 increased the mobilization potential for the MCA and led to massive growth. Government promises to grant independence was followed by local and state elections. These elections demonstrated that power was available in the political process. The success of the MCA in these elections led to a rapid spiral of growth. The MCA created local presence in the New Villages and won seats on the village councils. MCA welfare programs provided tangible benefits that increased the selective incentives supporting the MCA recruiting drive. The MCA had between 160-200,000 members at the end of 1951 and was growing rapidly.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Gullick, p. 93.

¹⁰² Stubbs, p. 203.

¹⁰³ Stubbs, p. 205.

¹⁰⁴ Stubbs, p. 205.

5. The Creation of the Alliance Party.

Efforts to form a multiethnic political party from 1948 to 1952 failed due to deep social, language and cultural barriers. In 1952, the government cooperated with the leading Malay and Chinese leaders to form an Alliance Party. Each ethnic group formed its own political party. The Malay UNMO, the Chinese MCA and the new Malayan Indian Congress each mobilized support within their ethnic communities. The three organizations then formed a power sharing arrangement so that the individual rights of each ethnic group was represented by its own organization. This solution proved very popular and the Alliance party swept the local elections. Victory in the local elections increased the expectations that the Alliance Party could be successful and that the new government could protect the concerns of the ethnic communities. The rapid increase in political mobilization eroded the remaining potential support for the MCP.

6. The Expansion of Regime Forces.

The administration, police and army forces all grew rapidly from 1948 to 1952. By 1952, the turbulence caused by the rapid organizational changes subsided. The new forces were trained, organized and functioning efficiently. Growth plateaued and the police and army hit their peak strength in 1952-3.

The police forces experienced massive growth. From 9,000 members in 1948, the police and police auxiliary peaked under Templer. In 1952, the police had 26,154 regulars and 99,000 auxiliaries. There were 39,870 Special Constables also reinforcing the police.¹⁰⁵ The nationwide registration plan of 1948 created the information base for a highly effective Special Branch. Increased organizational presence and structural changes gave the regime a massive intelligence advantage. The police used checklists to account for each dead and captured guerrilla by name. Virtually, the entire MCP and MRLA membership had been identified.

The army also grew from 10 battalions in 1948 to 19 battalions in 1950. Total numbers increased from 10,000 in 1948 to a peak strength of 55,000 in 1953. This peak

¹⁰⁵ Coates, p. 123.

includes 25,000 from the United Kingdom and 10,000 Ghurkas.¹⁰⁶ Battalions reorganized and retrained to support company level operations. The battalions worked for the local district and state war executive committees. Operational responsibilities remained below the division level.

The Home Guard program armed and equipped villagers to defend their own communities. From 1948 to 1952 this remained primarily a Malay program and the Malay Home Guard expanded to 100,000 members guarding 2,000 villages. Templer decided to mobilize and arm Chinese Home Guards in 1952. By the end of the year 50,000 Chinese protected the New Villages.¹⁰⁷

The administration was also reorganized. Traditionally, the Malayan Administrative Service was only open to the British and Malays. In 1953, Templer convinced the Malay sultans to open the service to all ethnic groups. Local Chinese were recruited as Chinese Affairs Officers but the economic boom caused by the Korean War made it difficult to recruit Chinese.¹⁰⁸ Openings in the private sector created better opportunities than those opened in the public sector. The expansion of government presence from national to village level was not as efficient as the police and military expansion. Problems with training, quality control and corruption meant constant effort to improve the system. Nevertheless, the expansion did increase government presence and control, and allowed government programs to reach villages. This increased the expectations and selective incentives available to the regime to recruit for the administration and Home Guard and to favorably influence local preferences.

Growth of government forces expanded government presence to every village. The village police post became the decisive tactical element in Malaya.¹⁰⁹ The army performed

¹⁰⁶ Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, 2nd edition, (New York: William Morrow, 1994), p. 566.

¹⁰⁷ Stubbs, p. 158.

¹⁰⁸ Stubbs, p. 162.

¹⁰⁹ Asprey, p. 570.

duties as an area reinforcement to protect the villages in a district. Templer deferred occupation of newly constructed New Villages until a functional police post was established. The police post, reinforced by the local Home Guard, guaranteed long term presence of the government. Police units gathered information on the local population that led to the elimination of local MCP presence. Intelligence is a function of established, permanent and secure local presence.¹¹⁰ The battle for presence was also the battle to close off the mobilization space of the MCP. The regime won a decisive victory in this effort during Templer's rule.

7. Elections.

Local elections were held in 1952. The success of the Alliance party was due to the growing organizational capabilities of the political parties. UNMO was led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, a Malayan prince, used the existing kampong social leaders as his contact nets for recruitment. The MCA was reorganized by Tan Cheng Lock in 1952 and established presence and contact nets in the New villages to adding to the preexisting *towkay* nets in the cities. Initial electoral success increased the prestige and expectations of future victory for both UNMO and the MCA.¹¹¹ "The MCA leaders were able to convert their new political power into a network of relationships which linked them, via state-level leaders, to local Chinese community leaders."¹¹²

The Alliance party harnessed the tendency of mobilization in one ethnic group to mobilize the other groups in a positive fashion. Balancing behavior between the ethnic groups reinforced the systemic behavior that increased the numbers and power of the Alliance party. The Alliance party provided a clever method for taking advantage of the systemic behavior of the contextual environment.

¹¹⁰ Asprey, p. 571.

¹¹¹ Steiberg, p. 368.

¹¹² Stubbs, p. 212.

8. Command and Control.

Templer fully implemented an integrated organizational plan. As a result, the efforts of the administration, police and army were controlled from the Federal War Council led by the High Commissioner. Each state had a State War Executive Committee (SWEC) consisting of the local political leader, a British advisor, and the senior police and military commander for the state. Each district had a War Executive Committee consisting of the District Office and the senior police and military officers in the district.¹¹³

The system established by LTG Briggs, was ineffective due to bureaucratic rivalries and unclear command authority. Templer served as both High Commissioner and Director of Operations. He was personally responsible for the governments ability to overcome organizational inertia and made the new procedures work. Templer had two deputies working under him: the Deputy High Commissioner who supervised the civilian and political operations; and the Deputy Director of Operations who supervised the military operations.

9. The Defeat of the MCP, 1952 - 1954.

The peak of the MCP insurgency came in 1952. After 1952, MCP numbers, organizational presence and operations steadily declined. Interaction of the MCP October Directives of 1951 with regime actions under Briggs and Templer eliminated the potential and space of the MCP. The decline phase of the MCP illustrate that once created, organizational factors preserve the organization structure, even in a highly unfavorable environment. The selective organization of the MCP and MRLA experienced little organizational growth, but demonstrated a tremendous ability to survive in an increasingly insecure environment.

After 1949, the MRLA simply reacted to British pressure while the MCP abandoned efforts to grow and focused on survival.¹¹⁴ From 1952 - 1954, the regime defeated the MCP insurgency. The guerrillas suffered heavy casualties and the casualty rates exceeded

¹¹³ Sarkesian, p. 144. Komer, p. 27.

¹¹⁴ Bell, p. 87.

the flow of new recruits. MRLA actions steadily decreased from 500 terror incidents a month in 1951 to less than 100 by 1953.¹¹⁵

The regime shifted from its defensive strategy during its reorganization from 1949-1951 to the strategic offensive in 1952. It isolated the guerrillas from the squatter communities and relentlessly tracked them down in the jungle. The government designated "white areas" as regions where the guerrilla presence was eliminated. In the white areas the government restored many of the suspended laws under the Emergency Regulations as a visible sign that living conditions would improve when the war ended.

The MCP engaged in a short cycle struggle for survival. Isolation from the villages led to starvation. The MCP and MRLA attempted to start gardens in the jungle. MCP forces attempted to create new potential and space with the aborigines in the mountains. The British followed and creating bases and expanding organizational presence in the aborigine communities. The regime political and military effort chased the MCP away from the aborigines and deeper into the jungle. Eventually, the MCP leadership fled over the Thai border. Elimination of the MCP threat came in 1954.

E. THE END OF THE EMERGENCY: 1955-1960.

1. The Baling Negotiations.

In 1955, the MCP was in a critical situation. The MRLA strength fell from a peak of 8,000 in 1951 to 3,000 in mid 1954.¹¹⁶ The politburo fled Malaya in 1953 to hide in Thailand. MCP presence in the squatter communities was eliminated following successful establishment of the New Villages. A major task of local units was simply preventing desertion. These factors led to a strategic reassessment and reorganization of the MCP. Chin Peng offered to negotiate an end to the Emergency. One Malay, Musa Bin Ahmad,

¹¹⁵ Komer, p. 20.

¹¹⁶ O'Ballance, p. 144.

and one Indian, Balan, were added to the ten man MCP Central Committee to improve the MCP's image with the other communities.¹¹⁷

The government met with Chin Peng and the MCP on 28 and 29 December, 1955. The Alliance government had won the recent elections and Tunku Abdul Rahman was the Chief Minister of the government as well as head of UNMO. He and Tan Cheng Lock, head of the MCA, met with Chin Peng. The MCP ignored their current situation and demanded a return to 1946 and refused the offer of a government amnesty. Chin Peng wanted the MCP declared a legal political party with the right to participate in elections. They would lay down their arms but would not agree to be held accountable for their actions during the rebellion. The MCP remained inflexible, demanding concessions as if they were in a position of strength. Chin Peng was ignored, and the MCP returned to the jungle to starve.

2. Independence.

The Alliance Party victory in the 1955 elections was part of the transition to independence. The formation of the Alliance government under the Tunku eliminated any hope of MCP success.

Malaya became independent on 31 August, 1957. The British handed over responsibility for the insurgency campaign over to the new government gradually from 1956 through 1957. In a state of collapse since the Baling talks the MCP fell to an estimated 1,500 members. The government formally ended the Emergency in July 1960. MCP remnants remained in the jungles on the Thai-Malay border until the 1990s. A broken reed since the Baling Talks, independence removed any remaining possibility of MCP success. A series of mass desertions after independence reduced the MCP to about 500 survivors hiding in the jungles along the border along with a remnant in Sarawak.

¹¹⁷ O'Ballance, p. 153.

F. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES.

1. Contextual Environment changes.

Political and economic changes reduced the political and economic grievances of the Malayan population. In 1948, the Malays were politically strong and economically weak while the Chinese were the opposite. The economic boom of the 1950s and the move to independence allowed both communities to realize political *and* economic gains. Rather than a zero sum situation, everyone gained by cooperating in the move to independence and sharing the wealth of the Korean war economic boom.

a. Political Changes.

The 1951 decision to open the political process and the many political changes under Templer in 1952 permanently changed the political environment. An open political environment provided an advantage for mobilizational organizations like UNMO and the MCP and put the selective, underground MCP at a severe disadvantage. The movement and countermovement dynamics of the insurgency made many previously neutral members of all ethnic groups politically active. Political parties captured this mobilization potential through the space offered by the new political system.

b. Economic Changes.

The Korean War led to a massive change in Malayan society. Prices of rubber and tin both increased after the war started in June, 1950. The government received a massive and fortuitous increase in revenues from export duties and taxes. Expecting to receive revenues of \$273.7 million in 1950, the Malayan government received \$443.4 million. This turned the 1949 government deficit of \$13.4 million into a 1950 surplus of \$289.9 million.¹¹⁸ The government paid for the war out of this surplus. The restructured military forces, the resettlement plan and other initiatives all gained from this surplus. Rubber prices remained high from 1950 to 1960.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Stubbs, p. 109.

¹¹⁹ Stubbs, p. 232.

The economic boom also provided gains for all of society. Urban areas experienced a general rise in wages and an increase in the local economy. Many Malays entered the tin and rubber work force which reduced the nature and power of the formerly Chinese dominated unions. The resettlement program led to unemployment and economic hardship in the New Villages that was offset by the rising demand for labor. Wages doubled for unskilled labor and went even higher for skilled miners and rubber tappers. The economic boom led to increased standards of living for all sectors of society. This unexpected boom greatly benefitted the government since its programs built off of the success of the new wealth.¹²⁰

c. Social changes.

The economic boom and the government resettlement program led to the urbanization of Malaya. The number of Chinese living in urban areas of 1,000 or more increased from 43% in 1947 to 73% in 1957. Economic opportunities increased for all ethnic groups and many Malays joined the wage economy. The areas which recieved the least economic benefit from the boom were Perak, Kedah, Johore and Pahang. These areas supported MCP groups far longer than the rest of Malaya.¹²¹

2. External Factors.

Britain was constrained by a severe economic crisis following WWII. The United Kingdom greatly valued the economic wealth from Malaya, but lacked the resources to resolve the situation. The British relied on the internal economic and manpower resources of Malaya to resolve the crisis. The peak commitment of 25,000 British troops bares comparison with the 550,000 US troops deployed to Vietnam. The British were forced to be flexible and adaptive due to their constrained circumstances.

¹²⁰ An economic boom does not necessarily help the government. In Vietnam, the Viet Cong benefitted enormously from the economic benefits that accompanied the American deployment. In Malaya, the MCP attacked rubber trees and acts of economic sabotage angered workers and led to the government being the protectors and thus beneficiary of the boom.

¹²¹ Stubbs, p. 234.

Mao's victory in China proved a key contextual variable for both sides in Malaya. For the MCP, it inspired them to attempt their own revolution. For the Chinese community as a whole, it removed the previous trend of the immigrants returning to China after accumulating wealth in Malaya. The Chinese business class was cut off and had to look for a local alternative. The granting of Malayan citizenship in 1951 proved a powerful incentive that led to Chinese support for the MCA and the government.

3. Task Environment Changes.

a. Counter regime.

During WWII the MCP established presence, potential and space in the rural squatter community. The MCP abandoned its advantage with the squatters and returned to the cities after the war. During the Emergency, the MCP returned to the squatters until the government forced them to leave with the resettlement program.

The MCP's organizational structure throughout its existence remained selective. Chin Peng remained the leader from Lai Tek's defection through the 1990s. The initial student Hakka and Hailam leadership never changed due to high initiation costs. The MCP retained high commitment at the cost of being incapable of changing goals or structure.

The MCP relied on a very narrow support base in a segment of the Chinese community. Their selective nature and poor decision making prevented this base from expanding. Believing that they could win in the short cycle, the MCP failed to show the ability to perceive or make a long cycle decision.

b. Regime.

The regime displayed far more flexibility and adaptability than the MCP. Starting poorly, not truly understanding the nature of the MCP threat, the regime focused on improving the efficiency and number of their forces from 1948 to 1951. The regime offered no political concessions and attempted to win the struggle through its existing organizational structure. Implementation of the Briggs plan addressed the efficiency of the government's forces and addresses issues such as isolating the guerrillas to decrease the efficiency of the opposition. It did not address the political, economic and social origins of the MCP.

Templer put in place a long cycle, mobilizational program that increased the efficiency of the government's forces while also increasing the effectiveness of the campaign. The political changes removed the political base of Chinese grievances and allowed the MCA to wage a countermobilization battle against the MCP.

c. Society.

Society underwent a comprehensive movement and countermovement process. Chinese mobilization led to Malay mobilization in UNMO. UNMO's cooperation with the regime led to Malay recruitment in the administration, police and army. Indians also mobilized in a variety of non cohesive organizations that finally crystallized in MIC.

Chinese society formed the true basis of the conflict. The MCP formed in the marginalized intellectual class that was a byproduct of the growth of the Chinese middle class in the 1920s and 1930s. Jobs in the Chinese community were based on clans. The Hakka and Hailam students were denied jobs in the private sector due to clan and in the public sector due to race. MCP alliance with the squatters resulted from the circumstances of war rather than a plan. The MCP and squatters were the economic and political losers of the Chinese society. The MCP rebellion challenged the existing Chinese society as much as it did the regime. Movements generated counter movements, inevitably the clans and secret societies fought back.

The Chinese countermovement did not gain momentum until 1952. Even then, only 25% of all eligible Chinese voted in elections. During the 1955 Baling negotiations, crowds of Chinese went to movie theaters to see newsreels of Chin Peng. This indicated that continuing sympathy and preferences for the MCP existed in part of the Chinese community. The collapse of MCP presence for the MCP and their lack of a mobilizational structure meant that the MCP could not convert this preference into mobilization. The MCA succeeded because there was no competition against them within the Chinese community. Presence, space and selective incentives allowed the MCA to succeed.

G. ANALYSIS.

Table 3-1 illustrates the relationship between the environment, organizational structure. The designations of potential, space and presence were developed in the strategic

ORG/DTG	Potential	Space	Presence	Org.Structure	Outcome	Remarks
MCP 1925-1940	Low	Urban	Urban	Selective	Slow Growth	
MCP WWII	High	Rural-yes Urban-no	Squatters	Selective	Growth	Mob. Pot. = Squatters
MCP 1946-1948	High	Rural-yes Urban-yes	Labor Unions	Selective	Growth	MCP: peak growth
MCP 1948-1951 Urban Squatter	Low High	No Yes	None Squatters	Selective Selective	Decline Growth	
MCP 1952-1954 Urban Squatter Aborigine	Low Low Low	No No Yes	None Decline Jungle	Selective	None Decline Limited	
MCP 1954-1960	Low	No	Jungle	Selective	Decline	Org. Structure
GOM 1925-1940	Low	None	None	Selective	None	No org. recruiting
GOM 1946-1948 Chinese Malay	Low Low	No Yes	No Regime	Selective	None None	No org. recruiting
GOM 1948-1951 Chinese Malay	Low High	Yes Yes	No UNMO	Selective MOB	None Growth	Recruiting Malays
GOM 1952-1954 Chinese Malay	High High	Yes Yes	MCA UNMO	MOB MOB	Growth Growth	Rapid Growth
GOM 1954-1960 Chinese Malay	High High	Yes Yes	MCA UNMO	MOB MOB	Growth Growth	

Table 3-1. Relationship between environment, organizational structure and growth.

interaction section. Outcome is the historical growth that did or did not occur for the organization. The MCP is examined in its relationship to the Chinese community. The GOM is examined in its relationship with the Chinese and Malay communities.

The MCP retained a selective organizational structure throughout the insurgency. Table 3-1 depicts the nature of the relationship between the GOM and the SMIs. The regime was selective in respect to both the Malay and Chinese communities from the end of WWII until 1948. The major decisions on the new constitutions and political future of Malaya were made by the United Kingdom with no consultation with either SMI. This led to both communities mobilizing in opposition to UK actions. After the start of the insurgency, the mutual threat allied the Malayan SMI with the regime against the MCP. The major Malay organizations such as UNMO cooperated with the regime. Malays mobilized and joined the administration, police and security forces of the regime. Thus, from 1948 to 1952, the regime used a mobilizational structure towards the Malays and a selective nature towards the Chinese. Efforts to recruit Chinese showed poor results until the political reforms instituted by Templer. This led to the rapid mobilization of the Chinese SMI by the Malayan Chinese Association.

1. Growth.

Table 3-1 shows the relationship between mobilization potential and space, presence, organizational structure and outcome. Growth is not possible without mobilization potential. With potential supporters, the organization needs space and presence to convert sympathizers into active supporters. The MCP illustrates the importance of space. From 1946-48, the MCP presence and support base was in the cities. Onset of the Emergency forced them into the rural areas. The resettlement program pushed them out of the squatter villages. The MCP shifted to the aborigine. Government efforts pushed them out of the aborigine areas and the MCP fled into the jungle. The jungle allowed them the geographic space to exist for the next forty years. With no contact in the potential support base, the MCP withered into a marginal criminal gang.

The regime demonstrated the role of presence. Presence requires more than physical occupation. The regime put Malay police into the Chinese villages with no real effect. It recruited Chinese speaking Malays and Europeans to establish contact with local social networks. Police posts in the villages led to local Home Guard membership and then local village councils. Only after local villagers were in government organizations did presence become effective. Presence was effective when the social networks served as contact nets to recruit new supporters. Contact nets served as an intelligence gathering system that fed information on communist sympathizers and members to the police. Social networks reinforced systemic effects. As government information improved, the government's ability to reward supporters and punish opponents also improved.

2. Organizational Factors.

a. Chinese Mobilization.

Table 3-2 shows the total mobilized support for the MCP and the MCA. The MCP numbers represent peak strength in 1952 and the MCA in 1955. For the entire Emergency, an estimated 12,000 Chinese served in the MRLA with 6,710 killed, 1,287 captured, 2,702 surrendered, 1,000 deserted or died of sickness or internal liquidations and 500 survivors stayed in the jungle.¹²² The regime mobilized far more Chinese than the MCP after 1952. Creating a counter organization like the MCA proved an effective way to deny potential and space to the MCP.

b. Organizational Structure.

The MCP remained a selective organization throughout its existence. The unchanging nature of the MCP serves as a useful contrast with the changing nature of the government. From 1946-48, the regime organization was selective for both Malays and Chinese. From 1948-51, the regime recruited many Malays into organizations. The regime used both selective organizations such as the security forces and mobilizational organizations such as UNMO. The Chinese were still excluded. Success within the Malay population was due to the 1948 constitution that restored many rights to the Malays and

¹²² O'Ballance, p. 164.

promised them increased economic and political power. Thus, the regime was inclusive to the Malays and exclusive to the Chinese. After 1952, the government became inclusive to the Chinese as well through a series of political changes. The regime mobilized the Chinese into the selective security forces and the mobilizational political party MCA.

The regime used a combination of both selective and mobilizational structures in its organizational struggle. Using selective organizations alone led to minimum recruitment and Chinese resentment. The Chinese resented the coercive nature of the selective organizations and this increased support for the MCP. Mobilizational organizations proved to be decisive. It was only after the regime changed the space and potential available to mobilizational organizations that the regime successfully conducted a mass mobilization in its selective security forces.

<u>GOVERNMENT OF MALAYA</u>		<u>MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY</u>	
Army	250	Party	3,000
Police	2500	MRLA	8,000
MCA	250,000	Min Yuen	50,000
Administration	13,000		
New Villages	500,000		
New Unions	16% Chinese		

Table 3-2. Mobilization of the Chinese Community.

Plagued by the characteristics of a selective organization, the MCP sought new ways to improve efficiency. This led to a focus on short term results. The MCP used high initiation costs to increase commitment at the cost of being incapable of changing goals or structure. Short cycle focus resulted in a long cycle defeat.

The regime also focused on efficiency and short cycle results from 1948-1951. During this time, the regime was dominated by selective organizations and exhibited many of the faults of the MCP. Under the surface, the regime conducted extensive organizational

preparation. The regime's shift to mobilizational methods would not have been as successful without the organization preparation. WWII served as a similar organizational development phase for the MCP. In each case, it took two to three years for new organizational structures to settle in and become effective.

3. Organizational Decision Making.

The MCP failed to make a long cycle decisions during the Emergency. It remained fixated on short term results. The 1948 plan for a protracted insurgency campaign to be concluded in three months is a shining example of an organization unable to test reality. The MCP did not understand their own capabilities, nor those of their opponents. After June, 1948 the initiative was lost and the MCP was forced to react to government actions.

Unlike the MCP, the government demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt during the campaign. It was characterized by disorganization and incompetence following WWII. This contributed to the start of the crisis. After a year of initial efforts to react to and identify the MCP threat, the regime developed new methods and organizations. The defensive strategy from 1948-51 provided time to reorganize and make long cycle preparations. This preparation period proved decisive in defeating the MCP from 1952-54.

The MCP recruited its largest number of organized supporters in the post war 1946 to 1948 period. Peak effectiveness of the MCP was in the 1948 to 1951 period. It lost many marginal supporters in the unions, but those who stayed in the MCP, MRLA and Min Yuen were highly committed and participated in the political violence. This shows that numbers and quality matter. The highest number of violent acts occurred in 1952 as the total membership of the organization peaked and began declining. Membership surged from 1948 to 1951 indicating that the MRLA activated sympathizers into members. Acts of violence peaked after the membership was falling in 1952. This reflects the increased efficiency of the MRLA in getting maximum action from existing membership. It also demonstrates the effect the violence had on alienating the Chinese support base. The MRLA success in the short cycle had a long term negative effect that the MCP never overcame.

4. Summary.

The Malayan Emergency illustrates the process model. Systemic behavior led to the mobilization of both the Malay and Chinese communities in 1946. The MCP lost due to consistent short cycle behavior. Throwing away its initial advantage in its urban presence, the MCP waged a rural campaign for which it was ill prepared. The MCP demonstrated how to lose an insurgency. It also illustrates the tremendous survivability of a selective organization. Never eliminated, the MCP was simply moved away from its mobilization potential so that no new recruits or support developed and they withered away.

The regime successfully adapted both its actions and its structure to the environment. It was able to think and act more effectively than the MCP in both the contextual and task environments. Regime reorganization of the existing political and military organizations, created new political organizations such as the Alliance party, which successfully mobilized the Malay, Indian and Chinese communities. These organizations eliminated the organizational presence and countered actions of the MCP.

a. Hypothesis 1.

The first hypothesis focuses on the interaction of the environment, organizational structure and organizational action. The MCP was nonreactive to the contextual environment. It believed that popular support would follow organizational action without investing time and effort in organization. The MCP focused their operations on the task environment. The MCP operated in a non munificent environment with an organizational structure lacking the capability to grow. Organizational actions of the MCP made the environment even less munificent by causing a regime and Malay counter mobilization and alienating the Chinese community.

b. Hypothesis 2.

The role of mobilization potential, space and presence has been examined. The evidence supports a conclusion that all three are necessary conditions for growth. However, the three variables are not sufficient to cause growth. Organizations must take action to grow. Regime efforts failed to mobilize and organize the Chinese until Templer's political reforms. His reforms changed the contextual environment for the MCA. The

MCA had already developed an organizational infrastructure and presence in the previous two years. The new environment and a massive mobilizational effort by the MCA led to a mass Chinese mobilization. The short and long cycle actions of hypothesis one convert the potential mobilization of mobilization potential, space and presence into actual numbers and organizational growth.

c. Hypothesis 3.

Adaptation was the crucial factor in the defeat of the MCP. This case provides a unique opportunity to hold one side constant while the other seeks to adapt. The MCP retained the same organizational structure, goals, leadership and methods throughout the insurgency. No strategic changes occurred, just some tactical adjustments in 1949 and 1951. The regime improved existing organizations, created new organizations and counteracted the actions of the MCP. It succeeded, but it took time.

The regime reorganized the administration, police and army under the Briggs plan. Initial reforms took place from 1949 to 1951 and were fully implemented by Templer from 1952 to 1954. Templer created the new government infrastructure for independence in a gradual process that went from the preparation period of 1952 to 1954, the election period of 1954 to 1955 and the final transition from 1955 to 1957. It is significant that this steady process of adaptation and change by the regime was paralleled by the steady decline of the MCP. The organizational growth and development of the regime had an interactive effect with the environment. The contextual and task environments became more munificent towards the regime and less for the MCP. At the action level, the regime never destroyed the MCP, they simply isolated the MCP in the contextual and task environment.

IV. NORTHERN IRELAND.

A. INTRODUCTION.

The insurgency in Northern Ireland represents a contrast to the British insurgency in Malaya. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) sustained itself with a strength of about 1,000 active members for 26 years. In the Malayan case, the MCP/MRLA was marginalized in Malaya despite a larger membership of 8,000 at peak strength and despite surviving for 45 years (1948-1993). This case study examines the situation in Northern Ireland to determine the organizational growth and staying power of the Provisional IRA and its relationship to the Catholic population in Northern Ireland.

B. CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT.

1. Geography and History.

Northern Ireland contains 1.5 million people in an area the size of Connecticut. It consists of six counties in the old province of Ulster. The Republic of Ireland contains 26 counties and the other three traditional provinces of Ireland: Connaught, Leinster and Munster. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom with the same status as Scotland and Wales. It has 17 members in Parliament. The population is about 950,000 Protestant and 600,000 Catholic.

The British conquered Ireland in the 12th century. In the 1600s, the British confiscated all the land in Ulster and established Scottish and British settlements. The Protestant majority in the North continues up to the present. In 1916, a Catholic rebellion was crushed. In the aftermath a new struggle ensued that led to the partition of Ireland in 1920. A guerrilla war from 1919 to 1921 under the Irish Republican Army led to the southern 26 counties becoming separated from Great Britain on 6 December, 1921.

The Irish Free State was established in 1922. The IRA refused to recognize the Free State. The IRA would only recognize a united Ireland. This led to a civil war in the south where the IRA attempted to overthrow the Catholic Free State. The IRA was defeated by

1923 and became a fringe element in the south. The Free State became the Republic of Ireland in 1948. The IRA remnants resorted to terrorism against the Republic and was defeated.

Northern Ireland followed a different path. The British set up a local government at Stormont while Protestants monopolized political and economic power. The Republic of Ireland continued to claim Ulster as its territory, but lacked the power to do anything about it. The situation stagnated until the 1960s.

2. Politics.

With Protestants dominating the political system, Catholic opinions suffered from a lack of local representation. The provincial assembly at Stormont ran local affairs with little interference from Parliament. Both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland treated Northern Ireland as a backwater of little relevance.¹²³ Protestants gerrymandered districts so that Catholics remained in the minority on local councils, even when they constituted the majority of the population. These local councils allocated housing and jobs. Under representation in these local councils increased Catholic grievances.¹²⁴ Dungannon was 53% Catholic, yet the local council had 14 Unionists and 7 Catholics. From 1945 to 1968, the council allocated 71% of the government housing to Protestants and 29% to Catholics.¹²⁵

The Protestants also used the legal system to suppress the Catholics. The Special Powers Act of 1922 allowed arrests, searches without warrants, censorship and other acts which violated the rights of Catholics. The Royal Ulster Constabulary and an auxiliary police force called the B Specials reinforced Protestant power and control. The police and judiciary were all Protestant.¹²⁶

¹²³ J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 5.

¹²⁴ John Conroy, Belfast Diary, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1987), p. 24.

¹²⁵ Coogan, p. 265.

¹²⁶ Bell, 1993, p. 44. Conroy p. 26.

3. Economics.

Economic grievances was the basis of widespread Catholic resentment in Northern Ireland. Unemployment rates for Catholics was twice that of the Protestants. In 1971, 17.3% of Catholic males were unemployed, compared to 6.6% among Protestants.¹²⁷ The Catholics faced a severe housing shortage. Many chose to emigrate from Northern Ireland. In the 1960s, new laws in America restricted emigration. The Catholic population increased relative to that of the Protestants, but the Protestants prevented Catholic expansion into new areas. This led to crowded Catholic slums located beside new Protestant housing developments.

Despite discrimination, a Catholic middle class developed after WWII. This group started a Campaign for Social Justice in 1964 that became the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in 1967. NICRA unified the local associations in the Catholic neighborhoods seeking better housing. It went beyond the initial demands for better living conditions by demanding an end to gerrymandering and equal voting rights. NICRA demonstrations mobilized Catholics using the housing issue.

4. Social Factors.

The Protestants and Catholics formed separate communities in Northern Ireland. Differences in the two communities was not religion nor was it ethnic. Being labelled Catholic or Protestant conferred different political and economic rights on the individual, whether desired or not. In the forty years between partition and the formation of NICRA, the two communities developed different social norms to reinforce their separate identities.

Divided, the two communities worked in different jobs, attended different schools and churches and interacted in separate social networks. The Protestant Orange Order formed part of an extensive network of associations that tied all the varying Protestant social classes together. Catholics used a rich grouping of associations to reinforce their

¹²⁷ Benjamin Kline, "Northern Ireland: A Prolonged Conflict", in Karl P. Magyar and Constantine P. Danopoulos, ed., Prolonged Wars: A Post Nuclear Challenge, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994), pp.421-448. p. 424.

identity. "Neighborhoods were segregated. Businesses, clubs, pubs, games, churches, hospitals, schools, all the institutions and arenas of society existed for either tradition but rarely for both."¹²⁸

5. Contextual Dynamics.

The contextual environment in Northern Ireland was in a transition after WWII. The Catholic population increased in size and wealth relative to the Protestant population. Catholic urbanization led to the development of a middle class and increased education and wages in within their community. Rural farmers also benefitted from better economic conditions. The Protestant population grew poorer due to decline in shipbuilding, textiles and other heavy industries. Economic disparity between the two communities narrowed while political inequity remained the same. These gradual changes produced long term political implications.¹²⁹

C. THE TASK ENVIRONMENT.

From the 1920s through the 1960s, Ireland enjoyed a stable task environment. Local government was dominated by the Protestant Unionist party. The Orange Order and other Protestant organizations supported the status quo. No single organization represented the entire Catholic community. Increasing levels of dynamism in the environment from 1966 to 1968 mobilized many Catholics and Protestants who were previously politically inactive. This dynamism produced new organizational challenges within the Protestant community and new organizations within the Catholic community.

1. Origins of Conflict.

NICRA was formally founded on 29 January, 1967, by a broad grouping of political activists in the Catholic community.¹³⁰ It conducted a protest march with 2,500 people on 24 August, 1968. On 5 October, a second march was met with a baton charge from the

¹²⁸ Bell, 1994, p. 39.

¹²⁹ J. H. White, "Ireland 1966-1982" in T. W. Moody and F. X. Martin, ed., The Course of Irish History, (Niwot, CO: Roberts Rinehart, 1994), pp. 342-361. p. 352.

¹³⁰ Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History, (Niwot, CO: Roberts Rinehart, 1993), p. 250.

police and fighting with Protestant counter demonstrators.¹³¹ This riot led to rapid escalation and mobilization on both sides increasing the dynamism of the environment.

On 12 August, 1969, the Protestants conducted their yearly Apprentice Boys parade in Derry. A Protestant mob attacked Catholic neighborhoods and rioting rapidly spread to Belfast. Casualties mounted as Protestant mobs burned Catholic homes. Stormont was unable to control the situation. The British Army intervened to restore order on 14 August, 1969.

The shift to violence surprised all of the organizations in the regime, counter regime and society. A stable, peaceful environment from 1922 to 1968, Northern Ireland was transformed into a dynamic, violent environment in 1969. Violence caused major preference shifts in both the Protestant and Catholic communities. At the local level, many people self mobilized in local groups without any organizational action. In 1969, Northern Ireland resembled a spontaneous reaction. The mobilization was initiated by the actions of NICRA and the organized response of the Protestants and the regime's police. However, organizations on all sides failed to anticipate the massive popular response. The events of 1969 to 1972 offer an opportunity to compare the revolution as an event theory against the organization theory of revolutions.

2. Regime.

The regime's situation was complicated and non cohesive. The Stormont government was the local government of Northern Ireland. Yet, Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and the British government is the national government of the territory. Britain regarded Northern Ireland as a backwater and allowed Stormont considerable autonomy. The crisis led to a major shift in the attention the UK gave to Northern Ireland. Stormont resisted these encroachments on their traditional power. This tension led the UK to dissolve Stormont and establishing direct rule on 18 April, 1972. From 1969 to 1972, tension between the UK and Stormont resulted in an unstable and

¹³¹ Robert W. White, Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and Interpretive History, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), p. 66.

incompetent regime during a period of turmoil that required strong leadership. From an organizational standpoint, structural weakness of the regime prevented long term analysis and led to reactive short cycle decisions to local events.

The UK placed pressure on Stormont from above while the Protestant community pressured it from below. Protestants dominated the administration and police forces. Unionist associations that represented the Protestant community exerted considerable pressure on Stormont to preserve the status quo. The Protestant perspective was reflected both within the regime from its Protestant membership and from outside the regime from Unionist political pressure.

3. Counter Regime.

The Catholic community formed the social movement that opposed the regime. Mobilization potential for the opposition included all Catholics, especially those who suffered in the sectarian violence and house burnings in 1969. However, once the situation stabilized, internal cleavages within the Catholic community surfaced. Catholics were internally divided by region and class. Existing social networks proved important in shaping organizations. Organizational competition within the Catholic community occurred between the emerging middle class organizations of NICRA and remnants of the old IRA.

a. NICRA.

This organization represented a coalition of a variety of Catholic organizations representing the Catholic urban middle class and students. The Campaign for Social Justice, Northern Ireland Labour Party, Republican Labour Party and a collection of activists came together in January, 1967 to become NICRA.¹³² As a coalition, the intent was to combine competing factions to conduct joint demonstrations. NICRA lacked strong, central leadership and its organizational structure was underdeveloped.

The segregation of Catholic housing areas meant that each separate neighborhood contained different local associations. Separation impeded coordination with the other

¹³² Bell, 1993, p. 55. Bell, The Secret Army, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), p. 156.

groups in different areas. The crisis of 1969 produced two effects. At the local level, it forced all Catholics in a given neighborhood to unite for self protection. At the national level, strengthened local groups eliminated central control causing a power vacuum to develop. Under pressure, NICRA dissolved back into its local associational base.

Over time, a new organization emerged from NICRA. A political party called the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) formed in August 1970.¹³³ Its development was not smooth. A radical left-wing student group called People's Democracy and the old NICRA opposed the SDLP. Rivalries and confusion prevented effective community-wide collective action by NICRA in 1969 and 1970.

Middle class associations that formed NICRA were a new development in the political and social structure of Northern Ireland. The newness of the organization caused the organization to break up under pressure. Lack of time prevented reorganization in the increasingly dynamic and violent environment.

b. IRA.

The IRA was organizationally unprepared for the crisis in Northern Ireland. It was primarily a southern organization based in Belfast. After defeat in the civil war in 1923, the IRA became a fringe group in the Republic of Ireland. An attempted bombing campaign from 1958 to 1962 failed for lack of popular support on either side of the border.¹³⁴

Development of an Irish middle class produced several new university-educated intellectuals who hoped to use Marxist-Leninist methods of political agitation. This was a clear break from the Republican tradition of military force alone. Leaders such as Roy Johnson, Tony Coughlin, Peadar O'Donnell and Mairtin O Caidhain sought to change the policy and structure of the IRA. Their answer to the crisis in the north called for an Army

¹³³ White, p. 83. Bell, 1993, p. 182. Coogan, p. 272.

¹³⁴ Sean Cronin, Chief of Staff of the IRA, attributed the failure of the campaign to the lack of popular support and the lack of an organization to mobilize support for the cause. Action alone failed to overcome organizational weakness. See White, p. 48.

Convention in late 1969. The Dublin General Headquarters planned to conduct a vote to end the principle of abstention and allow the IRA to become a legal political party.¹³⁵

The situation in Northern Ireland was very different. The Belfast Brigade of the IRA had about 15 members in 1966. By December, 1969, it increased to about 26 members.¹³⁶ The whole organization in the north consisted of about 100 members, many were inactive after the 1962 campaign. The IRA represented a small group of traditional Republican families from the urban and rural working classes. They had a narrow recruitment base, common social background and were an insular, tradition-bound, conspiratorial clan.¹³⁷ Their social backgrounds were very differed greatly from the new middle class intellectuals in Dublin.

Tensions between the north and south caused a split in the IRA during the December, 1969 Army Convention. The Provisional IRA represented the traditional organizational structure and strategy of victory through violence. In contrast to the original IRA which sought to find a new approach of political agitation. The split was a total one, in that northerners and southerners ended up in each of the new organizations. The impact of the split was organizational confusion and with some violence between the two organizations from 1969 to 1972. Eventually, the original IRA renounced the use of violence and became a Worker's Party hoping to unite Protestant and Catholic workers against both the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland governments. The original IRA became a marginal mobilizational organization with no supporters and disappeared as an organization by the 1990s.

The Provisional IRA retained a military structure consising of the Army Council, brigades, battalions and companies. They were not a factor in the events of 1969. They lacked members, weapons and funds. From 1969 to 1972, they grew rapidly to an

¹³⁵ Kline, p. 427-8. Bell, 1974, 344-347. Bell, 1993, pp. 140-145.

¹³⁶ Bell, 1993, p. 140. White, p. 63.

¹³⁷ White, pp. 131-2.

estimated 1,500 to 2,000 members.¹³⁸ PIRA had a selective organizational structure, but operated in the open. All government presence in Catholic areas eliminated by the August, 1969 riots. The Catholics established No Go areas and the PIRA established offices and openly recruited.

c. Organizational Dynamics.

The contextual and task environment favored the growth of the PIRA compared to its rivals for support within the Catholic community. The only regime presence in the Catholic areas was the British Army. The Protestant police were withdrawn because their partisan activities further inflamed the violence. Inevitably the Army shifted from protecting the Catholics to fighting the Catholics. Traditional Catholic enmity towards the British was one factor. Lack of an alternative political organization was another. The army offered no political solution, and its efforts to stop the riots led to clashes with both Protestants and Catholics. There was no government organization within the Catholic community and no social networks for the government to use to create permanent organizational presence.

Both NICRA and PIRA were in organizational confusion in 1969 and 1970. Mob attacks on the Catholic community led to the creation of Citizen Defense Committees. The need for self defense was the immediate demand of the local communities. Initially, neither PIRA nor NICRA could provide this defense. NICRA and the newly organized SDLP both sought a non violent solution. The PIRA had no weapons and was flooded with recruits. The local communities were on their own.

Over time, this situation favored PIRA. The PIRA met violence with violence and promised immediate action while the SDLP tried to organize for future operations. The PIRA managed to coopt the Citizen Defense Committees by promising to defend local communities. The Central Citizens Defence Committee initially represented all the different Catholic factions, but then split over whether or not to support the PIRA.¹³⁹ PIRA

¹³⁸ White, p. 63.

¹³⁹ Coogan, p. 281.

filled this political space while the SDLP was still organized. The violence and uncertainty of the time favored the PIRA, which offered short cycle solutions over the long cycle efforts of the SDLP.

4. Society.

Society in Northern Ireland became so polarized by 1969 that there was no middle ground. The Catholics represented one social movement industry and the Protestants another. Over the years efforts were made to form cross sectional organizations. The Alliance party has maintained a steady support base of 9-10% from 1972 to 1995. However, these efforts never played a major role. The sectarian divide remained too deep.

On the other hand, ethnic differences did not cause civil war. Troubles began with the NICRA demands for reform, not revolution. The Catholic community sought to reform the system, not leave it. Long term objectives of the PIRA have little popular support. The bulk of both the Protestant and Catholic communities have preferences for a compromise solution.¹⁴⁰ The problem is that neither the Protestant nor Catholic communities are represented by a single organization. Both sides have a variety of organizations of both extremists and moderates. The organizational competition within the communities has prevented a compromise between the British government and the Catholic and Protestant communities.

D. INTERACTION.

The conflict in Northern Ireland went through several distinct phases. From 1969 to 1972, all sides reorganged and short cycle violence in the task environment dominated the conflict. From 1972-1975, British security forces nearly crushed the PIRA. From 1976 to 1981, the PIRA recovered and reorganized while the British sought a political solution. From 1981 to 1986, the PIRA shifted to a political organization and participated in elections. It was only from 1986 to 1995, that negotiations towards a compromise between organizations representing the different views in the Catholic community were possible.

¹⁴⁰ Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, Northern Ireland: The Choice, (New York: Penguin Books, 1994. pp. 62-6.

Organizational changes in Northern Ireland best explain success or failure of the various strategies attempted by competing organizations.

1. 1969 -1972.

The situation in Northern Ireland was dominated by short cycle events from the introduction of British troops in August, 1969, until the end of the Stormont regime in 1972. The regime, Protestant, and Catholic organizations all reacted to the events on the streets. No genuine effort was made to develop a long term solution while rioting and violence continued. The regime sought to end the instability while PIRA wanted to increase it.

The British blundered badly during this period. Organizing activities of PIRA and NICRA gave the British Army the initiative. The regime contained many Protestants but few Catholics. Consequently, the government did not have presence in Catholic areas. This left the government with little idea of the true situation within the Catholic community. Government authorities assumed that the PIRA provided leadership for the Catholics and ignoring the NICRA leadership. No political solutions were offered. Only military actions were taken by the army to stop the violence. These actions were perceived as hostile to the Catholic community.

a. UK Actions Alienate Catholics.

In 1970, the army conducted mass sweeps and searches for arms. With no presence and no information, these random searches treated all Catholics as suspects. The army used tear gas to support their operations. A series of riots in Belfast from 27 June to 5 July, 1970, increased local Catholics animosity toward the army.¹⁴¹ The rise in local opposition to British presence led to an increase in British efforts to suppress it. PIRA responded to British activities with a bombing campaign totalling 134 bombs between April and June, 1971. It kept the campaign a secret from its followers since the most Catholics did not desire an increase in violence.

¹⁴¹ J. Bowyer Bell, The Gun in Politics, (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. 141.

Escalation of violence between the army and PIRA continued until August 9, 1971, when the British announced an internment policy. The British swept Catholic neighborhoods and arrested local leaders and activists. With no idea who was actually in the PIRA the Army arrested many innocent individuals. The partisan nature of this policy was demonstrated by the fact that only a few Protestants were detained. Internment removed neutrality and free riding behavior among the Catholics. Whether they participated or not, British attacks and CS gas would seek them out.

Bloody Sunday occurred on 30 January, 1972. Army troops shot and killed 13 unarmed Catholic protesters. The steady escalation of violence by the army and the continual police and military targeting of the entire Catholic community created an insurgency where none had previously existed. The SDLP and all other Catholic associations rallied around PIRA in defense of their own lives. There had existed a very real opportunity to separate the PIRA from the rest of the Catholic community. The preferences of the Catholics was on reform and not revolution. The escalation of violence had a reinforcing effect of increasing the scale and intensity of violence which precluded a moderate alternative.

b. Catholic Response.

The onset of violence broke the weak national links of NICRA. The Catholic community separated into local associations.

They included tenants associations, the Belfast Central Citizens Defense Committee, the Committee for Truth, the Minority Rights Association, the Association for Legal Justice, the Northern Resistance Movement, and the Anti-Internment League.¹⁴²

Over time, the SDLP reformed and consolidated the original position of NICRA. In the interim, lack of an established organizational structure within the Catholic community caused short cycle drift. There was an absence of central control and the community lacked an organizational responses to UK actions.

¹⁴² Maurice Tugwell, "Politics and Propaganda of the Provisional IRA" in Terrorism, Vol. 5, No. 1-2, 1981, pp. 13-40. p. 21.

The Provisional IRA had an established organizational structure. It grew rapidly despite their historic insular and selective nature. PIRA had no established organizational competition within the Catholic community. Several self defense committees claimed to be part of the IRA without contact with the organization. PIRA was overwhelmed with the task of consolidating control from December, 1969 to January, 1972.

Once PIRA had reorganized, it returned to its primary organizational goal to remove the British with short cycle violence.¹⁴³ The bombing campaign of 1972 is the logical outcome of the PIRA organizational structure and goals. In the short cycle, this led to the fall of Stormont and PIRA success. In the long cycle, it caused a highly effective British counter reaction and a loss of support in the Catholic community.

c. British Army Miscalculation.

The major shortcoming of the army was preoccupation with the PIRA. Focusing on eliminating the PIRA, Army actions affected the entire Catholic community. Since the task environment is a triangular relationship between the regime, opposition and society. Army efforts to isolate operations in two dimensions between the regime and PIRA failed, and produced unanticipated effects in the entire Catholic population. The British interpreted the increase in violence manifested in the PIRA bombing campaign, mass mobilization of Catholics in self defense committees and the growth of the SDLP as indicators of a mass PIRA insurrection. This assumption became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

2. 1972 to 1975. UK Crushes PIRA.

The rising tide of violence forced the British to reassess the situation. On 25 March, 1972, the British eliminated the Stormont regime and established direct rule. The British attempted to negotiate a political solution. However, they continued to perceive the true situation. Their misperception of reality was demonstrated by their unwillingness to

¹⁴³ Tugwell cites PIRA defector Mary McGuire as saying that the IRA Army Council believed that the British would withdraw once they lost 36 soldiers killed. The UK withdrew from Aden after 36 deaths. PIRA believed that once the cost of Northern Ireland became too high, the UK would leave. PIRA ignored the likely Protestant reaction to British withdrawal. See Tugwell, p. 15.

negotiate with the SDLP and Catholic middle class leaders. The July negotiations failed when PIRA demanded unconditional surrender from the United Kingdom. The Provos were trapped in their short cycle view of events and were not capable of exploiting the opportunity presented in the negotiations.

a. UK Restores Order, Offers Long Cycle Reforms.

The British response focused on elimination of the No Go areas with Operation Motorman on 30 July, 1972. The PIRA enjoyed high potential, open space and an increased presence in which to entrench themselves in the Catholic urban areas since July, 1971. It reached the peak strength of their existence in this munificent environment. Elimination of the open space represented by the No Go areas started a process that eventually broke the Provos. The British combined negotiations with force to isolate the PIRA from the general Catholic population.

Politically, the British took action to solve some of the Catholic grievances. Elimination of Stormont was very popular with Catholics. In December, 1973, an effort was made to form a power sharing arrangement with the SDLP and the Alliance party. This effort led to a Protestant counter reaction demonstrated by a Protestant general strike that succeeded in stopping the Sunningdale effort. The shift in British efforts from favoring the Protestants to trying to solve the Catholic grievances helped restore the status quo. Violence and rioting decreased and popular support for moderates increased.

Militarily, the British reoccupied the Catholic neighborhoods and placed a new emphasis on selective targeting. No more wholesale attacks on Catholics were to occur. The UK security forces focused on combining good intelligence with selective actions to arrest those guilty of crimes with a minimal impact on bystanders. The effect of the new strategy was dramatic.

By late 1974, the army intelligence system had built up an impressive bank of detailed intelligence on over 40% of the population of the Province...By December, 1974 the Belfast Brigade was in such weak strength that it compromised only fifteen or so active bombers and marksmen, mostly boys aged between 14 and 17.¹⁴⁴

The rest of the PIRA was in jail.

b. PIRA Escalates Violence.

The PIRA response after the fall of Stormont was to increase the level of violence. Indiscriminate bombings and terror alienated Catholics and helped British intelligence efforts. By the end of 1974, PIRA was defeated and most members were in jail. In January, 1975, PIRA agreed to a truce offered by the regime. PIRA had no real option since they lacked popular support and their open organization proved very easy for the regime to penetrate.¹⁴⁵ It regarded the truce as a breather, not an opportunity to change organization or strategy. In later years, many PIRA leaders called the truce an error when they realized how effectively the British strategy was working.

c. British Long Cycle Strategy Defeats PIRA.

The British continued to make long cycle decisions to develop a long term solution, in contrast to the previous effort to stop the PIRA in the short cycle. This strategy ended internment, restructured and reorganized both the civil and military organizations, and led to a series of political and economic reforms for the Catholic community. The PIRA attempted to counter this long cycle accommodative strategy with a short cycle strategy of increased violence.

Within a matter of months, the truce, the ending of internment and the restructuring of the army became operational and propaganda defeats for the IRA.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, (New York: New York University Press, 1979), p. 154.

¹⁴⁵ The PIRA had been so badly defeated that the regime had to release PIRA leaders from jail to control the PIRA remnants for the cease fire. All the local leaders had been arrested.

¹⁴⁶ White, p. 1377.

3. 1975 to 1981. PIRA Reorganizes.

The intransigence of the Protestant community prevented the UK from capitalizing on their tactical defeat of the PIRA. PIRA reorganized and adjusted their tactics during this period. It proved that it could sustain a steady level of violence, yet it offered no political solutions. Although the PIRA stagnated during this period, the inability of the UK to negotiate a political solution allowed PIRA enough space to survive.

a. The Reorganization of PIRA and Sinn Fein.

The truce period forced the PIRA to reassess their organization and strategy. PIRA decided to reorganize as a more efficient selective organization. True to their selective nature, no change in goals were considered. The objective remained centered on achieving a military victory. PIRA leadership blamed previous failures on the organization's inclusive structure which resulted in recruitment of uncommitted, untrustworthy individuals. The PIRA chose to reorganize in a tight cell structure and to shrink from 2,000 members to about 300 highly committed members.

The new PIRA organization was a strategic choice. The Provos recognized that they could not win a military victory. The new organization was designed to maintain a steady level of violent activity in order to attrit the British and force them to leave. PIRA assumed the Protestants were irrelevant and that with a British defeat all objectives would be achieved.

PIRA consisted of both an army organization and political wing called Sinn Fein, but the membership of the two organizations was the same. Traditionally, retired or inactive fighters waited in Sinn Fein until an opportunity to use violence appeared. Under the new organization, Sinn Fein became an open political party. PIRA wanted Sinn Fein to recruit the people who wanted to join PIRA, but who could not be used due to the small size and long indoctrination used by the cells. Previously, PIRA intermixed their covert and overt elements. Now they formally segregated the covert, selective, violent organization from the overt, mobilizational support organization. The entire organization was controlled by the PIRA with Sinn Fein in support.

b. The Peace Movement.

Organizations within the Catholic and Protestant communities did not reflect the preferences of the population. The Peace Movement illustrates a strong preference for compromise not reflected in PIRA, the SDLP or the regime. In August, 1976 two housewives and a reporter formed the Peace Movement after three children were killed during a police/PIRA car chase. By the end of the month, 10,000 protesters joined. At the end of September, the movement grew to 100,000 protesters from both communities who demonstrated for peace.

The Peace Movement disappeared because it lacked effective leadership and organizational structure. No organization existed that supported the movement's goals, therefore it failed. A cross sectional organization was not formed due to mistrust between the communities. The movement produced latent mobilizational potential, but it lacked the mobilization space to for an organization to form and grow. The Peace Movement illustrates that preferences alone are not a causal factor in the task environment. An organization must capture mobilization potential for it to produce long term effect.

c. Regime and PIRA interactions.

The regime lost the initiative after the collapse of the Sunningdale agreement. Protestant opposition prevented the formation of a joint Catholic and Protestant government. The environment stabilized from the dynamism of 1969 to 1972 and terrorism became an accepted part of the environment. The regime reached a level of stability where it could not lose, but neither could it eliminate the PIRA. PIRA's new organizational structure of was very survivable.

The SDLP grew steadily with strong support from the Catholic middle class. The party developed a reliable following of about two thirds of all Catholic voters. "In the 1970s there was no coherent party to represent those who supported traditional republican objectives."¹⁴⁷ Reorganization of Sinn Fein began filling this available potential and space and built support within one-third of the Catholic population that was not pro-SDLP.

¹⁴⁷ Boyle and Hadden, p. 56.

These supporters did not necessarily prefer the utopian PIRA goals, but Sinn Fein represented the only alternative to the SDLP.

PIRA was in a reorganization period from 1975 to 1977. It took two years to set up the cell structure and establish new organizational structures and procedures. From 1977 to 1981, PIRA averaged 870 shootings and 321 bombings a year.¹⁴⁸ PIRA was capable of sustaining a steady cycle of violence, but this failed to shake the resolve of the British government. It increased the sectarian divide between Catholics and Protestants and alienated potential Catholic supporters.

4. 1981 to 1986. The Rise of Sinn Fein.

The hunger strikes broke the static environment in which caused PIRA to stagnate. An unanticipated surge of support convinced several PIRA leaders to seek a political method of harnessing popular support. However, the rapid rise and fall of sentiment proved too transitory to benefit the movement. This led to efforts to change Sinn Fein from a support organization to a full political party so that it could mobilize popular sentiment, allowing the movement to use both political and military methods. Rise of Sinn Fein derived from short cycle considerations, but created significant long cycle results. This development placed moderate political leaders in charge of the movement and opened doors to a future political compromise.

a. The Hunger Strikes.

The violent actions of the Provos failed to achieve any results. Government counter action put most of the PIRA into jail. With the bulk of the organization in jail, the focus of action shifted to the prisons. Hunger strikes were a short cycle activity conducted by the Provos to gain recognition as political prisoners. The effect of the strikes on society surprised the PIRA as they were focused on interaction with the regime. The hunger strikes produced a wave of sympathy in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

During the H block protests, sympathizers arranged to have some of the hunger strikers run for elections as a means of protest. The hunger strikers won the elections. This

¹⁴⁸ Boyle and Hadden, p. 71.

success by Sinn Fein led to a reappraisal of strategy. Since the military campaign stalled, it seemed possible to achieve more short cycle gains through political mobilization. Gerry Adams developed the 1975 cell structure reorganization of PIRA. Now he played a critical role in pushing for a political role for Sinn Fein. Adams proved to be a capable long cycle decision maker previously overlooked by the IRA.

A political strategy was not compatible with the goals and ideology of the IRA. The Provos split with the original IRA over a previous effort to adopt a political strategy. A bureaucratic struggle developed in the republican movement as Adams and his supporters gradually supplanted the hardliners. Sinn Fein attracted new supporters and a new faction within the party arose called 'the politicals'. This faction represented the new non violent members who emphasized political solutions.¹⁴⁹

b. Rise of Sinn Fein.

The 1983 elections consolidated the dominance of the politicals in Sinn Fein. At the 1983 Ard Fheis meeting of the Sinn Fein, Adams took over as president of Sinn Fein.¹⁵⁰ Gerry Adams previously commanded the Belfast Brigade and his violent past lent him the credibility required to change the movement. The Republican movement was still governed by the principle of abstention which held that no one elected could actually serve in office. Adams formed several committees and conducted a long preparation phase for changing abstention. This organizing activity continued from 1983 to 1986.

In 1986, Adams was finally ready to change the abstention policy. He reorganized Sinn Fein from a supporting organization of PIRA to the dominant organization in the Republican movement. The Provisional IRA conducted its first Army Convention since it split with the original IRA in 1969. A small element split from the movement to form a new organization called Republican Sinn Fein. The rest of the

¹⁴⁹ Brendan O'Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein, 1985 to Today, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), pp. 121-2.

¹⁵⁰ O'Brien, p. 116.

organization accepted Adams new strategy. This new organization would fight with a gun in one hand and a ballot box in the other. PIRA would continue the armed campaign, yet Sinn Fein was allowed to be an open political party to seek and hold office.

Changes that occurred between 1969 and 1986 explain why PIRA supported Sinn Fein and Adams when the 1969 convention rejected the political process. In 1969, the violence of the period generated widespread Catholic support. Many of the Provos shared the expectation that military victory was possible. However, by 1986, it was evident that the military approach failed and that the movement had lost support. The Peace movement shocked the Provos and the demonstrations of support for hunger strikers clearly proved that the political strategy could increase popular support. The hardcore members who split demonstrates the failure of an insular organization to function in a long cycle environment. The Republican Sinn Fein failed to grow and remains marginalized.

c. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Accord.

The United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland signed the Anglo-Irish Accord on 15 November, 1985. This treaty institutionalized power sharing between the Protestants and Catholics in the Province. The Irish government received a direct role in the affairs of the Province. Protestants resisted the agreement, but did not totally reject it, as in the 1974 general strike.

This agreement did not solve differences between the UK and the Republic, nor the differences between the Catholics and Protestants. Parameters were proposed in which the respective parties could discuss their differences. Finally, the parties attained middle ground so that some sort of negotiations could occur. Previously, all players were in a zero sum game. Gains could only come at the loss of someone else's cost. The Anglo-Irish Accord allowed a non zero sum solution.¹⁵¹

The agreement proved to be popular to both sides in the Province. Seventy-two percent of Catholics approved of the treaty and the Protestants tacitly approved by their

¹⁵¹ Brogan, p. 385.

lack of concerted action.¹⁵² Neither side looked like it could win militarily, and a growing consensus advocated a political solution.

5. 1986 to 1995. The Primacy of Politics.

Sinn Fein experienced an initial surge of support when it mobilized existing mobilizational potential within the Catholic community. This proved to be the Catholic working class and unemployed: about one third of all Catholics and ten percent of Northern Ireland. Stability returned after 1986. PIRA sustained the rate of violence and Sinn Fein maintained a strong electorate. John Hume and the SDLP, which represented two thirds of all Catholics, took advantage of the new politically focused Sinn Fein to negotiate with both Sinn Fein and the UK. His actions proved decisive in starting the negotiations that led to the 1993 cease fire.

a. Stalemate.

Sinn Fein has evolved since the 1986 convention into a stable political party. It routinely receives about ten percent of all votes in the province. This represents one third of the Catholic population that supports them. Sinn Fein supporters are urban working class and unemployed Catholics. The SDLP sustains support from the bulk of the Catholic community and represents Catholic middle and upper classes, clergy, students and rural areas. It receives about 22 percent of the votes in elections. Receiving about eight percent, the Alliance Party, includes both Catholic and Protestant support. The Original IRA received only one to two percent and dissolved in the late 1980s.

Electoral support for the political parties stabilized in 1983. The supporters of the varying factions established organizations. Politically and militarily, Northern Ireland has been stalemated since 1986. Each organization has existing mobilization potential, space and presence. The PIRA may be illegal, but its presence is well established in Catholic communities. Even though the government knows who is in the organization, they can not remove them without local support. The regime learned this from its failed efforts of the 1970s.

¹⁵² Bell, 1987, p. 357.

b. John Hume and the SDLP.

The original crisis developed from the actions of NICRA. The SDLP was NICRA's successor and was marginalized by the dynamic, violent environment. A stabilized environment allowed the SDLP to consolidate its support. The SDLP represented the bulk of the Catholic population and Sinn Fein's return to politics confirmed this dominance in every election. It sought a nonviolent political solution to the conflict.

Britain desired a political solution while the Irish government wanted isolation and elimination of the IRA. The Republic remembered the IRA effort to overthrow their government in the 1920s and the IRA declared goal to do so again after they won in the north. John Hume was in a position to resolve the political impasse. He sought discussions with the PIRA in 1985 and 1988.

The PIRA had no desire to negotiate. They received 240 tons of weapons from Libya in 1987-88. The Provos thought that they could use the SDLP to increase their own support. The 1985 talks failed when PIRA wanted to videotape the negotiations with Hume. In January, 1988 Hume and Adams started a new round of negotiations. These negotiations started a slow tedious process that led to the PIRA cease fire of 1993.¹⁵³ The major difference between the two sides remained the PIRA use of violence. Sinn Fein tried to change the focus from the violent acts of PIRA to the British presence. Meanwhile the SDLP focused on the effects of PIRA violence on the Catholic community.

The 1989 elections indicated the effect of the talks on the Catholic community. SDLP gained 20 district council seats and Sinn Fein lost 16.¹⁵⁴ Sinn Fein efforts to use the SDLP backfired and pressure to regain political support drove Sinn Fein to truly negotiate. Whereas the organizational preference of Sinn Fein and PIRA was to avoid negotiations, the pressure from preferences of their supporters forced them to change. Sinn Fein adapted its organization to match that of its supporters, while overcoming the different preferences of its own membership. Sinn Fein's actions during this period illustrated how an

¹⁵³ O'Brien, pp. 172-175.

¹⁵⁴ O'Brien, p. 176. Boyle and Hadden, pp. 54-9.

organization shapes the preferences of its members to be different than that of its original support base. Yet, the organization can not permanently vary its preferences from that of its supporters without losing its support base. Something had to give, and it was Sinn Fein.

c. The Cease fire.

PIRA ordered a cease fire on 31 August, 1994. The 25 year war has reached a new point and is again undergoing a transition. The cease fire took over a year of internal preparation within Sinn Fein and PIRA as well as the required negotiations with the UK. The process started with a message from Sinn Fein on 22 February, 1993. The Hume - Adams talks lasted from April to September of 1993. The Downing Street declaration in December represented the agreement of the UK and the Republic of Ireland. It took until August for Sinn Fein and PIRA to gain the agreement of their own members.¹⁵⁵

Several reasons contributed to the PIRA decision to stop seeking a victory through military means. Most obvious is that the strategy was not working. The United Kingdom showed great resolve and determination throughout the conflict and the position of the PIRA deteriorated. The SDLP established itself as the dominant party in the Catholic community. In 1992, Joe Hendron, the SDLP candidate, defeated Gerry Adams in the UK general election. This defeat in West Belfast, the stronghold of the PIRA, sent an ominous message to the organization. The decline in Catholic support was the major factor in the decision for a cease fire.¹⁵⁶ This drop in support is not just a preference shift, but a result of the effective organizational actions of the SDLP.

E. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES.

1. Contextual Environment.

The contextual changes since 1969 reinforced the sectarian divide between the two communities. The political grievances of the Catholics resulted in significant reform. The remaining economic grievances still create tension between the communities. The effort

¹⁵⁵ IISS, Strategic Survey: 1994-1995, (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 118-122. O'Brien, pp. 287-320.

¹⁵⁶ IISS, pp. 124-5. O'Brien, pp. 320-2.

to solve grievances with violence was attempted by both communities without success. A political solution is possible, but depends on the two communities ability to compromise.

a. Political Changes.

The political structure underwent a steady process of reform since the end of Stormont in 1972. Since the collapse of the Sunningdale agreement in 1974, the British attempted to create a joint Catholic and Protestant government. The problem is that the Catholics wanted to join the Republic in order to become the majority and the Protestants wanted the return of majority rule within the province where they had the majority. For both groups, majority rule meant a tyranny for the larger group.¹⁵⁷ The 1985 Anglo-Irish Accord created a middle ground for negotiations. Political issues remain unresolved.

Nevertheless, the major political demands of NICRA in 1968 were achieved. Stormont was eliminated, and the political system reformed. Now Catholics fully participate in the political process. Sinn Fein political activism included using demands for increases in local government benefits and services as a method to mobilize support.¹⁵⁸ The political process has been given an opportunity to work. This increased the expectation in the Catholic community that the SDLP can solve the conflict and that PIRA is part of the problem.

b. Economic Changes.

The economy in Northern Ireland entered a period of decline after 1974. This was due to a lack of investment caused by the conflict, a general decline in the UK economy and the decline of heavy industry in general. During the 1970s, jobs in manufacturing declined from 32 percent of the total workforce to 23 percent. The service sector expanded from 41 to 54 percent. The net effect of this benefitted the Catholic work force and hurt the Protestants. Protestants traditionally dominated heavy industry.

¹⁵⁷ Moody and Martin, p. 351.

¹⁵⁸ Sinn Fein "has organized groups to protest housing conditions, receive government benefits, obtain recreation centers, promote sporting events, repair streets and drains and work in a variety of other causes." Soule, p. 41. Far from rejecting the system, Sinn Fein is using the existing political system to further their own goals.

Unemployment climbed in the Protestant working class. The rise in the service sector benefitted the educated, Catholic middle class.¹⁵⁹

The economic differences between the communities remained. Average income for Protestant households per week in 1988 was 228 pounds compared to 185 for Catholics.¹⁶⁰ Unemployment remained high in the urban slums. The net effect of the economic changes was differentiated in the Catholic community. The urban working class that supported Sinn Fein still faced poverty and economic discrimination. The middle class that supported the SDLP saw marked economic improvement since 1969.

c. Social Changes.

The political and military deadlock is reflected in the social stalemate between the two communities. Effective use of violence reinforced the segregation of the two communities. The mixed neighborhoods of 1968 are no more. Now urban neighborhoods are divided by concrete walls. The two communities still attend different churches and schools, and live and work apart. This increased divide between the communities prevented the rise of a cross sectional organization.

In the long term, demographics of the Catholics continue to change. Catholic birth rates exceed the Protestants and eventually, the Catholics will become the majority. The urbanization of the Catholics continues. The Fair Employment Act and other legislation helped increase the size and influence of the Catholic middle class. These factors increased the size and power of the SDLP, which sought to represent the new forces in the Catholic community. Sinn Fein represents the urban, uneducated poor who are not benefitting from the economic modernization of the Catholic population.

The Protestants are becoming less cohesive over time. Two major Protestant religions are the Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland. Presbyterian membership fell from 413,000, in 1961, to 336,000 in 1991. The Church of Ireland declined from 353,000,

¹⁵⁹ Moody and Martin, p. 352.

¹⁶⁰ Boyle and Hadden, p. 50.

in 1951, to 279,000 in 1991.¹⁶¹ Declining heavy industry resulted in Protestant urban ghettos existing next to the Catholic ghettos. The Unionist Movement has always been divided into a number of political parties and paramilitary groups. The Ulster Unionist Party dominated the Protestant community from the 1920s through the 1960s. Today, it is challenged by the hard line Democratic Unionist Party and internal divisions over accommodations with the Catholics.¹⁶²

Political and economic relationships between the community have changed. Politically, the system has been reformed to allow both sides compete electorally on a level playing field. Protestants continue to hold most government jobs. Although discrimination is a factor many Catholics will not work for the security forces. Jobs in the security forces represent 11 percent the workforce and 90 percent of these jobs are held by Protestants.¹⁶³ Political compromise is needed to address economic problems.

Changes in the two communities does not preclude a negotiated end to hostilities. The growing power of the SDLP and the moderate consensus in the Protestant community holds great hope for compromise. Surveys repeatedly show that both communities desire an end to conflict. The organizational dynamics have become the major reason that conflict has continued for so long.

2. Task Environment.

The task environment fundamentally and permanently changed the interrelationships of the communities in Northern Ireland. Before 1969, no major organization represented Catholics and strong unified Protestant organization controlled the political and economic structure of the province. Today, the SDLP and Sinn Fein occupies a permanent, viable niche in the Catholic community. The Protestant community

¹⁶¹ O'Brien, p. 31.

¹⁶² Boyle and Hadden, p. 57.

¹⁶³ John W. Soule, "Problems in Applying Counterterrorism to Prevent Terrorism: Two Decades of Violence in Northern Ireland Reconsidered", in Terrorism, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1989, pp. 31-46. p. 34.

lost its former cohesion and political and economic control. Politically and economically, the Protestant community maintains an advantage. community politically and economically, but its organizations lack the cohesion and adaptability shown by the SDLP and Sinn Fein.

a. Regime.

The political system was restructured under direct rule. Catholics have been able to participate in free fair elections since the time of the 1974 Sunningdale agreement. However, the UK has not been able to work themselves out of a job. It still brokers the political process to prevent the Protestant majority from abusing the system. The political process is making progress, but is not yet solved.

Regime recruiting continues to focus on the Protestant population. The Ulsterization process has been successful in decreasing the British presence. This had the side effect of increasing the Protestant role in the government, since Catholics won't take government jobs.¹⁶⁴ The size of the British Army peaked at about 12,000. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), RUC Reserve and the Ulster Defense Regiment number 18,000 locally recruited members. Over 90 percent are Protestant and they live in virtually every Protestant neighborhood in the country.¹⁶⁵

The security forces are highly coordinated. The primary counterinsurgency organization is the police. The army operates in supporting role. The RUC is organized into 12 divisions. Local and regional support units can rapidly reinforce local units. Army, intelligence and police actions coordinate jointly from the local level all the way to a central Joint Intelligence center in the United Kingdom. The high degree of coordination allowed 30,000 security forces to control the Province of 1.5 million.

Ulsterization created a strong and permanent regime presence in the Protestant areas. The regime failed to establish presence within the Catholic social networks because the social cleavages are too wide. Police recruited Catholic informers which increased the

¹⁶⁴ This isn't just patriotism. PIRA kills Catholics who work for the government.

¹⁶⁵ O'Brien, p. 90. Soule, p. 32.

conviction rates of PIRA activists. However, coercion was used to recruit them, which increased Catholic resentment.¹⁶⁶ There is no true government presence in the urban Catholic areas. Most crimes are not reported. PIRA resorted to beatings and kneecappings to keep some semblance of order in the area.¹⁶⁷

b. Counter Regime.

The growth of the SDLP is the true cause of the cease fire. The SDLP became the dominant Catholic organization. Competition between PIRA and the SDLP steadily marginalized the PIRA within their own community. The post-1986 PIRA prevented further decline in PIRA support. Sinn Fein stabilized its support base in the urban areas, especially Belfast. There are regional variations in South Armagh and Tyrone, but the SDLP is effectively gaining control of the Catholic community.¹⁶⁸

The SDLP cooperation with the regime limited the actual counter regime support base to the Sinn Fein and the PIRA. Growth of Sinn Fein since 1986 includes many of the 'politicals'. This group believes in the political process and not necessarily the violent goals of PIRA. The armed opposition base of PIRA steadily narrowed.

Since 1985, PIRA has maintained a strength of less than 300. This is partly due to the cell structure and their fear of penetration. PIRA feels a small number of highly committed members is less vulnerable than a larger organization. The end of Stormont, in 1972, makes the smaller size a necessity. Many who supported PIRA's violence stopped

¹⁶⁶ Soule, p. 40.

¹⁶⁷ There have been 1200 Catholics knee-capped since 1969. PIRA has no jails or other method to prevent crime except force. The beatings and murders of Catholics has increased the alienation between the PIRA and the Catholic community at large.

¹⁶⁸ At the micro level, there is considerable variation in local support. South Armagh has remained a Sinn Fein and PIRA area since the 1920s due to the activity of a few strong republican families through the generations. Established social networks have proven themselves capable of surviving over time, despite social and economic changes. See O'Brien, pp. 199-205.

doing so after Stormont was eliminated. PIRA failed to understand the preferences of its supporters.

PIRA competed with violent rivals within the small social movement support base that espoused violent action. The Marxist Irish Republican Socialist Party of the 1970s became the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Its strength is less than 50, but for its numbers conducted more violent operations than the PIRA. INLA involved violent conflicts with the original IRA. In 1987, internal rivalries led to assassinations and a new splinter groups called the Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO).¹⁶⁹

The lack of success using the PIRA strategy caused rivalries within its SMI from both selective and mobilizational organizations. Sinn Fein proved the most successful. The open mobilization space, potential and presence created an opportunity for a mobilizational organization. Competition on the selective side can not be ignored. The PIRA/Sinn Fein shift to the political process increases the appeal of the radical splinter groups. As the PIRA has proven, a small, selective organization creates an impact out of proportion to its actual membership.

c. Society.

The violent period from 1969 to 1972 spawned a variety of new organizations. A middle ground appeared that represented neither the regime, nor the two sectarian communities. The Peace Movement is an indicator of a cross sectional preference, not reflected in the existing Protestant and Catholic organizations. The Alliance Party fills part of this area. It gets eight to ten percent of votes in elections and is evenly split in both Protestants and Catholics. A variety of middle class human rights associations also exist in the space between the two communities.

Boyle and Hadden describe a small minority of people who identify with neither side in the conflict. This group includes mixed marriages and those who reject any religious label. This group represents five to fifteen percent of the population. It forms a

¹⁶⁹ Peter Janke, ed. , Ethnic and Religious Conflicts, (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994), pp. 101-2.

portion of support for the Alliance Party.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the overall behavior is consistent with free riding. This group is seeking to avoid the costs of being on either side. As such, their behavior is self seeking, and it would be expected that no strong organization exists. This is the case in Northern Ireland. Many members of this group resume their ethnic identity in times of high violence, seeking the safety in the larger community.¹⁷¹

The existence of a small neutral sector reflects the sharp sectarian divide. Catholic and Protestant organizations dominate the task environment. Neutral organizations help the two sides negotiate, but lack mobilization potential or the organizational size to be decisive.

F. ANALYSIS.

Table 4-1 illustrates the relationship between the environment, organizational structure and growth for the competing organizations within the Catholic community. The regime failed to mobilize and organize Catholics in its own organizations, except for small numbers in the security forces. Most Catholics place their allegiance with their local political party, and not to the regime.

The abbreviation MC stands for the middle class social movement that forms the preference base for the SDLP. WC represents the working class social movement that supports the republican movement of Sinn Fein, PIRA, INLA, Republican Sinn Fein and the other republican organizations. The Catholic community developed into two distinct social movement industries. The middle class group contains two thirds of the Catholic community while working class group constitutes one third. Members of Sinn Fein and the SDLP are from different neighborhoods with different socio-economic backgrounds. The conflict reinforced this division within the Catholic community.

¹⁷⁰ Boyle and Hadden, pp. 62-6.

¹⁷¹ Boyle and Hadden, p. 65.

1. Growth.

Table 4-1 illustrates the environmental effects and outcomes for the major organizations within the Catholic community. Initial PIRA advantage in the chaotic period of 1969 to 1972 resulted in rapid growth. From 1972 to 1981, PIRA lost much of its strength and was reduced to a small group of survivors. The SDLP underwent a period of

Catholics	Potential	Space	Presence	Structure	Outcome	Remarks
1962-1969 NICRA IRA	High Low	Urban Urb-Rural	association old guard	MOB selective	Growth Stagnant	Catholic SMI activation
1969-1972 NICRA/ SDLP IRA/PIRA	High High	Entire Catholic SMI	association CCDC	MOB Selective	Reorganize Growth	PIRA dominates SMI
1972-1975 SDLP PIRA	High High	Legal Illegal	Middle Class-MC Working Class-WC	MOB Selective	Stable Stable	PIRA in jail
1976-1981 SDLP PIRA	High High	MC WC	MC WC	MOB Selective	Stable No Growth	
1981-1986 SDLP Sinn Fein PIRA	High High Low	MC WC WC	MC WC WC	MOB Reorganize Selective	Stable Growth Stable	
1986-1995 SDLP Sinn Fein PIRA	High High Low	MC WC WC	MC WC WC	MOB MOB Selective	Stable Stable Stable	Situation Stabilized

Table 4-1. Environment, Organizational Structure and Outcomes.

growth, then stabilized its support base. Working class Catholics favored the PIRA and remained unorganized until the hunger strikes. From 1981 to 1986, Sinn Fein grew as it mobilized the Catholic working class and then it stabilized. From 1986 to 1995, the SDLP and Sinn Fein have maintained their support bases with no significant changes. The Catholic community is fully mobilized within the existing environment.

a. PIRA Advantage Over NICRA, 1969 to 1972.

The period from 1969 to 1972 illustrated the short cycle advantage of a selective organization in a dynamic and violent environment. PIRA became the dominant organization in the Catholic community because it was able to act faster than NICRA. The existing army structure of PIRA incorporated new members into battalions and brigades gave them defined tasks. NICRA was a new organization with weak infrastructure and fell apart in the dynamic environment. PIRA was more successful than NICRA for the following reasons.

(1) Selective organizations are more capable of rapid action than mobilizational organizations. NICRA redefined its goals and achieved a consensus in the changing environment. With known goals and methods, the PIRA mobilized new members right away and conducted its first violent actions in February, 1971. NICRA reorganized and the nascent SDLP remained ineffective until after the UK established direct rule.

(2) A dynamic, violent environment favors selective organizations. The need for self defense favored PIRA more than NICRA. PIRA offered immediate security while NICRA could only offer defense after negotiations, leaving members exposed in the interim. Established organizations have competitive advantage over new organizations. Even though the IRA was much smaller than NICRA, it used its existing and developed organizational structure to grow. NICRA spent the period from 1969 to 1971 creating an organizational structure.

b. Stalemate 1972 to 1986.

The end of Stormont was a significant decision causing short and long cycle effects. In the short cycle, it resolved the major Catholic demand and helped stabilize the environment. In the long cycle, it left a stalemate between the UK, Protestants and Catholics. Even though the UK had enough strength to endure, it could not win a militarily, nor negotiate a political solution.

c. SDLP Stabilizes its Support.

British moves to close the No Go areas diminished both the dynamism and violence in the environment. In this situation, the SDLP consolidated and grew. It has

maintained a fairly constant and reliable support base since 1973. Growth of the SDLP in itself produced no effect on the violent conflict between PIRA and the UK. Prevention of further conflict represents its major contribution. PIRA lost the support of most Catholics. It sustained enough support to continue fighting, but not enough to win.

d. Sinn Fein Stabilizes Support.

Between 1972 and 1975, the UK nearly destroyed PIRA. From 1975 to 1977, it reorganized. Since 1977, it has managed to survive with under 300 active members. The reorganization created a vacuum in the urban, working class, Catholic neighborhoods that traditionally supported PIRA. Neither the SDLP nor the UK were able to gain any members in these areas. Yet, the new structure of PIRA left this group unmobilized. The results of the hunger strikes indicated the potential power of this unmobilized group. PIRA's selective structure was not designed to mobilize this group. From 1981 to 1986, Sinn Fein reorganized as a mobilizational organization and established a solid support base in these Catholic neighborhoods.

The failure of PIRA to mobilize potential supporters depicts the organizational nature of internal conflict. The contextual environment favored mobilization of the Catholic urban working class. This group possessed the greatest political and economic grievances in the Catholic community. Although relative deprivation and macro societal explanations of revolution such as that espoused by Ted Gurr and Theda Skocpol predict that this group would mobilize. But because of the internal organizational choice of PIRA, no mobilization occurred.

The decision to form a mobilizational organization can clearly be identified as a response to the hunger strikes. Efforts of Adams and McGuinness to reorganize the organization took five years. This time period resulted from the internal organizational desire to avoid a schism. Organizational dynamics explain this, relative deprivation does not.¹⁷²

¹⁷² See O'Brien, p. 42-3 on deprivation variations within the Catholic community.

2. UK Ulsterization Policy.

The United Kingdom chose to 'Ulsterize' the conflict in the mid 1970s. The Ulsterization policy reduced the British role and increases reliance on local solutions and local resources. Politically, this move lowered internal domestic opposition in the UK. It also led to searches for a political solution and efforts to negotiate with the Republic of Ireland, as well as the non paramilitary Protestant and Catholic organizations.

Ulsterization had the inadvertent effect of increasing the sectarian nature of the conflict. The RUC police force and UDR military force are primarily Protestant. The new policy placed them in the forefront of the conflict and their casualties soared. Each death increases Protestant resentment and desire for revenge against the Catholics.

3. Mobilization.

The Catholic community became mobilized during the violent period of 1969 to 1972. Managing to mobilize its potential strength by 1973 the SDLP remains stable. Hunger strikes activated the mobilization potential that Sinn Fein mobilized after 1983. Since 1983, the Catholic community has been stable. No new increases in mobilization have occurred. There are still sentiment shifts but the organizational stability of the SDLP and Sinn Fein means that there are no large groups of Catholics which lack representation in existing organizations.

The UK attempted to increase Catholic membership in the administration, police and military. About 10 percent of the 18,000 local security forces are Catholic. This means that the government has more armed Catholics than PIRA. Yet, 18,000 Catholics out of a population of 500,000 is minuscule. The Catholics who work for the UDR and RUC hide their identities and live with the fear that the PIRA will discover them.¹⁷³ The UK has been more successful in increasing the Catholic presence in the administration. The SDLP and Sinn Fein together won 160 of 566 district council seats in 1985. These two organizations are gaining seats with each election. They won 164 of 566 in 1989 and 177

¹⁷³ Tony Parker, May the Lord in His Mercy Be Kind to Belfast, (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), pp. 189-203.

seats of 578 in 1993.¹⁷⁴ The local councils determine local government jobs and housing. Protestants still dominate the administration, but not to the degree that they dominate the police and army.

The UK failed to establish effective presence in the Catholic community. The social contact networks of the Catholics remain impervious to British efforts. UK presence is limited to heavily bunkered police, army posts and roving patrols. It relies on informants who are normally coerced to provide information to avoid imprisonment. The British demonstrated remarkable ability in gathering extensive intelligence on PIRA without effectively to establish a voluntary presence within Catholic social networks. This allowed them to increase the effectiveness in their counter organizational struggle with PIRA.

4. Organization Efforts.

Without Catholics in the government forces, the regime has been unable to wage the counter mobilization effort that proved so decisive in Malaya. The UK can not eliminate the potential and space of the PIRA in the Catholic working class neighborhoods unless they use massive force. However, the UK accommodation strategy proved an effective way to isolate the insurgents within their own community. Today, the SDLP condemns PIRA violence and its declared goal is to foster peaceful resolution of the conflict.

¹⁷⁴ O'Brien, p. 197.

V. ALGERIA.

A. INTRODUCTION.

The two previous case studies demonstrate the descriptive capabilities of the organizational model. This chapter attempts to show the model's utility as a prescriptive tool as well. Unique to this case is the absence of substantial external intervention in the conflict.¹⁷⁵ This enhances our ability to examine the explanatory and predictive qualities of the model. Additionally, the contextual environment includes Islamism, a phenomenon which many argue makes internal conflict unique.¹⁷⁶ A review of the development of the conflict combined with an assessment of the current situation in Algeria demonstrates the utility of the organizational model.

B. CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT.

Algerian political, economic, and social development over the past 40 years has been centrally controlled by a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Politics preceded society in Algeria.¹⁷⁷ This assertion simplifies the current predicament of the Algerian government and its poor relationship with the people. Made up of an elite group that grows smaller over time, the regime's efforts to manage the population by controlling the environment

¹⁷⁵This is based on the absence of major physical intervention by external actors. Many sources indicate that France continues to provide funding and recently began supplying limited amounts of high-tech military hardware; in addition to funding from both French banks and the IMF. The FIS allegedly has received funding and limited support from Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia.

¹⁷⁶Much has been published in recent years citing the unique nature of internal conflict caused by Islamism, or political Islam. While most of this material exists in the popular media, some scholars have argued that Islamism adds a dynamic worth considering as a new phenomenon (Samuel Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, 1992). The authors do not agree that ideology or religion exist in a causal relationship to internal conflict.

¹⁷⁷Susan Waltz, Human Rights and Reform: Changing the face of North African Politics, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

produced favorable conditions for internal conflict. A description of the contextual factors defines the environmental structure of the current conflict.

1. Geography and Historical Background.

Much like the geographical limitations of Malaya, Algeria's population of approximately 27 million is confined to one-fifth of the total land mass that falls within the state boundaries. The country is divided into two distinct geographical regions. The northern, urban areas are located in the mountains, valleys and plateaus of the Maghreb region. This area is easily geographically subdivided from east to west by terrain features. The south, four-fifths of the Algerian countryside, consists of uninhabitable desert.

Twentieth century Algerian history began under French colonial rule which ended in 1962. As early as 1908 groups formed to pressure the regime for reform. Both secular and Islamist organizations, although small and ineffectual, existed until they were banned in 1929. By the late 1930s, these groups began to grow and mobilize the population. Attempts by the French to accommodate the growing Algerian Nationalist movement failed.¹⁷⁸ Efforts during World War II also failed and by the end of the war the Nationalist movement elicited itself in mass demonstrations and civil unrest.¹⁷⁹ Algerians initiated their war for independence against France in 1954.

The war lasted eight years and cost the Algerians close to 250,000 dead and stripped the infrastructure of French bureaucrats.¹⁸⁰ Establishing a new authoritarian regime, the National Liberation Front (FLN), struggled to consolidate power. Far from cohesive, the front consisted of a wide array of interests. It nearly collapsed in the first few years into a civil war along an urban - rural divide. Characterized by internecine violence and

¹⁷⁸The Violette Plan sought to offer certain socio-economic sectors of the Algerian population French citizenship. It failed to become law, rejected by the Algerians.

¹⁷⁹This final gesture was called the "Manifesto of the Algerian People" and like the Violette Plan failed to impress the Algerian leadership.

¹⁸⁰Some estimates place the number as high as one million.

rivalries between various elites, the FLN survived in large part due to the role of the military. To complete consolidation of power, the regime integrated Islamic institutions, coopted the clerics by requiring certification, and screened (sometimes composed) Friday mosque sermons.¹⁸¹

2. Politics.

Algeria developed into a bureaucratic authoritarian state. The chaotic power struggles after independence led to an effort to consolidate power and prevent the development of future challenges to the regime. The regime's policies can only be understood in the light of an urgent need to establish and maintain control. The political system became selective and steadily narrowed over time. This stratified the political system. The ruling elites became more and more insular. At the regional and local level, mass populist organizations mobilized members from virtually every possible social connection at the work place and in local neighborhoods. In the short term, this stabilized the dynamism of the environment and allowed stability. In the long term, the populist approach created political networks interwoven throughout society. The narrowing of the regime elites created a growing gap between the elites and the organizations within society.

In 1965, Houari Boumedienne assumed Algeria's highest office in a military coup. He understood the necessity of balancing the interests of the elite and FLN with the desires of the military much better than his predecessor. Algeria is not a one party state. The top of the political structure represented a balance between the bureaucracy, the military and the FLN. Boumedienne shifted the power relationships in this triad by establishing the primacy of the military and the bureaucracy over the FLN. He placed members of the FLN in local and regional government positions. National power was exercised through a network of patronage and control within the elite hierarchy, relegating the FLN to symbolic roles.

¹⁸¹Hugh Roberts, "Radical Islam and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: The Embattled Arians of Algiers," Third World Quarterly. 10(2), (April, 1988) p. 556-559.

Boumedienne's ambitious "*Revolution Socialiste*," initiated a dynamic process in the contextual environment. He sought to control all associations and organizations in society to prevent the emergence of any future challenger. Over time this activity produced conditions favorable for the rise of a populist movement (Islamists would eventually organize it). Between 1965 and 1971, the regime assaulted the private property of Muslims. Acquisition of public property came at the expense of the private sector. In order to begin the agrarian reforms and nationalization programs, Boumedienne mobilized the large younger generation. He used them to challenge the traditional symbols of authority and the defenders of the status quo within the regime SMI.

By mobilizing the younger generation, primarily to challenge the old guard FLN and entrenched elites, short cycle growth and outcomes favored the regime. Boumediene narrowed the membership in the top elites by mobilizing new social groups against the middle hierarchy. Structural changes included:

(1) the mobilization of rural society and subversion of traditional centers of authority, (2) develop[ment of] societal condemnation of private capital, (3) an attempt to establish the Party as an effective instrument for political mobilization, in order to bring the rural and urban working sectors into the national political community.¹⁸²

Under the "*Revolution Socialiste*," Boumedienne nationalized industry and a radical land reform program began in rural areas. This served the political purpose of eliminating any potential power base in the private sector. The FLN continued efforts to keep the population focused on the shared experience of the war of independence. The ultimate goal of the FLN was to reinforce the identity of the Algerian nation-state. Efforts to cultivate a national identity became paramount as the Algerian culture underwent severe strain caused by forced modernization. According to Hugh Roberts,

The mobilization of rural society...[was] a process which involved the subverting of tribal and kinship structures and the elimination of traditional centers of authority in the countryside...It was an offensive against private

¹⁸²Ibid., p. 573.

capital (agrarian and commercial) combined with the stigmatization of the 'bourgeois tendencies' of the new middle class.¹⁸³

The impositions of the radical ideas of Boumedienne on the traditional communities in Algeria led to a "climate of unremitting tension, and to a degree of political and ideological polarization...in Algeria without precedent".¹⁸⁴ This tension produced a situation unfavorable for the regime when it failed to meet expectations of the growing population.

The regime actions against the traditional social and business leaders required the regime to develop a new social base to rule the state. The regime selected a secular policy relying on an educated bureaucracy. Education became the credentialing criteria for political, economic and social status. Both the military and the bureaucracy recruited from this support base. The FLN became a backwater to pay off the old, traditional supporters of the regime.

From independence to the elections of 1990, the military maintained a low profile, working behind the scenes to control the elites. To avoid implication for occasional violent repression, the military employed a paramilitary organization to stop rioting in the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁸⁵ The power of the military can be seen in the periods of leadership transitions. Although the FLN selected candidates, until 1991 the military influence in the decision was critical.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³Ibid., p. 573-574.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., idem.

¹⁸⁵Europa Publications Limited, 1995, 41st Ed., (London: Staples Printers Rochester Limited, 1995)p. 265. Human rights associations were illegal. The leaders of the Algerian League of Human Rights (ALHR) and the Sons of Chouhada were arrested in 1985. Clashes between the government and human rights organizations occurred regularly through the 1980s.

¹⁸⁶Waltz, Human Rights, pp. 86-87. Waltz points out that the military is generally designed as an institution for coopting potential opposition more than promoting the military as a body.

3. Economics.

According to Spencer, "revolutionary socialism in Algeria . . . was as much a political as economic response to the fragmentation of society".¹⁸⁷ Understanding the regime as the patron of the people depicts the crucial role of the political economy of Algeria. Economic policy was driven by political concerns. This emphasis on control in the short cycle creating serious problems for both state and society in the long cycle.

Boumedienne's patronage and control leadership methods hindered his attempts to diversify capital intensive industrial development. By focusing on capital-intensive heavy industry, little funding remained to support labor intensive business which increased unemployment.¹⁸⁸ State projects employed the large technocracy. Boumedienne feared that diverting funds from state projects might cause a negative reaction among the technocracy. He relied on their loyalty to administer his reforms. These policies eliminated the private sector and established the bureaucracy as the dominant political and economic force.

Failure to diversify resulted in major economic problems, particularly in agriculture. Export-led growth aggravated structural imbalances. Algeria's traditional agricultural sector stagnated while the public sector failed to respond to the politically motivated schemes of the regime. Once able to feed its population and export a surplus, Boumedienne's land reform eventually destroyed Algerian agriculture. Leaving the destitute rural areas in search of work. A massive rural to urban migration began in the 1970s compounding the crisis.

The regime's unbalanced and inefficient economic policy was masked by oil revenues. After the 1973 oil crisis, oil wealth exploded. This allowed the regime to continue its economically inefficient policies to politically coopt and control society.

¹⁸⁷Claire Spencer, "The Maghreb in the 1990s," Alephi Paper No. 274 (London: Brassey's IISS, 1993) pp. 15-18.

¹⁸⁸Helen Chapin Metz, Algeria: A Country Study, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994) p. 94.

However, it was not possible to permanently mask the growing political, economic and social inequalities forever. Economic problems in the 1980s forced the regime to undertake limited reforms.

Following Boumedienne in 1980s, Bendjedid Chadli's two five-year plans focused on diversification and constituted a break with Boumedienne's strict central control. Attempting to reverse the dismal performance of the agricultural sector, Chadli focused more on this sector from 1985-1989. By 1987, Chadli's liberal approach was manifested in the abolition of the Ministry of Planning. His final Five-Year Plan further reduced the role of the government in economic planning. This relatively decentralized approach constituted a major break with the trends of the first 20 years of the Republic.

4. Social Factors.

Major social divisions, although a historical feature of Algeria, are not ethnic or religious as they were in the Malayan and Irish case studies.¹⁸⁹ The primary vertical cleavage in society lay between the ruling elites and the remainder of the population. Although division between the lower socio-economic strata and the educated, middle and business classes exist these are not impermeable barriers. Local associations and community organizations exhibit the strongest commitment from members. Many of these groups overlap. Ethnic and class divisions are not as wide or as deep as in the other case studies. Only the barriers between the elite and the general population constitute a significant permanent structural separation.

In addition to these vertical cleavages, horizontal divisions in society exist. A rural-urban split developed during last 30 years, due largely to the failure of economic

¹⁸⁹Azzenine Layachi, "Algeria: Reinstating the State or Instating a Civil Society?" in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995) p. 174. The state controlled all official mosques. Unofficial mosques began to form in the late 1970s as small groups of Islamists organized to meet the requirements of the growing urban population and to attempt to begin to mobilize support. Only a very minuscule portion of Algeria are non-Muslims.

development combined with the growing population.¹⁹⁰ Algeria's population growth is one of the highest in the world. Unemployment rose with the simultaneous failure of labor intensive industry and agriculture. Compounding the volatility of this shift is the growing number of Algerians under the age of 30.¹⁹¹

Long a smoldering issue in Algerian history, the conflict over the official Algerian languages continues to exacerbate any political issue involving the Berber population, particularly in the Kabyle province. Berbers constitute approximately 20 percent of the population and demand acceptance of the traditional Berber language. Although the Berber community reflects the fragmented nature of the rest of Algeria, most Berbers unite on this issue. At a minimum, Berbers favor maintaining French rather than adopting a purely Arabic state. Arabophones, particularly the Islamists, threaten to place the Berbers at disadvantage in the society by advocating an Arabic-only national language.

State education is taught in Arabic while the most prestigious professions and graduate schools teach in French. Children of the state elites occupy most vacancies in these schools ahead of their Arabic schooled peers. The disadvantage of not learning Arabic limits the capability of the non-elites to compete for the best state jobs. Language equals future opportunity.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰Bennoune (1988), Between 1967 and 1979, 1.3 million Algerians moved from the countryside to the cities.

¹⁹¹Susan Morgan, "A Little Late in the Day," The Middle East, (June, 1994) p. 29. This is a good article to reference for details on Algeria's economic situation from 1993-1994. Morgan also provides compelling evidence on the demographic problem and how it affected the work force. "...only six million out of a population of over 27 million are potentially economically active."

¹⁹²Ali El Kenz, Algerian Reflections on the Arab Crises, (Austin: University of Texas, 1991) p. 13. Disparity in language and position led to the current situation described by this source where, "French-speaking engineers and Arabic-speaking ideologues" must cooperate. Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa, (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, UT at Austin, 1993) p. 257.

The contextual environment at this point was characterized by low mobilization potential and no mobilization space for opposition movements. Under Boumedienne, cultural monolithism followed the strictly controlled political and economic program. Riots and other brief forms of civil unrest occurred but these cases represented unorganized, local protests easily contained by the regime. With little potential and no space or presence, opposition organizations did not appear until 1982.

5. Contextual Dynamics.

The contextual environment of Algeria created unstable conditions for the regime. Characterized by a selective structure, the political system offered little space for political participation or expression. The circle of ruling elites grew smaller and more exclusive.¹⁹³ Reduction in political opportunity occurred as the urban middle and lower sectors of the population grew. Meanwhile, the urban and rural economies performed dismally, amplifying the vertical and horizontal cleavages. Over the long cycle, these factors created a contextual environment that directly contradicted the needs of the task environment. Change to the contextual environment eventually occurred as a result of regime actions. These actions, however, compounded the existing problems because they contradicted the structure of the society and regime.

C. TASK ENVIRONMENT.

Algeria's task environment was dominated by the regime effort to use populist organizations to capture all possible mobilization potential and space in society. The proliferation of organizations led to government penetration into all aspects of political, economic and social life. The regime was capable of sustaining this effort through the 1970s due to oil revenue. In the 1980s, declining government income reduced the state's ability to pay for organizational dominance in the task environment.

¹⁹³Todd Shields, "The Battle of Algeria: A Wary World Watches as Muslim Radicals Take Aim at Strategic Arab Nation," U.S. News and World Report, 117(8), (August 22, 1994) pp. 44-47.

Algeria's task environment reached its highest level of stability during the 1970s.¹⁹⁴ The FLN dominated government at all levels. Most believed in the FLN as the shrine of revolutionary nationalist values. Islam, the state religion remained a stabilizing fixture of the society. A few riots protesting specific actions or policies of the regime produced negligible effects. Popular support for the government remained high until various internal and external factors combined in the middle 1980s making it difficult for the government to continue doling out food, housing and medical care.¹⁹⁵

Then, as Chadli's liberal economic policies began to impact the contextual environment, mobilization potential and mobilization space increased.¹⁹⁶ Chadli's economic liberalization altered the mechanism designed to maintain political control over the population. Government presence declined and mobilization space opened. This new policy started an unanticipated systemic reaction in the task environment. This increase in munificence and dynamism led to the formation and growth of new political organizations. The selective organizational structure of the regime failed to establish effective presence at the local levels. Consequently, the absence of local level organizational structures impaired the regime's ability to test reality.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴Layachi, "Algeria: Reinstating the State," p. 175. "As long as the state continued to perform its distributive function . . . opposition could hardly gather support by attacking the social and economic policies of the regime."

¹⁹⁵Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa, (UT at Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1993) p. 86.

¹⁹⁶Lohouari Addi, "The Islamist Challenge: Religion and Modernity in Algeria," Journal of Democracy, 3(4), (October, 1992) p. 77. In the 1980s, authoritarian models of economic development failed, precipitating the decline of the regime and the decision to turn toward more liberal policies. The authors note that this turn was required to ensure IMF assistance.

¹⁹⁷ An organization's systemic viewpoint influences what factors it reacts to that drive organizational action and change. See Huse and Bowditch, pp. 310-312.

1. Origins of Conflict.

Failure of Boumedienne's plans left a disenfranchised young generation and former opponents poised against the traditional structure of society. Coalitions between these two large sectors of society began to develop in 1979. With sharp divisions between the Boumedienne's successor and the elites beginning to manifest themselves in society, the dynamism and complexity of the environment increased. According to Tarrow,

the most salient changes in opportunity structure (mobilization potential and mobilization space) are: (1) opening participation, (2) shifts in the ruling elites, (3) availability of influential allies, and (4) growing cleavages within the ruling elites.¹⁹⁸

Algeria in the 1980s, met all four of these Tarrow's criteria.

Counter regime organizations flourished under Chadli's *infitah*. Economic liberalization created a dynamic environment exceeding the capability of government control and increasing mobilization potential. The associated simultaneous withdraw of government presence in the cities and rural areas provided an unprecedented opportunity for political entrepreneurs. The Islamists filled the political vacuum created by the regime's declining support base. Regime decisions during this period represent one error producing an unfavorable systemic reaction, followed by another inappropriate decision. The long term dynamic produced a spiral away from regime control.

2. Regime.

The regime's authoritarian control, selective structure, and one-party dominance of politics continued, in spite of increasing munificence and dynamism in the task environment. Internally, the ruling elites competed for control and influence of the dwindling resources available to the regime.¹⁹⁹ This upset the established patronage

¹⁹⁸Sydney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 86.

¹⁹⁹Waltz, Human Rights, p. 90. Five distinct factions emerged in the middle 1980s.

networks. These developments placed massive internal strain on the regime SMI.²⁰⁰ As in the Irish case (see Chapter IV), the Algerian government structure prevented any long term analysis of its policies and led to short cycle decisions.

Bureaucratic politics in the regime were balanced between the bureaucracy, military and FLN. The rise of the state controlled economy shifted power towards the bureaucrats and away from the FLN. The economic crisis led to elaborate economic plans that required high technocratic expertise. Chadli's efforts to rule were constrained by the political rivalry between the rising technocrats and declining FLN. A compromise reached in the early 1980s left him with control of economic policies while the FLN and military handled political and institutional issues. The FLN's public visibility grew very strong during this same period, setting it up to take the blame for conditions that led to rioting in 1988.²⁰¹ Ultimately, this would lead to the FLN's demise.

The new middle business, bureaucratic and technocratic sectors relied on state projects for work and funding. But efforts to open the economy also threatened their security. This educated, middle sector of society sought greater autonomy in the political sphere and opposed liberal economic reforms that threatened to end the state patronage. This government apparatus accustomed to the patronage of the elites began to feel threatened. As a result, continued efforts to conceal the cleavages in the government no longer succeeded. The business sector began funding the nascent Islamist movement as a reaction to government activity.

a. Front for National Liberation (FLN).

A front organization, not a political party, the FLN was characterized by disunity and multiple factions. The concentration of power in the FLN required that a group or coalition gain leverage over the leaders of the various districts of Algeria. The

²⁰⁰John P. Entelis, "Political Islam in Algeria: The Nonviolent Dimension," Current History, 94 (January, 1995) p. 15. Elite groups long accustomed to living on the benefits of the state were reluctant to surrender economic and social privileges.

²⁰¹Layachi, "Algeria: Reinstating the State," p. 176.

elites administering these *wilayas* made no efforts to mobilize their constituents or recruit outside the elite networks.

Normal dynamics within the FLN were zero-sum. Unable to develop a mechanism for compromise, the factions within the Front shifted back and forth in order to prevent any one coalition from dominating the organization. Ironically, the political culture of this organization, and arguably for the rest of the country, stressed unity but it was rarely manifested in behavior. The underlying ideology of the elite is egalitarianism. A coalition that begins to assume a dominant role often triggers a balancing coalition. Ruling factions often resorted to coercive tactics. At times assassination of internal opponents occurred in order for competing groups to maintain the balance of power.²⁰²

The FLN's inherent problem with growth improved under Boumedienne, but remained deficient given the absence of competition and large potential. Having observed the poor performance of recruiting new members, he took control of the FLN apparatus himself. In 1977, he appointed Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui (a *pagsiste*, member of the former Communist faction of the FLN), as head of the National Assembly. During his three year tenure, party worker strength rose from 5,000 to 15,000. This is also the period that the PAGS was given tacit control over the mass organizations, particularly the workers unions. But these groups were not cohesive.

Boumediene's death led to the dominance of the bureaucrats over the FLN. Benjedid Chadli came to power as a result of the military influence in the Fourth Congress held in January, 1979. Chadli consolidated his position by purging the Central Committee of all opponents.²⁰³ Chadli represented an alliance of the technocrats and the military against the FLN. The FLN generally supported Chadli and his "consumption-oriented"

²⁰²Waltz, Human Rights, p. 85-87. Waltz gives a very thorough explanation of the dynamic underlying the FLN.

²⁰³Chadli fired all of Boumedienne's cronies. Removal of Yahiaoui caused major consternation amongst followers of the late Boumedienne. Chadli's appointment and subsequent dismantling of the failed *Revolution Socialiste* served as a catalyst for the coalition between Islamists and the urban peasantry.

economic ideals until 1985. Efforts to alter the National Charter to reflect the milder economic approach renewed regime in-fighting. The "enriched" National Charter was approved following the Fifth National Congress held in 1985. Growing tension and resentment formed in the FLN as their former influence and power waned.

Although characterized by chronic divisions, the FLN's greatest split occurred in the early 1990s over support for the regime. It developed a bicephalous leadership defined by the separation between 'conciliators' and 'eradicators'. The conciliators favored Chadli's moderate, accommodative strategy for dealing with the rising Islamist opposition. Eradicators pressed the regime for massive repression to terminate what was viewed as a serious threat to the elite. An identical split developed in the FIS when it formed, demonstrating the balancing dynamics of social movements.

The divisions within the FLN represent a reaction to the waning power of the FLN relative to the bureaucrats. The internal divisions within the regime SMI became the dominant factor in determining the behavior of the regime. Having eliminated, suppressed or coopted all organizational opposition, the regime based its behavior on the need to control its own SMI. This led to the rise of new associations and organizations within society unobserved by the regime focused on its internal short cycle rivalries.

2. Counter Regime.

Prior to 1989, opposition organizations formed from FLN splinter groups. With links to the FLN, these groups did present a considerable political threat to the regime. In the late 1970s, small grassroots Islamist groups began to form. Lack of potential and space prevented them from growing very large. These groups generally confined themselves to the new associational base that formed in the poor suburb neighborhoods of Algiers and Blida. Opening of the economic sphere created a dynamic that also loosened the regime's political and social control over the population. This dynamic continued through the 1980s providing space for counter regime organizations to develop and grow.

a. Secular Opposition.

Early secular counter regime organizations suffered from disunity and incoherent platforms like the FLN.²⁰⁴ They also failed to establish presence and reflected similar symptoms of elitism that continues to dominate Algerian politics. Waltz sights evidence of this flaw. In the early years, neither the FFS nor the PRS attempted to respond to potential constituents needs or articulation of their demands.²⁰⁵ Repression from the regime also constrained these organizations. The regime controlled space so that these mobilizational organizations had little room to grow. The regime coopted or repressed the leaders of any group that appeared viable.

(1) Party of the Socialist Revolution (PRS). Organized in 1962, this group was led by Mohammed Boudiaf. Characterized by an selective organizational structure with a strict hierarchy, it failed to grow.²⁰⁶ Following their release from Algerian jails, the leaders resided in Paris and directed operations in absentsia. In 1968, members located in Algeria openly challenged this organizational structure and were ejected from the group. There after PRS membership declined and the organization died.

(2) Front of Socialist Forces (FFS). Organized in 1963, this Berber-based group challenged the regime as illegitimate and called for rehabilitation of the compromised revolution. Unlike the PRS, the FFS suffered from a lack of organization. According to Waltz, the leadership discouraged development of an organizational structure, encouraging members to fight within the frameworks of existing organizations. This demonstrates the institutionalized nature of the local association. National level organizations appear to represent foreign concepts to Algerians. Throughout the sixties the

²⁰⁴The authors use "secular" to refer to any counter regime or political organizations that exist outside the Islamist movement. This is an effort to simplify the discussion. Some analysts argue that the FIS is genuinely secular. The authors agree with this assessment but wish to differentiate between those who use Islam as an ideological front and those who do not.

²⁰⁵Ibid., p.95.

²⁰⁶Ibid., p. 95.

FFS used terrorism and other forms of political violence against the regime. After suffering decisive losses in open confrontation with government forces, Ait Ahmed escaped into exile and the organization went underground.²⁰⁷ It resurfaced in 1989 when space reopened.

(3) Avant - Garde Socialist Party (PAGS). The only political organization allowed to exist along with the FLN, the PAGS was formed the 1970s. Boumediene managed to coopt the Communist Party of Algeria (PCA) in 1966. After reorganizing, People's Communist Party of Algeria (PCA) became the PAGS. Boumedeinne used this organization to infiltrate the workers unions. Although it became a counter regime organization when Chadli Bendjedid dismissed Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui from the FLN leadership, the PAGS continued to maintain connections with selected elites within the FLN and regime.

b. Islamists.

This movement emerged in the early 1980s. The presence of this new movement was felt in the suburban neighborhood mosques and the universities. Members of these small, autonomous groups espoused social and cultural reforms by handing out tracts to individuals.

The Islamist movement formed in the only space not closed by the regime. An Islamic country could not directly repress Islam. Indirectly, the regime funded mosques, certified imams and censored the Friday sermons. Nevertheless, the demographic explosion in the cities led to the development of small, adhoc mosques located in apartments and garages outside of state control. These new, local mosques formed the space that allowed regime opponents to use to organize. University students founded and ran the mosques, supported by funds from a disenchanted business and middle class. The mosques started local charity programs that tied together the students, businessmen and the urban poor.

Initial indications of the growing strength of the Islamists surfaced after the police arrested Islamists following a clash between Islamist and Berber university students. The

²⁰⁷Ibid., p. 96.

arrests triggered a protest march of 5,000 Islamist sympathizers. A 14-point document demanding government reform was rejected by the regime.

After a decade of gradual development, the Islamist movement represented about 2,000 mosques located in cities and towns throughout the country. Each mosque represented an alliance of local elements of the community. There was no regional or national infrastructure to the movement due to regime opposition. The movement was based around political and economic reforms with Islam representing a moral code lacking in a secular, corrupt regime.

(1) Armed Islamic Movement. The first Islamic political organization, it represented a radical, violent fringe. From 1982-1987, Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), led by Mustafa Bouyali, began employing guerrilla forces against the regime. Using a selective framework, this group was organized into 16 cells across Algeria. Members came from all social backgrounds, most were educated and employed by the state. A small organization that experienced little growth, it disintegrated with Bouyali's death in 1987. This group received considerable clandestine support from the military and former FLN revolutionaries in the region of MIA operations. Elite power struggles were beginning to spread into the open. The jailed leaders reappeared a few years later to assume leadership positions in the FIS.²⁰⁸

(2) Islamic Salvation Front(FIS). Following the riots in 1988, Abbas Madani, a professor of sociology, announced the creation of the FIS. The two leaders of the broad Islamist movement, Ahmed Sahnoun and Mahfoudh Nahnah thought Madani's move ill-advised. But Madani, an experienced politician proceeded with developing the organization. In 1989, the FIS mobilized the neighborhood mosques in less than six months. The organizational development of the Islamist movement over the previous 12 years produced impressive results. The number of mosques increased from 2,000 to

²⁰⁸Frank Tachau, Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994) p. 47.

10,000.²⁰⁹ As local mosques were mobilized, the message of the FIS went out to the large, diverse, disenfranchised sectors of the population. The FIS represented the first grassroots support political organization in the 30 year history of the Algerian Republic. Local associations were mobilized in support of a national organization. The mobilization potential that had developed in the 1980s acquired mobilizational space in 1988 which it rapidly filled. The rapid growth was caused by an extensive organizational presence in over 2,000 local mosques.

In less than two years the FIS built a capable political organization. According to George Joffe,

By . . . June 1990, the FIS had created a five-level national organization. At the national level was the *Bureau Executif National* or *Majils ash-Shura* to which were linked five commissions responsible for organization, education, social affairs, planning and information. This structure was replicated at the provincial (*walaya*) level and at the communal level. Within each commune, a number of mosques were grouped together to form the fourth level and, around each mosque, were gathered a number of neighborhoods (*quartiers*). In each neighborhood was the fifth organizational level, the *comite de quartier*. Authority was delegated down the chain of command, and at its apex, above the *Majils ash-Shura* stood . . . Madani and Benhadj.²¹⁰

Tachau's analysis claims that actions at the lowest level were dictated from above. Madani appointed himself as the sole official spokesman for the organization.

FIS drew its support from virtually all the disenchanted members of Algerian society. Members, supporters and sympathizers included highly educated technicians and students primarily from science and technical backgrounds. The non state controlled sector of the economy provided strong support, especially from parts of the private commercial sector and the members of the black market. These two private business groups provided

²⁰⁹George Joffe, "Algeria: The Failure of Dialogue," in The Middle East and North Africa, 41st ed., (Europa Publications Ltd., 1995) p. 6.

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 6. Tachau, Political Parties, p. 41. *Bureau Executif National* consisted of 30 to 40 members. This was the decision making body and kept secret until the demise of the organization in 1992.

the bulk of the funding for the FIS. Most important to the FIS, however, was the massive mobilization base consisting of unemployed, marginalized, young males.²¹¹

The FIS emphasized seizure of political power as a prerequisite to reform society. This type of appeal reflects the elitist bent in the leadership of the FIS and appeared similar to the rhetoric of the old FLN. A populist approach with little intellectual content produced an ambiguous image favorable for rapid growth. It's great mobilizational power created growth but the large, open organizational structure fostered a politically heterogeneous group with lower commitment to the organization, than a more selective structure. The major division that developed within the FIS reflected that of the regime. One side favoring Madani's moderate philosophy of conciliation with the regime. The other side demanded total elimination of the regime and fell under the influence of Ali Benhadj.

(3) The Armed Islamic Organizations. The imprisonment of the Islamist Front leadership and repression of the movement, in 1992, changed the task environment. Security and organization survival became the dominant goal for counter regime groups formerly part of the FIS coalition. The only groups to survive organizationally switched to closed, selective structures. The **Armed Islamic Group (GIA)** received most of the attention in press reports and analysis of the massive increase in violence. GIA's base of support was regional centered on Algiers and the area extending to Blida. Limited expansion occurred in 1993, when the GIA formed a coalition with two other groups regionally based around Sidi Bel Abbes and Jigel.²¹² Strength of the GIA in 1995 was estimated as less than 5,000.

The other major armed group formed based on old networks associated with Bouyali's **Armed Islamic Movement (MIA)**. According to Joffe, the MIA's better, more

²¹¹Ibid., pp. 42-43.

²¹²Joffe, "Algeria: The Failure," p. 11.

experienced leadership has avoided capture and the appearance of indiscriminant targeting. Oran appears to represent it's center of support, including the hinterland behind Kabylia.²¹³

However, the Western tendency to view former FIS as a homogeneous organization distorts reality. Some analysts project that at one point in time over 600 groups with less than 12 members conducted independent acts of violence. How many of these groups remain viable is unknown. The dynamism created by the sheer number of local organizations that operate on their own increases the complexity within the Islamist SMI.²¹⁴

d. Organizational Dynamics.

The contextual and task environment favored the growth of the Islamist Movement in the 1980s. Although the FLN possessed the resource advantage in the same period, the leadership refused to alter its organizational structure to accommodate the Islamists. The secular opposition suffered from the same elitist structure that characterized the FLN. It was unable to establish presence and activate ties with local associational networks which reinforced organizational inflexibility.

The Islamist movement grew at the grass roots and developed independent, local-level organizations. Initially able to adapt to the absence of space, they focused on organizational maintenance functions such as survival and commitment. When space opened these groups responded by recruiting new members and developing ties between local groups. Experienced leaders (formerly associated with the established elites) built an organizational structure to link the local groups into a national organization. Possessing a much broader base, the FIS marginalized the secular opposition.

²¹³Ibid., idem.

²¹⁴James Bruce, "Arab Veterans of the Afghan War," Jane's Intelligence Review, 7(4), (April, 1995) p. 175. The GIA area of operations appears to be the cities. Some of it's leaders are Afghan veterans. The MIA although active around the western cities also has a more rural base.

3. Society.

The regime's policies led to the alienation of society. The steady narrowing of power within the state elites pushed the regime's own populist organizations into opposition. Algeria is a self created problem. The regime shaped and nurtured the contextual environment in an unanticipated direction. The state economic policies ruined the old agricultural base of society, led to a huge population shift from rural areas to urban areas, created mass unemployment and education policies created an intellectual group with no hope of employment. Socially, the regime alienated the rural traditional leaders, the Berbers and the urban Islamists.

The mobilization of society that began as a result of Boumediene's socialist agenda, combined with efforts of the FLN began to produce social movements in the 1980s. Riots and protests occurred more frequently. The political activism of the general population was an unprecedented phenomenon for the regime. Far from the previous trend of unrest caused by specific issues, all sectors of society began to ask questions about the governing ability of the ruling elites.

Since the failure of Boumediene's reforms, discontent increased in all sectors of society. The economy failed and with its stagnation, the regime became a despised institution for the first time.²¹⁵ Openings in society resulting from Chadli's policies provided opportunity for the public to express their dissatisfaction. Algerian society contained many local associations opposed to the regime. Regime actions had prevented any organizations to develop in this space, but the initial success of FIS shows the high potential of any organization that can overcome the problem of mobilizational space.

D. INTERACTION.

The conflict in Algeria went through three phases leading up to the current situation. From 1988 to 1990, the Islamist and secular opposition organizations competed with each other in open mobilizational space. The FIS was the most successful organization,

²¹⁵Most analysts credit the exposure of massive government corruption as a cause for increasing the emotional, moral indignation of the society.

mobilizing massive bases of support. Regime groups lacked presence and mobilization potential, therein failing to conduct an effective counter mobilization effort.

The second phase saw the initial electoral success of the FIS in June, 1990 until the government crackdown in January, 1992. The regime was caught by surprise by the FIS challenge. This led to internal power struggles and organizational change within the regime. During the 18 months it took the regime to formulate a response, the FIS grew rapidly and decisively won the 1991 national elections.

The regime closed political space and sought to reestablish its control during the third phase from 1992 to 1995. The military intervened to control both the regime and FIS. Government repression allowed the regime has dominated the environment but led to an active and widespread insurgency. New selective organizations arose in the Islamist SMI and the violent tactics of the GIA and other groups have polarized the task environment.

By closing political space and establishing a low level presence in the suburbs of the major cities, the military stalled the growth of the Islamist opposition. Regime presence constituted by the military is limited to physical presence. Penetration and accommodation of social networks at the local level has not occurred.²¹⁶ Absence of an effective political apparatus prevents this from developing. The FIS, severely damaged by the regime crackdown, attempted to control the fragments of it's former organization. A clear break between the FIS leadership and the MIA occurred in 1993.²¹⁷

The internal war between the military and the GIA and MIA obscures the preferences and actions of society. Several demonstrations, many in Kabylia, protested the

²¹⁶Juan Goytisolo, "Algeria in the Eye of the Storm," New Statesman and Society, 7(316), (August 19, 1994) pp. 22-28. Goytisolo describes a visit to Algiers and Blida, an area contested by the GIA. Army units and paramilitary groups exist openly in during the day but once inside the cities, locals indicated that the influence of the GIA and other groups rule the night.

²¹⁷Joffe, "Algeria: The Failure," p. 13. The FIS's hold over the clandestine organizations weakened and a split placed the GIA and MIA in conflict. The GIA killed 66 MIA militants as a symbolic warning to avoid agreeing to negotiate with the regime.

use of violence and condemned negotiations with the terrorists. Measuring the position of the general population is difficult at best. However, in 1993, 100,000 to 1.5 million people entered the streets to demand an end to the violence.²¹⁸ The violence continued and several attempts to negotiate failed to produce more than a wider gulf between the parties.

1. Organizational Development 1979 - 1987.

One of the most important decisions made by the regime occurred when Chadli began rescinding the strict policies of Boumedienne, without tailoring the political structure of the regime to meet the demands of the environment.

Pressured by internal and external economic and political constraints, and by the domestic failure of the development strategy, the new regime made several decisions that, together, constituted a sudden retreat, or disengagement, of the state, not only from the economic sphere but also from the political and social control it once held. Faced with opposition on both sides of the ideological spectrum, left and right, within the FLN and military, Chadli Bendjedid attempted, while guaranteeing a minimum of social and economic benefits to the most impoverished . . . to do away with Boumedienne holdovers in the party [FLN].²¹⁹

Hugh Robert's assessment supports Layachi. Contrary to the past policy that created a centripetal dynamic "which enabled the state to keep a grip on all the various currents in the society,"²²⁰ Chadli's policies created a centrifugal dynamic. Failure to replace the old FLN ideology with a new one, designed to mobilize and unify the public in support of economic liberalization, left society to create its own. "The state lost the capacity to capture and canalize the various ideological tendencies and currents in the society."

The economic failure of the state led to crisis in 1988. Two developments explain the outcome of the state and society interactions in 1988. The first is the internal rivalry between the bureaucracy, military and FLN. The technocrats attempted to use the economic

²¹⁸Ibid., p. 272.

²¹⁹Layachi, "Algeria: Reinstating the State," p. 180.

²²⁰Hugh Roberts, "The Algerian State and the Challenge of Democracy," Government and Opposition, (1992) p. 448.

crisis to replace the existing leadership while also establishing control over the military and the FLN. The technocrats believed that an opening of the political system would favor their looser, more inclusive structure over the selective military and FLN. While this is true within the regime SMI, it overlooked the fact that most of society had been excluded from the regime and formed a new society SMI. The focus on their own internal struggle in the task environment caused the technocrats to overlook the changes in the contextual environment.

2. First Phase: Open Space, 1988 - 1990.

a. Crisis of 1988.

The combined explanations of Entelis and Roberts a compelling argument for the causes of the crisis in 1988.²²¹ Layachi calls the riots and associated malaise of 1988 a deep crisis in the authority of the state.²²² Having opened space and withdrawn its presence, the regime faced a disgruntled population ripe for mobilization. Failing to either recognize this dynamic or react to it with changes in structure, the regime was presented with a situation requiring major concessions or massive repression. Ironically, the regime chose the later followed by the former. It would repeat this contradictory policy following the annulment of the 1991 elections.

(1) Society. Bigger and more disruptive than ever before, thousands of young people took to the streets to protest the failure of the regime in meeting the needs of society, such as the lack of: housing, affordable food, employment opportunities, health care, and education. These material grievances were combined with the protest against the

²²¹John P. Entelis, "Political Islam in Algeria: The Nonviolent Dimension," Current History, 94 (January, 1995) p. 14. Entelis says riots began as a result of material grievances. Hugh Roberts, "Radical Islam and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: The Embattled Arians of Algiers," Third World Quarterly 10(2), (April, 1988) pp. 556-589. Roberts argues that the overwhelming majority of people rioted to protest the government's legitimacy. He notes that the riots ended with no material concessions from the regime.

²²²Layachi, "Algeria: Reinstating the State," p. 176. Supports Roberts assertion that the regime's very existence was the heart of the protest leading to the riots.

government as a institution. Ultimately, these issues transformed Islamism into a broad based political movement.²²³

It is important to note that the Islamists did not start or lead the rioting. The riots were initiated by a series of workers strikes centered around the industrial areas of Algiers. However, Islamist representation in the protest was large. Prominent leaders of the Islamist movement called for restraint in speeches given to the throng but to no avail. The political environment after the riots in 1988 lent itself to expression, rather than the recognition of the grievances which had accumulated during the first 30 years of Algerian independence.

(2) Government Response and Consequences. The regime responded with indiscriminate repression. The army broke with it's low profile strategy and intervened with tanks and heavy weapons for the first time. The large Islamist presence offered a distinct target for government forces. Following the violence, special military courts were established to prosecute those suspected of taking part in the uprising. Human Rights Watch estimated that hundreds of civilians died with thousands more incarcerated in prisons under blanket charges and no trial.²²⁴

Repression created a consensus across the diverse opposition groups under which to unite against the regime.²²⁵ The actions of the regime in response to the riots increased the mobilization potential of the general population, thereby enhancing the Islamist movement opportunity for growth. Chadli's decision to open more space a short period after the repression, further enhanced the opportunity for opposition growth.

Chadli met with Islamist leaders, primarily because they represented the only homogeneous group which took part in the uprising. By meeting with Ali Benhaj, Chadli lent an additional air of legitimacy to the Islamist movement. The meetings caused another

²²³Entelis, "Political Islam," p. 14.

²²⁴Human Rights Watch, "Middle East," 7(5), (August, 1995) p. 11. Torture, long associated with the French, became the regime's nemesis.

²²⁵Burgat and Dowell, The Islamic Movement, p. 270.

shake up within the ruling elite. The regime distanced itself from the FLN by making the presidency separate from the Government, answerable only to the National Assembly.

3. Second Phase: FIS Growth and Regime Response, 1990 to 1991.

Numerous political organizations developed during the opening that followed the 1988 riots. A highly munificent environment organizations formed and began registering with the government. In an attempt to counter the growing counter regime, the regime sponsored two political parties in an attempt to coopt moderates in the opposition and isolate the radicals. These two groups remain actor in the conflict and are the Rally for Culture and Democracy and the HAMAS, or Islamic Society Movement. The regime formed the RCD as a counter balance to the resurgent FFS in Kabylia, the region dominated by Berbers. Mahfoud Nahnah organized HAMAS to counter the growth of radical Islam in the FIS.²²⁶

a. The Regime Creates a Counter Organization.

The regime created the Rally for Culture and Democracy in 1989 before the legalization of "associations of political character." Its support base was formed by former members and networks associated with the defunct Berber Cultural Movement (BCM). Designed to play a "clientist role in the Berber region of Kabylia; the RCD conducted campaigns to weaken and suppress this region, or agitate it when necessary."²²⁷

The RCD demanded separation of religion and politics. The politicization of language served as a mobilizing factor for this group. By drawing on the existing Berber fears of the Islamist calls for Arabic as the exclusive language of the state, the RCD

²²⁶The RCD was created by the regime and acts with but inside the opposition SMI. It is more accurately classified a society SMO. The HAMAS formed from within the counter regime SMI and constitutes a genuine SMO competitor with the former FIS SMOs. HAMAS members have more association with areas outside Algiers than the FIS which is dominated by urban groups. It's credibility has, however, suffered for its association with the regime.

²²⁷Mohand Salah Tahi, "Algeria's Democratization Process: A Frustrated Hope," Third World Quarterly 16(2), (1995) p. 206.

provided a small counterweight to the Islamists.²²⁸ The leadership of the RCD continuously played the role of speaker on behalf of a government faction or army clan and maintained ties with the secret service.

b. The FIS takes Action.

Capturing the potential and space in the aftermath of the riots, the FIS presence in the network of neighbor mosques became a well connected, effective machine. The FIS decimated the FLN in the mobilization competition that culminated with the elections in 1990 and 1991.²²⁹ In June, 1990, the stunning success of the FIS in the local elections (See Table 5-1) threatened to permanently marginalize the FLN. One result of the overwhelming victory of the FIS was the founding of HAMAS. Nahnah's goal was to balance the radical element of the FIS, in the event it did well in the upcoming National Assembly elections.

Violent confrontations occurred between the radical wing of the FIS and the regime several times from July 1990 to September 1991. The FIS victory emboldened Madani and Benhaj. FIS leaders demanded declaration of *shari'a* law, electoral law changes and a change in the scheduled 1992 election dates to 1991. After several deaths resulted from clashes between Islamists and the police, Benjedid declared a state of emergency. A large schism between the regime and the FIS developed that has not been bridged since 1991. Victory in the National Assembly first round went to the FIS (See Table 5-2). President Chadli began to make power sharing arrangements, then the military intervened and violence began.²³⁰

²²⁸Spencer, "Algeria in Crisis," Survival, 36 (Summer, 1994) p. 157.

²²⁹Lahouari Addi, "Religion and Modernity in Algeria," Journal of Democracy, 3(4), (October, 1992), p. 82. Addi estimated the number of sympathizers to be in the millions and number of activists in the thousands with in three months of the legalization of the Front.

²³⁰Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, "Algeria's War on Itself," Foreign Policy, 99, (Summer, 1995) p. 135. The regime suffered a rude awakening when their scheme to use the French-style winner-take-all model. They assumed they could win more

PARTY	VOTES	APC'S WON	APC SEATS WON
FIS	4,331, 472 (54.2%)	856 (55.5%)	5,987 (45.7%)
FLN	2,245, 798 (28.1%)	486 (31.6%)	4,799 (36.6%)
INDEPENDENTS	931,278 (11.7%)	106 (6.9%)	1427(10.9%)
RCD	166,104 (2.1%)	87 (5.7%)	623 (4.7%)
PNSD	131,100 (1.6%)	2 (0.1%)	134 (1.0%)
PSD	84,029 (1.1%)	2 (0.1%)	65 (0.5%)
PRA	65, 450 (0.8%)	2 (0.1%)	61 (0.5%)
PAGS	24,190 (0.3%)	0	10 (0.1%)
OTHERS	5, 367	0	7

Table 5-1.²³¹

Number of Registered Voters: 12,441,769

Number of Votes Cast: 7,984,788

Rate of Voter Participation: 65.2

4. Third Phase: The Regime Closes Political Space, 1992- 1995.

The regime, failing to win the countermobilization battle, was left with counter organization as the alternative. It's choice lay between adapting the organization to the environment, or choosing to eradicate the opposing organization with the existing regime structure. The military chose the latter.

a. The Regime Reaction to National Election Results.

The regime failed to recognize the changes in the contextual environment. Failure to adapt to the environment resulted in a crisis when the election results of December, 1991, were announced. The military entered the politics directly after Chadli's overtures to the FIS. The technocrat challenge to the military and FLN triad within the SMI had nearly led to the regime losing power. Although Chadli "accepted the possibility of sharing power with the new popular movement, the army declared itself the guardian of

seats with this arrangement than in a popular vote.

²³¹Tachau, 1994, p. 35.

democracy and modernity . . . [and] moved directly . . . into the political arena, removing Chadli in 1992.”²³² The military purged the technocrats from power and sought to restore the status quo both within the regime SMI and in regard to the regime relationship with society.

The government annulment of the election results gave the high mobilization potential of the FIS an additional boost. The FIS won the most seats in the parliament in an election with 49 or the 64 legal parties participating (See Table 5-2). In spite of the election results, the regime reneged on commitment to honor free and fair elections. It claimed that irregularities existed in 145 districts and fed the press reports that implied electoral fraud.²³³ The public was not impressed with the regimes veiled attempt to disguise its actions.

Algerian voter turnout was only 23.26 percent of the population of 25 million.²³⁴ Votes in favor of the FIS dropped by one million from the 1990 elections. Regime actions had the counterproductive effect of increasing FIS support. The FIS produced the greatest growth relative to all other parties. More indicative of the decline of the regime was the continued loss of support of the FLN and the RCD.

Within a few days the government formed the *Haut Comitee d'Etat* (HCE) and replaced the old judicial apparatus with the National Consultative Council (CCN). The CCN became the rubber stamp for the HCE's policies and directives.

Demanding his resignation, Chadli stepped down under pressure from the military. In February, 1992, the HCE declared the FIS illegal and arrested key leaders. In a pattern similar to the regime's actions in 1988, the HCE offered to meet with the opposition to discuss potential concessions following massive repression against Islamists.

²³²Tahi, Algeria's Democratization, p. 198.

²³³Human Rights Watch, p. 14. These allegations of foul play remain a point of disagreement in the material available for research.

²³⁴Roberts, "The Algerian State," p. 453.

PARTY	VOTES	CONSTITUENCIES WITH CANDIDATE	SEATS WON	RUNOFFS
FIS	3,260,222 (47.3%)	430 (100%)	188	186 (144/42)
FLN	1,612,947 (23.4%)	429 (99%)	16	171 (44/127)
FFS	510,661 (7.4%)	322 (75%)	25	19 (4/15)
HAMAS	368,697 (5.3%)	380 (88%)		5 (1/4)
Independents	309,264 (4.5%)	N/A	3	6 (1/5)
RCD	200,267 (2.9%)	295 (69%)		5 (1/2)
MNI	150,093 (2.2%)	208 (49%)		2 (1/1)
MDA	135,882 (2.0%)	334 (78%)		
PRA	67,828 (1.0%)	381 (89%)		1 (1/1)
PNSD	48,208 (0.7%)	243 (57%)		
PSD	28,638 (0.4%)	N/A		1 (1/1)
MAJD	27,623 (0.4%)	199 (46%)		
OTHERS	177,389 (2.5%)	N/A		

Table 5-2. December 26, 1991, APN Election Results (First Round)²³⁵

Number of Registered Voters: 13,258,554

Number of votes cast: 7,822,625

Rate of voter participation: 59 percent

Blank or spoiled ballots: 924,906

Chadli's move in the late 1980s to by-pass the FLN by slightly altering the structure of the regime made the departure of the FLN from the regime SMI all but inevitable. Denied influence, the FLN split in two. Some of the FLN moved over to support the FIS. They saw the FIS as the reincarnation of the old FLN. The FIS's populist approach mirrored the original FLN. When the military stepped in and declared the election results illegal, what remained of the formal FLN elite within the regime SMI evaporated. Addi called the creation of the HCS and appointment of Mohamed Boudiaf the point at which

²³⁵Tachau, 1994, p. 26.

the FLN became a member of the opposition. However, some militant members supported the HCS.²³⁶

b. Space Closes and Violence Increases.

Within six months of the military decision to annul the elections, the military began closing space. After declaring the FIS illegal, paramilitary units and police began occupying neighborhoods. Threatening to lock up or destroy illegal mosques if members did not comply with religious regulations. This approach did not enhance the regime's image.²³⁷ With the severe increase in violence the government declared a state of emergency and altered the judicial system to streamline the prosecution of suspected terrorists. No efforts were made to begin fighting a counter mobilization battle. This represented a counter organization strategy designed to wipe out the radicals and coopt the moderates.

(1) The FIS Social Movement Industry Responds to Election Results.

The FIS and other parties condemned the government decision to annul the elections. Annulment increased the number of FIS sympathizers and encouraged many supporters to condone violence.²³⁸ Confronted with the arrest of the FIS leadership and thousands of supporters, Islamist groups disbanded or reorganized into closed structures. Groups formerly under the leadership of Belhaj began a campaign of violence while regime efforts to meet with the leaders of the opposition were rejected. Following the collapse of the FIS mobilizational organization structure, mobilization potential remained high and continued to rise.

The structural change within the Islamist movement occurred too slowly for many members. Thousands of Islamists were rounded up and imprisoned. Even moderate Islamist groups were forced underground by the onset of government repression. Regime

²³⁶Lahouari Addi, "Religion and Modernity in Algeria," *Journal of Democracy*, 3(4), (October, 1992) p. 78.

²³⁷George Joffe, "Algeria: Failure," p. 11.

²³⁸Entelis, "Political Islam," p. 16.

sweeps of FIS controlled neighborhoods resulted in the arrest and incarceration of thousands of members, supporters and sympathizers. The government's shift to a counter organization policy of eradication worked further isolated the regime and increased sympathy for the FIS. It wasn't until the radical groups within the former FIS began using indiscriminate violence that popular support began to decline.

The intense dynamism in the environment caused the Islamist coalition of organizations split into two independent groups: the Salafiyyists (extremists) and the Djarz'arists (moderates) made up of hundreds of local associations. Cleavages within the two groups added to the growing complexity of the task environment. They were generally split between degrees of conciliation or eradication. The nascent Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) led by Abdel Chebouti consisted of both Salafiyyists and Djarz'arists. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) clearly constituted a eradicator-Salafiyyist organization.²³⁹ The GIA has successfully prevented the moderates from making gains, although at great cost to the Islamist movement.

(2) Between eradication and conciliation, 1993-1995. Estimates place the casualties of the conflict in Algeria since 1992 at over 300,000 lives.²⁴⁰ The strategy of the Zeroual regime continues to combine tough military measures intended to destroy the radical Islamist groups while simultaneously seeking dialogue with moderate Islamist organizations. Although the repression initially increased the popularity of the counter regime, Algerian society grew weary of the violence with in a few months.

d. Society.

The society perception that the violence perpetrated by both the regime and counter regime resulted in the appearance of vigilante groups. Two groups claimed

²³⁹Tahi, Algeria's Democratization, p. 212.

²⁴⁰Graham Benton, "Current Affairs: Algeria - Killing Fields," The Middle East, (February, 1995) p. 8.

responsibility for deaths of several Islamist leaders.²⁴¹ Berbers, former members of the armed forces and police may comprise the militants in these groups. The potential development of a new faction within the military may seek to mobilize portions of the moderate society. The so-called "*Troisieme Force*", consisting of younger, middle-ranking officers, feel that "the regime is compromised, whether it seeks conciliation or confrontation. They advocate a new initiative based on the St. Egidio declaration."²⁴² The alleged support of high ranking police officials, however, limits the credibility of this assessment.

E. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES.

1. Contextual Environment.

What little link existed between the regime and society completely dissolved as a result of the changes in the contextual environment. Opportunities to enhance, rather than destroy the vestiges of a relationship came and went. They were ignored by the inflexible, closed, elite organization running the country. Government rejection of the results of free and fair elections led to violence. The violence only increased the polarization of the regime and counter regime. Maximum separation between society, the regime and the counter regime now holds the country in a stalemate.

a. Political Change.

The political structure changed very little in the 35 years since independence. In spite of a few token reforms that offered more economic and social

²⁴¹Graham Benton, "Current Affairs: Algeria - Looking for Scapegoats," The Middle East, (May, 1994) p. 21. Two recognized anti-Islamic vigilante groups formed in the wake of violence: The Organisation Secrete de Sauvegarde de la Republique del' Algerie (OSSRA) and the Free Young Algerians (OJAL). Both claim responsibility for several assassinations of Islamists.

²⁴²George Joffe, "Algeria and the Maghreb--The Future Looks Grim," Jane's Intelligence Review, 7(5),(May, 1995), p. 220. Pierre and Quandt, "Algeria's War," p. 137. The St. Egidio meeting occurred in January, 1995, in Italy. It was a meeting mediated by the Catholic Church in an effort find a solution for peace. The opposition attended the regime did not, declaring that it constituted meddling in affairs of a sovereign state.

liberty, the process for acquiring power remains unchanged. It is difficult to separate the economic and political factors in this case. Political power, largely established with little interaction with the society, existed solely on the basis of the regime's ability to buy public support. Efforts by the FLN to add a shroud of national unity failed miserably over the long term. The roots of the conflict in the 1990s are symptomatic of an impotent economic structure and absence of unifying identity.

b. Economic Changes.

Movement away from Boumedienne's socialist economy represents the only positive development since the founding of an independent state. Favorable changes in the economy, however, were offset by the dynamic political and social environments directly affected by the economic policy. The bankrupt revolutionary socialist programs of the 1970s produced little in long term results. The liberalization reforms of the 1980s opened the private sector and helped eliminate the prevailing bias against private capital. Economic growth, however, failed when the world oil market prices fell. An open economy promised the best outcome for Algeria but stalled largely due to the declining living conditions of the elites. The economy today is a basket case over \$26 billion in debt with little capability to raise revenue to pay the interest. The lingering insurgency continues to delay any repairs, the long cycle effects of which will endure for years after stability returns.

c. Social Changes.

The FLN's nationalist rhetoric in the early years replaced by Islamism in the past decade reduced some of the traditional divisions in society. Yet, the same basic cleavages remain: the unbridgeable canyon between the regime and the society and the fight over access to benefits of the state.

The language issue is the closest characteristic to an ethnic division like those in Malaya or Ireland. It continues to set the French-speaking elites, technocrats and Berbers against the Arabists, which consist of lower socioeconomic strata and the Islamists. Algeria's zero-sum political culture irritates this issue. Willingness in either side to compromise exists in an inverse relationship with the increase in environmental dynamism.

2. Task Environment.

The task environment has fundamentally and permanently changed the interrelationships of the regime, counter regime and society. Separation of the FLN from the regime and rise of the military altered the public attitude toward the government. No longer able to draw support from old Nationalist slogans the regime remains isolated. Islamist organizations exist but for the short term are experiencing little to no growth and appear to be stuck in a cycle of self-defeating violence. Society demonstrated its weariness for the violence of the Islamists by voting overwhelming to support Liamine Zeroual in the Presidential election of 1995.²⁴³

a. Regime.

After fifteen years of rhetoric about the opening of society, the regime finds itself in a dilemma. Its policy toward the opposition, broadly defined as the society and counter regime organizations, contradicts stated goals. According George Joffe, the regime's policy is trapped in a contradiction.

On the one hand, it sought to persuade the Algerians that it was seeking to recreate the political aura of the 'historic FLN' and the Boumedienne era as a means to rally popular support... On the other hand, it sought [seeks] to crush and de-legitimize its opposition through repression which was increasingly general in its effects. Indeed, whenever there was a choice between dialogue or repression . . . repression was [is] the preferred option for the state.²⁴⁴

The regime's efforts to retain power has blocked any organizational adaptation. Regime policies are designed to retain power for the elites within the current organizational structure. This is not possible. The regime must address the problems within its SMI and

²⁴³The authors believe that the results of the 1995 Presidential elections represent balancing behavior discussed in chapter 2. Dissatisfied with the regime, the electorate voted just as convincingly for the Islamists. Violence that ensued following the elections caused a negative reaction in the populace resulting in a preference for stability. This does not constitute renewed support for the ruling coalition.

²⁴⁴Joffe, The Middle East, p. 11.

between itself and society. Repeated efforts since the 1970s on short cycle adhoc measures have led to a widespread and volatile crisis.

b. Counter Regime.

The birth of the FIS occurred in an extremely dynamic, complex and munificent environment. Political, economic and social characteristics of Algeria in the late 1980s increased mobilization potential. This was an opportune moment for the existing Islamist groups to recruit members and garner support. The regime decisions to open, and subsequently, withdraw presence created the requisite political space for the Islamists.

By June 1990, the FIS five-level organization managed to develop a mobilizational-selective, structural hybrid to support the growth of the organization. With the favorable environmental changes, the flexible organizational structure worked well in the environment. However, this structure was vulnerable to the sudden changes in threat levels initiated by the regime in 1992.

The FIS decision to grow quickly with an open organizational structure meant acceptance of a higher level of risk in the event the environment turned hostile. The divisions within the FIS demonstrate the concept that an inclusive organization is less cohesive and allows individuals and groups to move in and out of the organization at lower cost-benefit ratios. Factions moved in and out of the Front coalition. Repression and violence increased the dynamism of the task environment and the cost of membership in the Islamist groups. The surviving remnants of the FIS shifted to selective structures or were destroyed.

c. Society.

The mobilization of society in the 1970s laid the foundation for future conflict. Destruction of the traditional power structures resulted in new coalitions and associational networks. A split between the rural and urban sectors divided the society between supporters of the old guard FLN and the rising counter regime organizations. Divisions within the elites and failure of the FLN to establish effective presence caused the gap between the regime and society to grow.

The riots in 1988 completely severed the tenuous relationship between the regime and the people. Preference for anything other than the regime produced votes for the various counter regime groups in the 1990 and 1991 elections. The reaction of society to the acts of the regime and the Islamists since the annulled elections passed from very supportive of the FIS and anti-regime, to anti-regime and anti-radical Islamist. Whether the FIS survives depends on the ability of its leaders to distance themselves from the violent factions. Two years of relentless violence helped swing the society away from the Islamists and toward the regime in a phenomenon that may be explained as balancing behavior.

The evidence indicates a significant mobilization potential for reform. The sudden and rapid surge for the FIS in the 1990 elections was not retained as the 1995 elections showed a similar surge for the regime. The lack of mobilization space in the first election led the population to vote for the only nation wide opposition organization. The insurgency led for a vote for stability. The population has shown loyalty to neither side in the conflict.

F. ANALYSIS.

1. Growth.

Table 5-3 depicts the environmental effects and outcomes for the major opposition organizations and the regime. Although the FLN and the regime existed in a single-party structure it grew very little. Even at the height of the FLN's popularity in the early 1980s, growth was unimpressive. The fallout over the government's heavy hand in suppressing the riots of 1988, irreparably damaged the FLN. It's size and influence declined. The Islamist movement filled the void left by the fall of the FLN. Growth in the FIS organization occurred at unprecedented rates, peaking in early 1990. It's membership stabilized in 1991 prior to the closing of political space in 1992. The advantage shifted back to the regime.

a. 1962 to 1988, The Regime Monopoly.

The environment during this period went from dynamic to stable, then turned extremely dynamic by 1988. In a single-party state, the advantage for growth lies with the regime. The Algerian government's ability to grow was limited to the number of technocrats accommodated by the elites. The only efforts to mobilize and recruit the

population existed during the 1970s. Boumedienne's program mobilized the population but not with the goal of adding members to the organization. The selective nature of the ruling elites, the officer corps and FLN prevented growth.

Opposition to the regime came from disenfranchised elites and occasional from the workers unions. The selective elite groups certainly wanted influence but not growth. Workers unions demanded settlements to grievances, not more members. However, below the surface of the dominant political and social structures, the Islamist-based, grassroots groups began to organize. These nascent groups existed in an environment with little space and potential. In order to survive, they conducted organizational maintenance functions.

ORG/DTG	Potential	Space	Presence	Structure	Outcome	Remarks
Islamist Social Movement 1979-1988	High	Urban & Suburban	Students, Lower MC & 'urban peasantry'	MOB	Growth (2,000 to 10,000 local orgs)	Grew from 2,000 to 10000 local grps.
FIS: 1988-June 1991	High	Urban & Suburban	Same plus more MC	MOB	Stable	
FIS 1992-1995	Low	SMI	Jail & Europe	Selective (est. 600 local grps)	Decline	
Regime/ FLN 1979-1988	High	Rural & Urban	Old Guard Elites, mili-tary & MC	Selective	Decline	French-speaking MC
Regime/ FLN: 1988-1991	Low	Rural & Urban	Declining Elites & military	Selective	Decline	
Regime 1992-1995	Low	SMI	Military, Upper MC	Selective	Growth	FLN non-player

Table 5-3. Organizational Environment, Structure and Outcomes.

b. 1988-1990, The FLN Falls and the FIS Rises.

During this period the FLN organization suffered a major mobilization defeat. Identified by the public as the perpetrator of the policies that led to the demise of Boumedienne's reforms and the establishment of economic liberalization, the FLN became the target of public protests. This setback in the battle between the regime SMI and society coincided with FLN losses within the regime SMI. As the regime opened the economic and political environments, the FLN became the regime's scapegoat. The decline of FLN credibility offered little support for the regime's goal to remain in control. It was forced out of the regime SMI. Elimination of the FLN opened additional space for the growing FIS organization.

(1) The Stagnant Regime. Growth requires mobilization potential, space and presence. Mobilization space for the regime closed steadily from the late 1970s through 1995. Although the regime occupied space associated with the Islamist movement, it suffers from a structural flaw that keeps it from becoming effective. It has no political party apparatus to connect the people and their social networks to the government. This situation continues and indicates little opportunity for future growth.

For example, even decisions that indicate an effort to expand potential and presence fail if the structure cannot implement them. Efforts to make concessions during Chadli's term might have produced better results if the regime structural changes corresponded with the opening environment. However, as the case study indicates, the regime efforts to accommodate the opposition consistently failed. This is directly related to the entrenched nature of the regime and the lack of an organization designed to bridge the gap between it and the people.

The regime elite adapts well enough to internal SMI conflicts to remain in power but consistently fails to adopt policies that increase the likelihood of long term success in the task environment. Thirty years after independence the fundamental elitist structure of the government remains unchanged. Meanwhile, increasing munificence, dynamism and complexity characterized the contextual and task environments.

Potential for growth in the regime SMI remains low. The selective, closed structure and absence of a political organization confine the regime to stagnation. Genuine structural changes occur with difficulty in selective organizations. Failure to develop and preserve a political party prevents the regime from establishing effective presence. In the short cycle, this arrangement is efficient but not effective. The passage of time increases the risk that the regime's failure to grow will destroy it.

b. The Fragmented Opposition.

The fall of the Islamist Front organization left the diverse groups of the Islamist opposition in disarray. Violence escalated and remains a problem that neither leaders of the FIS, nor the military effectively control. Moderate Islamists have fared poorly since 1992. High levels of violence in the environment constrains the ability of these open groups to grow.

Radical groups use violence on both internal and external opponents creating a efficient cycle that no longer provides a short cycle payoff in the system. Indeed, after three years of violence, long cycle effectiveness of continued violence may benefit the regime. The regime's isolated position is becoming more attractive to society, simply out of the need for stability. As long as the GIA and other violent organizations dominate the counter regime SMI, low potential for growth will persist.

c. Society.

The society needs a political organization that can exert pressure on the regime to support a constitutional arrangement for peaceful transfer of power and representative government. The regime and counter regime SMIs produce little space for moderates. Both the regime and counter regime are closed, selective organizations which leaves the majority of society without a political connection. The mobilization potential of Algerian society is extremely high. Look for the formation of new or reorganized party seeking to harness this human resource.

2. Forecast.

The relentless level of violence, much of which appears indiscriminate, produced a reaction that adversely affected all three sectors of the system. This dynamic has directly

affected the potential for growth. In the regime, the opposition's campaign of violence resulted in a shift in the preferences of society. This was reflected in the results of the Presidential election held in November, 1995. Shifting away from the closed and increasingly isolated FIS to the opposite extreme is step in the balancing process of social movements that seeks resolution in the middle between the two extremes.

The recent presidential elections indicated overwhelming stability and an end to the violence. Ignoring GIA death threats, 75 percent of the electorate voted and gave Liamine Zeroual a 95 percent approval rating. But what does this vote really mean? In 1991, 25 percent of the population gave the FIS candidates for National Assembly a 98 percent victory. The massive shift from support for the FIS to the regime most likely represents a preference shift in the general public. Society is exhibiting balancing behavior in an effort to find middle ground.

The unceasing campaign of violence appears to have produced a backlash against the GIA, who is perceived to represent the Islamists. Indiscriminate violence, often blamed on or claimed by the GIA pushes the organization to the extreme margins of the counter regime. In order for Zeroual to receive such a high number of the votes, the regime apparently managed to shield itself from the same backlash effect.

In the fight between the regime and counter regime, neither side can win.²⁴⁵ The Islamists lack space and presence, even as potential remains high. Positive short cycle effects of violence produce diminishing returns. Meanwhile the regime is an elite without a people. Absence of potential and presence the government SMI cannot grow.

²⁴⁵Bruce, "Arab Veterans," p. 179. Jane's Intelligence analysis considers it "inconceivable for that the Islamic guerrillas can be crushed, while they are not strong enough to defeat the government militarily."

Algerian society represents the future outcome of this struggle. The only way for this stalemate to end is if both sides make major concessions or a new organization emerges to capture the massive potential present in the Algerian society.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁶Pierre and Quandt, "Algeria's War," p. 137. This article proposes that negotiations theorists might predict that the two parties are in a "hurting stalemate," which is often a precondition for serious negotiations.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES.

A. INTRODUCTION.

This chapter will expand the organizational model from the perspective of the competing organizations within a state to the perspective of other states seeking to influence the outcome. The focus will be on the implications of the organizational model. A theoretical model will be discussed. This chapter forms a framework for adapting the model to the needs of an external intervenor. The role of the United States as an external intervenor will be examined so as to determine the policy implications of the organizational model.

B. THE EXTERNAL INTERVENOR.

The external actor is governed by a different contextual and task environment than the intervenee state. The contextual and task environments for the intervenor are fundamentally different. The contextual environment is the country's own political, economic and social structure. The domestic environment constrains the resources and policy options available for intervention. The task environment is the world system of states. The states fulfil the same role as organizations at the substate level. Actions taken by one state leads to reactions in others. The task environment as a system can balance against an action or reinforce the impact of an action.

The United States faced a bipolar task environment during the Cold War. The US and USSR each sought to balance the actions of the other. The shift to a multipolar world has greatly complicated the task environment. In a bipolar world, the systems dynamics are predictable. The US and its allies are relatively consistent in their behavior with the USSR and its allies. In a multipolar world, the states that seek to balance against an action or reinforce an action will vary with each specific situation.

C. INTERVENTION

The dilemma of intervention is that the external actor's environment is different than that of the intervenee state. The external actor is constrained by his own contextual and task environment which responds to his domestic contextual and international task

environments. The intervenee state is constrained by his own domestic contextual and local organizational task environment.

The outcome will be determined by the environment of the intervenee state unless the external actor permanently occupies and annexes the territory. The factors that influence the competing regime and opposition organizations remain local as described in Chapter II. The external actor can increase the amount of resources available to one side or the other. This action leads to systemic interaction in both the local contextual and task environment. The additional resources can have the unintended effect of helping the wrong organization.

The external actor can also deploy his own organizations. This act will put the two systems of the external actor and the intervenee state into tension. The external actor's organizations respond and adapt to their own contextual and task environment. The host nation organizations respond to their own environment. The external actor faces a grave difficulty in adaptation and action. Its organizations will not normally change in accordance with local conditions. The US forces deployed in Korea, Japan and Germany are not changing their organizational structure and operations due to local conditions. They change to meet the domestic and international needs of the US.

1. The Powell Doctrine.

The organizations of the external actor face their own dilemma. If they do decide to change to match local conditions, they will be making themselves unsuitable for operations in other states. The United States can not have one military for Korea, one for Haiti, another for Germany and whatever other crisis pops up next.

The United States resolved this dilemma by developing the Powell doctrine. This doctrine grew from the 1973 Nixon or Guam doctrine where the US would support other states but the intervenee state would fight the main battle. The Weinberger and later Powell

doctrines further defined the US role. The US would only intervene with massive force for a short period of time.²⁴⁷ The US feared the domestic political consequences of a prolonged campaign.

Figure 6-1 illustrates the Powell doctrine. In an ideal case like Panama or Haiti, the US invades with massive force and quickly withdraws. The new government restores order and takes over as the US withdraws. Three situations must occur. In the invasion phase, the US must overwhelm all opposition and establish control. In the transition phase, the US maintains control while handing off responsibility to the host nation government as soon as it is capable of taking over. In the final phase, the host nation government's organizations consolidate control and rule over the stabilized country.




Figure 6-1. The Powell Doctrine Process.

2. Problems of the Powell Doctrine.

The organizational model reveals several problems for the Powell doctrine.

a. Systemic Behavior.

A massive and rapid movement will generate a strong countermovement.

The major shift in the contextual environment will lead to balancing behavior by all those

²⁴⁷ Edwin G. Corr and David C. Miller, Jr., "United States Government Organization and Capability to Deal with Low Intensity Conflict", in Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, Low Intensity Conflict, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 17-45. p. 30.

groups that benefitted from the previous status quo. In Panama, this counter movement led to the reelection of Noriega's party. The situation in Panama is shifting back towards the original status quo.

Systemic balancing behavior can be countered by organizational action. The rapid handover of authority as the US withdraws hinders the ability of the new regime to operate effectively. The case studies and operations research theory say that major organizational changes take two to five years to implement. The US plans on conducting the transition in months, not years.

b. Transitions.

US doctrine calls for an invasion and then a handoff to the new regime. The conditions and standards for when and how this transition will occur are defined by the US. The Powell doctrine has a clear concept of the organizational structure of the invasion and handoff. In the invasion, the US forces are controlled by their own organizational chain of command. After the handoff, the US forces leave and the host nation controls its own organizations as a sovereign state. The weakness of the doctrine is in the organizational interaction during the transition.

The issue is on whether the US and host nation organizations should combine into one organization or remain separate. The United Kingdom formed integrated civil and military organizations from district to national level in Malaya and Northern Ireland. The US prefers to keep US organizations apart. The US will provide advisors but does not integrate US and foreign units. This means that there are two parallel organizational structures within the host nation during the transition. The US commands US forces and the host nation controls its own.

Coordination does occur, but coordination is not command. The separate organizations also separate the US and host nation systems. The US organizations will not need to adapt or change to the local environment. This also means that they will not

learn.²⁴⁸ From the perspective of the US task environment, this is beneficial. From the perspective of the host nation, the US organizations can inadvertently cause adverse systemic reactions. The US lacks a doctrine for the organization and training of the new regime for counterinsurgency. The effort the US takes to preserve its forces for an international task environment means that the host nation should not copy US organizations or methods. The effort in Vietnam to create ARVN as a mirror image of the US Army meant that South Vietnam lacked an integrated local, counterinsurgency force until the start of the Phoenix program in 1968.²⁴⁹

c. US Organizational Confusion.

The United States lacks a unified organization to plan and control US efforts in a given state. The players in US support to insurgency or counter insurgency include the National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, the military services, the CIA, USAID, USIA, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Department of Commerce, and the ambassador and his country team.²⁵⁰ At the US national level there is no unified interagency process to control the actions of the separate agencies.²⁵¹

d. Organizational Cohesion.

The United States does not have a unified organizational structure for foreign intervention. This makes a transition to host nation government difficult. It also reinforces the law of unanticipated consequences. The lack of cohesion leads to US agencies taking actions that negate the actions of other US agencies. This prevents long

²⁴⁸ James Clay Thompson, Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program Failure, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 135-155.

²⁴⁹ Ronald H. Spector, After Tet, (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 283.

²⁵⁰ Corr and Sloan, pp. 33-40.

²⁵¹ Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). pp. 81-107. Komer discusses the coordination and control problem at the national, theater and country team level of operations.

cycle planning and leads each agency to focus on its own short cycle interactions. Inconsistent US activity increases mistrust and confusion in the host nation organizations and society as to the actual intentions and goals of the United States.

The US intention of rapid withdrawal increases the dynamism of the environment for the mechanistic US organizations. This increases the coordination problem between US agencies. It is an unfortunate and common perception in foreign countries that US agencies work together for common goals. This means that misguided or poorly implemented policies are perceived as part of an overall plan. This does not always occur in the US system. Bureaucratic politics plays an increased role in a dynamic environment.²⁵²

2. Problems of Intervention.

Any intervenor faces certain constraints whether or not it uses the Powell doctrine. These constraints include asymmetry of interest, asymmetry of power, political ambiguity, duration and adaptation. All of these issues are caused by the overlap of the external actor's system of contextual and task environment with the host nation's system of contextual and task environment.

a. Asymmetry of Interest.

The external actor is less committed to the struggle than the competing organizations in the host nation. The intervenor is conducting foreign policy and the intervention is one out of many foreign policy concerns. The host nation organizations are vitally concerned with the outcome. They have far more at risk than the external actor.

b. Asymmetry of Power.

An external actor such as the United States has far more political, economic and military power than an insurgent organization such as PIRA in Northern Ireland or the FMLN in El Salvador. However, US power is more applicable for use against other states than for employment against a sub state actor. Internal war is manpower intensive and involves local social networks. The advantage here rests with the indigenous organization.

²⁵² Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, ed., Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 10-11.

There are different types of power between international politics and domestic politics in a specific state. "Not only does superiority in military force (conventionally defined) not guarantee victory; it may, under certain circumstances, be positively counterproductive."²⁵³

c. Political Ambiguity.

A conventional war has clear cut objectives so that success or failure can be easily determined. Internal war can be similar or very different. Internal war can be either a zero sum game for total victory or defeat for one side. In many cases it is a non zero sum game where each side gains or loses. The United Kingdom in Malaya defeated the MCP but at the cost of allowing a very profitable colony to become independent. Political goals shift in internal war over time. This makes it difficult for the external actor to maintain his commitment.

Political ambiguities also affect moral judgements. There are few angels in internal war. "Counterinsurgency usually entails US aid and pressure to shore up and reform an inefficient, corrupt and abusive government."²⁵⁴ Supporting insurgents such as the Contras in Nicaragua or UNITA in Angola also involves support to organizations with human rights issues. It is difficult to portray internal war in a good guy - bad guy relationship.

d. Duration.

Protracted conflicts make it difficult for the external actor to justify his costs in its own contextual and task environment. The Powell doctrine is designed to minimize the length of intervention. Another option is an extended low visibility commitment to minimize its effect on the external actor's system. The time requirement for organizational change and the nature of the organizational and mobilizational struggle indicate that years of preparation are required before one side can move towards an end of the conflict. The United States exhibits a strong desire for rapid, decisive outcomes. Patience is a virtue in internal war.

²⁵³ Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", in World Politics, 27 (October 1974-July 1975) pp. 175-200. p. 177.

²⁵⁴ Corr and Sloan, p. 260.

e. Adaptation.

The external actor's organizations change in response to its own system of contextual and task environment. It is very difficult for operations in another system to change organizations. The environment that creates and sustains US organizations is isolated from environmental influence of the host nation. The United States in Vietnam feared that any local adaptation would diminish the US capability to operate against the USSR.²⁵⁵

It is not impossible for the external actor to adapt, but it is very difficult. Adaptation involves organizational restructuring and changes to doctrine, strategy and tactics. It also requires the organization to identify the system level of analysis and change to match the system.²⁵⁶ Too often, change is conducted by military organizations in response to insurgent military organizations. This ignores the political, economic and social aspect of the struggle.

Partial systemic adaptation can be more damaging than none at all. In Vietnam, "lack of any overall management structure contributed to the overmilitarization of the war by facilitating the predominance of the US and GVN military in its conduct."²⁵⁷ Focusing on the military aspect of the struggle increases the bureaucratic power of selective, armed organizations and decreases the space and operations of moderate, mobilizational organizations. A focus on the military side of a struggle inhibits the development of non zero sum solutions. The role of the MCA in Malaya and SDLP in Northern Ireland has been overlooked by military orientated theorists.

²⁵⁵ See Komer, pp. 69- 80 on the problems the US faces on adapting to an internal conflict. He recommends methods to induce adaptation on pp. 167-9.

²⁵⁶ See Thompson, pp. 135-153, on the specific problems of adaptation faced by the United States.

²⁵⁷ Komer, p. 82.

D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.

The Powell doctrine has some serious side effects when applied to an internal conflict situation. This section identifies methods to improve the existing US approach and to develop alternative strategies.

1. Improve US Unity of Effort.

Many theorists have suggested a variety of options to improve the US organization for low intensity conflict.²⁵⁸ The organizational inertia in the US has defeated all of these efforts. Progress is being made, but it is slow and inconsistent. Empirical reality dictates that the current US organizations will have to improve their cooperation in organizational action, since a reorganization of the US is very unlikely.

There is a consensus that the US military is resistant to change and does not desire to participate in internal wars.²⁵⁹ However, since the Goldwater - Nichols act the US military has founded the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and an Assistant Secretary for Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC). The Department for Defense has shown far more adaptation than any other US agency including the Department of State, USAID and the CIA.

2. Develop a Doctrine.

The United Kingdom has an integrated all agency doctrine for internal conflict.²⁶⁰ The United States can benefit by adapting the UK doctrine for interagency cooperation. The transitions required by the Powell doctrine from US control to mutual control to host nation control is an area in vital need of development.

The military can also improve its own doctrine. Current area studies examine the contextual environment of the political, economic, social and military structure of society. These studies are static in that they reveal a picture of the current situation. The area study

²⁵⁸ See the conclusions, to Komer, Thompson and Corr and Sloan for typical examples.

²⁵⁹ See Corr and Sloan, pp. 266-7.

²⁶⁰ See Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping, (London: Farber and Farber, 1971).

can be improved by adding a dynamic task environment. The task environment should be analyzed to determine its relationship with its own social movement, the competitors within its SMI and its interaction with other organizations in other SMIs. This is a dynamic analysis to determine trends, momentum, opportunities and constraints. Current area studies are nonprescriptive. A dynamic analysis develops political and military options.

The task environment section should identify not just existing organizations but their connection with different social bases. What do the different social movement industries look like and where are they going? The threat is not all organizations in an opposing SMI. It is often possible to isolate radical, violent organizations within their own SMI by allowing gains by moderate organizations. A short term loss can lead to a long term gain.

US AirLand battle doctrine was designed to fight a Corps level conventional war against the USSR. It is time to create a new doctrine for internal warfare. Internal warfare is unconventional warfare. Political aspects and police type operations dominate military concerns. US bureaucratic politics prevent changes in conventional doctrine because of fear that change threatens US ability to fight conventional war. This fear is overstated. The UK is successful in both types of warfare.

The true need is a doctrine so that military personnel can operate in an internal environment before returning to their conventional role. The United Kingdom has maintained a high readiness level in both types of warfare. When you improve the training and capabilities of personnel, you improve their capabilities to conduct all types of missions. The quality of personnel matters more than the equipment.

3. Role of Special Operations Forces.

The US Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the vanguard of unconventional warfare capabilities in the US. SOF contains personnel highly trained in a wide variety of military and political skills. The organizational structure and training of SOF units emphasizes operations in support of other nations. SOF personnel are trained in the language, culture and contextual and task environments of every state in the world. SOF

will remain very important to US unconventional warfare efforts until and unless the US reorganizes its foreign policy infrastructure. The advantages of SOF are in presence, size, visibility and quality.

a. Presence.

In a US intervention, the military provides the largest number of US personnel. The organizational model indicates that organizational presence plays a crucial role in the effect of organizational actions on the local environment. For the local population, the US platoon in the local community has a far greater impact on their own expectations and incentives than a staff member in the embassy. The day to day actions of the military have a systemic effect far greater than other agencies with organizational presence in the US or only the embassy.

This creates advantages and risks. The other agencies must plan for the organizational presence and resources of the military. Efforts to change preferences from the top can fail due to the actions of US units on the bottom. SOF units are trained to be sensitive to host nations systems and reinforce this training with constant deployments to a variety of different nations.

The majority of military forces are not SOF. SOF units advise and train conventional forces on activities in the local environment. A large intervention is a conventional operation led by conventional commanders. SOF are only part of the solution, not all of it. Joint doctrine and training are needed to improve the coordination of conventional and unconventional operations. The transition period from US control to joint US and host nation control is a conventional operation that needs improvement.

b. Size.

SOF forces are only 1.2% of military manpower. Nevertheless, SOF has over 10,000 trained operators ready for deployment. This exceeds the deployable manpower of all civilian agencies. Department of State, Department of Justice, USAID,

ICITAP all have limited manpower.²⁶¹ SOF has the trained manpower to operate at the regional and local level. The civilian agencies only have the manpower to operate at a national level.

SOF forces have the potential to be a force multiplier for the civilian agencies. Unconventional warfare requires central planning and decentralized operations. SOF personnel at regional and local level can help advise, assist and monitor an interagency US and host nation campaign plan. It is not the mission of SOF to develop interagency plans, but they can augment the ability of the US to actually implement a national plan.

c. Low Visibility and Long Duration.

SOF forces have low visibility. SOF units are currently deployed in every continent. El Salvador received lots of media visibility, but the low numbers and remote operations of SOF allowed operations to continue despite significant domestic opposition. SOF forces can deploy before a situation becomes a crisis and stay long after the situation has stabilized. The low visibility of SOF allows them to stay for the duration of the conflict. This allows SOF to overcome some of the constraints that drive the short duration of the Powell doctrine.

Conventional forces rapidly redeployed after the invasion of Panama, Desert Storm and Haiti. All of these operations are used as examples of the Powell doctrine. However, in contravention to the Powell doctrine, US forces are still there. Both conventional and SOF forces remain in Panama, Haiti, Kuwait, and Kurdistan. The low visibility of small forces allows these extended commitments without internal US opposition.

d. Quality.

SOF personnel receive extensive military, cultural and language training. Members are selected from personnel who are above average performers in the conventional forces. SOF units more mature and experienced than normal conventional

²⁶¹ Deployable SOF manpower exceeds the entire manning of several agencies such as ICITAP and USAID. Foreign policy agencies are designed for routine state to state diplomacy. They do not have deployable contingency subelements. Their role and mission is diplomacy, not governing foreign countries.

units. The organizational structure, training and operations of SOF are designed for unconventional warfare. Other organizations such as the DOS or ICITAP, not designed, manned or equipped for UW must undergo organizational restructuring to fit the environment. Organizational theory and the case studies in this thesis show that major organizational changes take at a minimum months to implement. SOF units are capable of immediate effective actions while non-SOF units and agencies require months to adapt. SOF forces are already established and trained for adaptation. On the conventional side, during Desert Storm SOF forces were tasked to provide coalition support teams to all of the allied forces to help integrate them into the US - Saudi chain of command. This was not a SOF mission, but the units rapidly adapted and were successful.

On the unconventional side, SOF forces in Haiti were deployed at regional and local levels throughout the country. The military regime lost control after the US arrival and these forces found themselves in a power vacuum. In many cases, SOF teams at village level assisted in establishing new local governments, police and judiciary. SOF advised and assisted in restoring government services and improving the health and welfare of the local area.

4. Conventional Forces.

Unconventional warfare can not be fought by SOF alone. Conventional forces are responsible for the planning and conduct of an intervention of all conventional and unconventional forces. The problem is that the conventional forces have been allowed to evaluate a mission as successful based on their own operations. The conventional forces should be equally accountable for the organization, training and operations of the host nations organizations during the transition period. Early withdrawal of US forces puts the host nation organizations at a serious disadvantage.

5. Alternate Strategies.

The Powell doctrine is one possible option for a US intervention. The range of military options for the US should include several options to allow the US a more adaptive response to future contingencies.

a. Protracted Strategy.

The Powell doctrine is an effort to achieve rapid victory. It is only applicable in certain unique circumstances. In many cases the US will support an internal war without committing massive forces. The three phases of the Powell doctrine: US control, joint control, and host nation control, are reduced to the last two. For example, in El Salvador the US supported the government with a few hundred advisors and large amounts of economic aid.²⁶²

The protracted strategy should focus on reforming the organizations of the regime. The US is not bound by internal bureaucratic forces to preserve the status quo in the host nation. True political and economic reform often requires outside support to overcome the regime's internal resistance. The US can also operate in its own task environment of international diplomacy to recruit other state allies and to persuade or coerce states supporting the other side in the conflict to cease their support.

Moderate support over an extended period of time is more suited to system dynamics than the Powell doctrine. Massive force in a short duration creates a dynamic environment that hinders the ability of the regime to achieve stability after the US withdraws. Moderate changes create less long term problems for the regime.

b. Transitions.

US support to a host nation government creates a control dilemma. The larger the US commitment, the greater this problem. Congressional pressure increases proportionally with higher US commitment. The US prefers to operate in other countries under its own command and control. This leads to US and host nation forces conducting parallel operations in the same country. Coordination is tenuous at best and only conducted at the national level.

²⁶²The US spent over six billion dollars and increased the armed forces from 10,000 to 57,000. Guerrilla forces decreased from 12,000 to 6,000, but military victory could not be achieved. Finally, El Salvador's political reforms resulting from US pressure, led to a negotiated solution. Far from optimal, this solution was more favorable to the US, than Vietnam. See Bruce Hoffman, "Current Research on Terrorism and Low-Intensity Conflict", in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 15(1) (1992), pp. 25-38. p. 31.

A more optimal situation is at least joint command at regional and local level. In some circumstances, US forces will command host nation forces and in other circumstances, US forces will be under host nation command. The United Kingdom has been successful in this approach in its operations.

Another option is secondment: attach US advisers to the host nation. The US advisers will become part of the host nation. This allows US advisers to command host nation forces. This allows direct training for the indigenous forces and the improved command leads to more efficient and effective operations. The greatest advantage that advanced countries have over third world countries is a better trained and experienced leadership.

The problem with transitions and alternate command and control arrangements lies in US bureaucratic politics. US leadership wants to retain the ability to rapidly break contact and withdraw. It is time to reexamine this policy. US joint command was effective in Korea. US forces have been very successful in leading host nation forces in the Philippines, Haiti and Nicaragua in the early 20th century, worldwide during WWII and in Vietnam in the 1960s.

c. Organizational Change.

Organizational change requires extended support throughout the transition. The US faced the problem in Panama and Haiti of trying to withdraw before organizational change was complete. In Panama, much of the old Panama Defense Force was left in place as there was not time to organize a replacement. This led to chronic problems for the new regime including an attempted coup. Finally, the regime completely disbanded the PDF. In Haiti, the US originally thought it could reorganize the police force in 30 days. Over one year later, US support remains crucial to maintain order. The Haitian police force has not finished reorganizing.

(1) Time, Persistence and Patience. It will take three to five years after a major event such as an invasion to complete a reorganization. In routine cases like El Salvador, even a decade of effort failed to reform the regime. Again, organizational change takes time. US efforts to hurry this process will lead to systemic interaction that

will make the problem worse. The US must be persistent and patient. Persistent requires a cohesive, systemic plan of organizational change and organizational action that includes political and military aspects of the organizational and mobilizational struggle. Patience is the long term commitment to implement this plan.

(2) Organization. The US separates the training of military and police forces between the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice. The problem is that in the countries in which the US intervenes, there is no such separation. In Haiti, the administration, army, police and fire department were all part of the same organization.

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the US Agency for Internal Development Administration of Justice Program are the US agencies that train foreign police forces. They lack the organizational structure, presence, size and quality factors of their military Special Operations Forces counterparts. This is not their fault, their organizations are not organized, manned or equipped for unconventional warfare.

In Panama, the Military Support Group (MSG) initially placed four man teams down to local, precinct level. The teams consisted of two Spanish speaking Special Forces members and two Reserve Corps members whose peacetime jobs were as civilian police. The Ambassador cancelled the program and replaced it with ICITAP. ICITAP tried to change the Panamanian National Police by conducting temporary ad hoc training seminars. "For its first six months, ICITAP had no permanent staff in country."²⁶³

ICITAP had to reorganize itself before it could take on the new mission. It was not prepared to train a 12,000 man police force. Conventional police operations in the United States differ from those in the third world. General Thurman commented that "ICITAP

²⁶³ John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing The Restoration of Panama, (Carlisle: US Army War College, 1992), p. 50. A former PNP leader called the training programs useless. In December, 1990 the 'new' police mutinied.

did not have the manpower, resources or lesson plans. ICITAP was ill prepared to set up a new police structure."²⁶⁴ It had less than ten personnel in country at the end of 1991.²⁶⁵

The problem will not be solved by blaming ICITAP. It was given a mission that it was not organized, trained or equipped to carry out. A more useful option would have been to place the MSG teams under the purview of ICITAP. ICITAP could have used their expertise to develop a program using the SOF trainers and reserve police personnel to implement it. ICITAP has the management and law enforcement experience to develop a national plan but lacks the manpower to implement and supervise it. SOF has the manpower and cultural skills needed to interact with the host nation. Bureaucratic politics within the US led to the failure of the program. Haiti has seen a repetition of Panama.

E. CONCLUSION.

The external actor is constrained by the tension between its own system and the system of the state in which it is intervening. A systemic perspective must drive the planning and conduct of operations of the intervenor. The Powell doctrine can have a serious counterproductive systemic reaction in the long term that negates the cost and effort of the external actor.

The United States is especially constrained by a non unified foreign policy infrastructure. It is unlikely that the US can change its poor organizational structure. This means that US actions must seek to overcome the constraints of its domestic environment and the US organizational environment while trying to conduct operations within the host nation's contextual and task environment.

This chapter examined organizational and operational methods to overcome the systemic constraints on US behavior. The US needs to develop an improved interagency doctrine and an improved doctrine within the military. The differences between

²⁶⁴ Richard H. Schultz, Jr., "The Post Conflict Use of Military Forces: Lessons from Panama, 1989-1991", in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1993, pp. 145-172. p.160.

²⁶⁵ Schultz, p. 160.

conventional and unconventional war require different doctrines. Special Operations Forces are not sufficient to wage unconventional war. It is a problem for conventional forces which will plan and conduct unconventional warfare operations with SOF support.

Two options exist for the US military. First, it can have two separate force structures with different organizational design and doctrines; one for conventional war and one for unconventional war. Second, it can preserve existing force structure and develop two doctrines to operate in either type of war. The US picked a third suboptimal option resulting in one organizational design that operates under one doctrine and accepts repeated failure in unconventional operations (Vietnam, Panama, and Somalia). Given resource constraints the best option for the US is to develop an unconventional warfare doctrine for employment with the existing force structure.

VII. CONCLUSION.

A. INTRODUCTION.

This chapter will examine the hypotheses in light of the evidence from the case studies. Then, the theory itself will be examined in its relationship to theories on the origins, process and outcomes of revolution.

B. AN EVALUATION OF THE MODEL.

This section examines the model and the three hypothesis. It provides an assessment on whether the evidence supported or failed to support the theory. Overall, the model proved effective in revealing the environmental and organizational constraints and opportunities that form the parameters of organizational action. At the same time, the high quantity and types of factors that exist in the contextual and task environment make prediction very difficult. In the long cycle, it is difficult to predict the beginning of the next insurgency. In the short cycle, it is difficult to predict the next action of an organization and the net impact of an individual act. The model is of value in explaining the interaction of the organization within its environment and the net systemic effects of organizational behavior.

1. Hypothesis One.

Hypothesis one examines the systemic interaction of the environment, organizational structure and organizational actions on the long term growth of the organization. The organization is capable of operating independent of its environment. It can survive in a hostile environment such as the MCP in Malaya from 1951 to 1960 and the PIRA from 1975 to 1995. Organizations can also grow in non munificent environments such as the MCP from 1948 to 1951. Obviously, the most rapid growth is where a munificent environment, a flexible organization design and organizational action are all in harmony. The rapid growth of the FIS in Algeria following the riots of 1988, Sinn Fein after the hunger strikes, and the MCA after 1952 in Malaya illustrate this optimal condition. The environment frames the parameters of organizational action, but does not cause it to occur.

Organizational action is also affected by organizational structure. Organizational structure has a behavioral effect and a time effect. The behavioral effect represents the selective and mobilizational organizational designs impact on the organization. Selective organizations are more action oriented and less patient than mobilizational organizations. The time factor equals the time it takes to change organizational structure. The development of Sinn Fein from a support organization of PIRA to a political party took from 1981 to 1986. The other organizations reviewed in the case studies required from 18 to 36 months to implement new organizational structures.

Organizations still have free choice. Environment and organizational structure are not deterministic. The IRA survived for fifty years on faith alone from the 1920s to the revival in the 1970s. It is a mark of organizational competence for an organization to overcome adverse environmental and structural. Sinn Fein under Gerry Adams exhibited a high level of competence, as did the MCA in Malaya from 1952 to 1960.

2. Hypothesis Two.

The second hypothesis examines the role of mobilization potential, mobilization space and organizational presence in producing growth. Mobilization potential is formed by the contextual environment which is the existing political, economic and social structure of society. Mobilization space represents the physical and demographic space available to the organization in the task environment. The task environment is formed by the current presence and activities of all other organizations in society: regime organizations, counter regime organizations and neutral organizations. Organizational presence equals the presence of organizational members within society.

a. Overlap Between Mobilization Potential and Space.

The case studies reveal an overlap between the contextual and task environment. The political structure of society can be quickly and radically changed by the regime operating in the task environment. Templer's reforms in Malaya, direct rule in Northern Ireland and the electoral period in Algeria were contextual changes with a rapid impact implemented by the regime. Mobilization potential and space also overlap. Areas with high popular support for the counter regime often coincide with mobilization space.

The utility in keeping the two concepts apart is demonstrated in the Malayan case. The sector providing mobilizational potential in the cities had very little mobilization space due restrictive regime activities and the opposition of the secret societies and KMT within the Chinese community. Conversely, the potential support from squatters was lower but there were no rivals in this mobilizational space.

b. Organizational Presence Redefined.

Organizational presence needs to be redefined. In Malaya, the regime established a presence with Malays in Chinese villages. In Northern Ireland, the regime also established presence with Protestant and British members in Catholic areas. In both cases, the effort proved ineffective and counter productive. The alien presence increased public sentiment for the opposition. In Malaya, the regime allowed the Chinese MCA to enter and recruit locals into the administration and Home Guard.

c. Presence and Social Networks.

Presence is most effective when it can take advantage of local social networks. This requires willing participation of local community members. It was possible in Malaya, but not in Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom demonstrated great ingenuity and organizational skill in acquiring information on the IRA without Catholic membership. The informant program and a massive intelligence campaign proved effective. Yet, the overwhelming presence of security forces and coercive nature of the reinforced mobilization potential and space for the PIRA. The security forces know the membership of PIRA nearly to the man, but can not stop PIRA activity. Without local community membership and assistance, the UK effort restricts the overt mobilizational space and maneuver room for PIRA. PIRA organizational presence remains rooted in the local community and can not be eliminated.

Organizational presence redefined as members who are part of existing social networks has more explanatory power. The MCA competed with the MCP in the same social networks. In Northern Ireland, the regime has no presence in the Catholic community. The SDLP's social nets are in the urban middle class and rural areas. Sinn Fein and PIRA dominate the urban working class. An anomaly like the PIRA stronghold

in rural South Armagh is explained by the long established republican, violent tradition of a few families in the region that predates 1969.

The role of social networks in the growth and sustainment of organizations became a subset of social movement theory in the 1970s. Individual social networks can overcome Olson's free rider behavior.²⁶⁶ However, once established these same networks sustain the organization even as the environment and the organization itself changes. The nature of the IRA in South Armagh has been fairly constant from the 1920s to today. This area provided strong opposition to Sinn Fein efforts to stop the war, which is consistent with their stand during the 1969 PIRA - OIRA split. It is consistent with their support for the IRA in the North long after the decline of the IRA in other areas.

d. New Proposition.

The importance of social networks, as the case studies indicate, is that current theory overlooks the value of establishing organizational presence. Political culture examines the long term continuity in social behavior in some countries such as the existence of violence in Northern Ireland, or in Columbia after the La Violencia sustained civil war. The ability of social networks to survive and sustain themselves even after the demise of the original organization indicates that sustained conflict creates a serious long term effect in a society. The American Civil War left bitter memories in many areas in the Southern States 120 years later.

This leads to the proposition that once an organization establishes itself in the local community it produces a long cycle effect. Once local social networks are mobilized to support a political organization, they sustain themselves and are easily activated when new organizations arise. This reinforces the theory that insurgent organizations must be defeated early. Yet, the social network approach does not mean that the regime will lose if the organization survives for ten or more years. It means that once the social networks are activated, they must be coopted, neutralized or eliminated.

²⁶⁶ See Knoke, pp. 57 to 84 for a summary of the role of social networks in organizational growth and a summary of the major theorists in this field. Of particular note are Klandermans, Huckefeldt, Zald and McCarthy.

The British successfully coopted the MCA in Malaya and this solution proved viable in the long cycle. It is still working after forty years. Neutralization means isolating the opposition in a marginal segment of society. This happened to the MCP in Malaya. The UK would love for this to happen to the PIRA. The last option of genocide proved of value to the Russian, Chinese and Cambodian Communists, but it is no longer acceptable to the Western Democracies and the international system. That has not deterred Burundi and Rwanda so it is will continue.

2. Adaptation.

Adaptation represents the ability of the organization to change itself to match changes in the contextual and task environment. Adaptation will not cause one side to win or lose by itself. All things being equal, in an extended conflict the more adaptable organization has a significant advantage over its rivals. If the environment determines outcome, then adaptation is not important. Adaptation provides the key argument against the structural approach to revolution.

The case studies show that organizations like the MCP and PIRA can adapt to survive in a hostile environment. Organizations like the MCA and SDLP can overcome slow growth in a difficult beginning period to achieve long term stability with a large support base. PIRA has been adaptable in its search for survival and new ways to use violence. This has not helped the long term goal of increasing mass support for removal of the British. The MCA, SDLP and Sinn Fein adapted more to the long cycle than to the short cycle factors that drive change for the PIRA. This supports the predictions on the relative emphasis of selective versus mobilizational organizational designs. It also raises the question about the difference between effectiveness and efficiency. A few observations arise from the case studies concerning the difference between efficiency and effectiveness, systemic behavior and the factors that influence organizational change.

a. Efficiency and Effectiveness.

Organization theory defines organizational competence as a combination of efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency defined as maximizing the utility of organizational

resources. Effectiveness is defined as organizational goals. Although they complement one another, the two concepts are not synonymous.

The search for efficiency can reinforce the nature of selective organizations and lead to a systemic reaction against the organization. The Briggs plan in Malaya was primarily used to increase the efficiency of the security forces. This allowed the security forces to increase their presence in the country and increase the scale and scope of military operations. It also led to great resentment in the Chinese community against the greater intrusion on their lives from the security forces. This problem was not solved until Templer's reforms. The spread of the Home Guard led to a massive increase of a fairly inefficient, poorly trained militia. Yet, the local nature of the Home Guards increased local support for the regime and forced the MCP into the jungle. The drop in efficiency was matched by an increase in effect.

The post 1975 reforms in Northern Ireland exhibit a similar effect. The government intelligence and security system has become very efficient. 30,000 men stabilized the situation in a country of 1.5 million. Yet, the Catholic living in the slums resent the heavy security actions in their neighborhoods. The results of UK efficiency preserves a stalemate. In the long run, this may prove effective if the UK can outlast PIRA. The current cease fire is a tribute to British patience. But it still illustrates that efficiency alone can not produce a long term solution.

The same criteria apply for insurgent organizations. In 1949 and 1951, the MCP sought to improve their efficiency. Similarly, the 1975 reorganization of the PIRA was also a search for efficiency and survival. Each achieved the short cycle effect of preserving the organization and allowed the number of violent incidents to increase. This increase in violence increased opposition from the opposing ethnic groups, the regime and the bulk of their own ethnic group.

This is not to say that the MCP or PIRA ever reached a level of efficiency even remotely approaching that of the security forces. J. Bowyer Bell's point on the inherent

inefficiency of the underground is well supported empirically.²⁶⁷ The point is that insurgent organizations keep searching for better efficiency or for that one single action that will bring victory. The case studies indicate that one spectacular act of violence systemically increases the opposition of regime and allied parts of society.

Effectiveness is the search for an optimal outcome for the organization. The MCA became part of the ruling government in Malaya and remains so today. The SDLP consolidated its position as the majority voice in the Catholic community and achieved a significant minority role in the government. Man for man neither of these organizations has as much of an impact as their violent rivals. In Northern Ireland, the regime and media remained fixated on the 300 man PIRA while treating the 300,000 supporters of the SDLP as a sideshow. Yet, it was the SDLP that overcame the opposition of both the Republic of Ireland and the UK to bring Sinn Fein and PIRA to the negotiating table.

b. Systemic Behavior.

The organizational model uses the society and the state as a system. Systems exhibit balancing and reinforcing behavior: violence leads to counter violence and movements to counter movements. There are times to act and times to organize. The balance between efficiency and effectiveness lies with an actor that responds to systemic behavior.

In a system, the outcome of individual acts are hard to predict. The reaction of other organizations in society can vary. Actions and reactions between organizations lead to an impact on all of society. Societal impacts vary with the varying social movements and groupings in the contextual environment. The 1969 march in Derry and the 1981 hunger strikes led to a systemic reaction that none of the participants expected.

This implies that theories that focus on the appropriate tactics and doctrine for insurgency are misplaced. Tactics and doctrine will vary within each different state. The US effort to transplant the Strategic Hamlet program implemented in Malaya into Vietnam

²⁶⁷Bell, 1990, pp. 194-211.

was a disaster. Similarly, Che Guevera died in a futile attempt to export the tactical methods of M-26 to an alien environment.

c. Organizational Change.

The model explains explains organizatinoal change using four factors. These include internal (1) bureaucratic politics; (2) competition between the organization and rival organizations within the same support base/industry; (3) competition between the organization and organizations from different support base/industry; and (4) environmental changes. The problem lies in determining which of these factors drives a new strategy or decision by the organization.

The decision of the MCP to start a revolt was partly due to the new leadership consolidating power after the defection of Lai Teck; increasing resistance from the secret societies and KMT within the Chinese community; increasing resistance from the regime and the Malayan community; and the closing of the favorable environment that existed since the end of WWII. In other words, parts of all four levels of analysis influenced the MCP decision.

d. Theoretical implications.

Two factors complicate a systems view of the organization. The first is predicting the outcome of a single act. The second is in determining what factors influence organizational behavior at a given point in time. The systemic influences described in this thesis cast doubt on any theory that claims it can predict short cycle behavior. However, in the long run it is possible to predict outcomes of behavior. This is due to the effect of time on actions and outcomes.

It takes years to change an organizational design. Contextual changes also take years to have an effect. The task environment and actions within the task environment can change rapidly but the relationship between the task and contextual environments remains fixed in the short run. Individual acts are not predetermined since organizational choice

varies. The overall behavior of an organization acquires its own unique pattern. Organizational acts may not be predictable, but organizational behavior can be predicted based on past behavior.

From the perspective of adaptation, organizations can be classed by their behavior as tending towards either short or long cycle behavior. The short cycle actor responds and adapts to events and the actions of other organizations in the task environment. This allows for rapid response of action and counter action. PIRA's tit for tat behavior is typical of this type of actor.

A long cycle actor adapts to changes in the contextual environment. The SDLP in Northern Ireland demonstrated a better appreciation of the impact of the 1985 Anglo - Irish accord than either of the two governments that signed the agreement. The accord pushed the new Sinn Fein into a corner. To pursue a political strategy, Sinn Fein had to take a stand towards the accord. To reject it outright would nullify the move towards politics. The SDLP used the accord and the new Sinn Fein to open negotiations.

Long cycle adaptation is crucial in prolonged conflict. By itself it will not bring victory. It increases the ability of the organization to compete within its own SMI and against other organizations in the rest of the task environment. Theories that focus on winning militarily overlook the importance of this variable. If neither side can win by force, the outcome can only be a prolonged stalemate or a negotiated solution. The latter two options are not zero sum. The adaptable actor achieves the next best optimal solution. The failure of the MCP to accept any negotiated solution left them with nothing, while the more flexible MCA became part of the regime.

C. THEORY.

The organizational model has some utility in examining the insurgency process. This section will examine the value of the model compared to existing insurgency theories. The organizational model will be examined as to its relationship to the origins, process and outcomes of insurgencies.

1. Origins.

The organizational model expects that revolutions are not spontaneous and that an extended period of organizational growth precedes the start of an insurgency. Three case studies are not sufficient to draw conclusions as to the origins of an insurgency. Gurr concluded in the Minorities at Risk study that organizations took an average of 13 years to develop before the initiation of violence.²⁶⁸ This does not explain why organizations turn to violence to achieve their aims. The case studies indicate that there is no consistent pattern in why organizations start an insurgency. The decision varies with each case.

The revolution as an event theory is not supported by the case studies. The 1969 outbreak of violence appeared spontaneous due to the rapid spread of violence throughout the country. Yet, the case studies reveal the organizational dynamics that preceded the crisis led to the insurgency. The contextual environment has value in that it explains the intensity and scope of grievances in the Catholic community. But the systemic interaction of organizations is part of a process that can override or change the contextual environment. Organizations can build support where they previously had none, or lose the support of an existing preference base.

This means that the theories that examine the preconditions of revolution have value as tools to examine the task environment. They usefully outline the vertical and horizontal cleavages that stratify society and that define the competing social movements. These theories do not explain the shift from conditions to actual revolt nor the process followed in insurgency. The organization approach includes the organization as a variable that determines the probability of a revolt. The organizational approach fails to provide a general theory that can predict outbreaks of political violence in a world system of over 200 very different states.

²⁶⁸ Ted Robert Gurr, "Communal Conflicts and Global Security", in Current History, Vol 94, No. 592, May 1995, pp 212-217. p. 215. Gurr is commenting on the average in 24 Western democracies and this average is expected by him to be lower in the third world.

2. Process.

The best application of the organizational model is for examining the process of revolution. The conditions that create grievances in society that precede violence are not the ones that determine the trajectory of the revolution nor the eventual outcome.²⁶⁹ The case studies all show that the contextual factors that favored the initial growth of an organization do not determine the survival of the organization. The MCP and PIRA both survived when the environment became unfavorable. After the outbreak of violence, changes occurred both the contextual and task environment. Neither relative deprivation theories nor historical inevitability theories can explain this process.²⁷⁰

The organization forms the link between the environment and outcome. The organization as a level of analysis forms the needed connection between the origins of insurgency and the final outcome. As the model demonstrates, the contextual and task environment form the parameters in which the organization operates. Concurrently, organizational design creates short cycle constraints on organizational behavior.

The task environment is very useful in explaining the behavior of the organization. Many theories of insurgency focuses on insurgency as a competition between the guerrillas and the government. The competition of the guerrillas with other organizations within their own social movement is ignored. In Malaya and Northern Ireland, the true center of gravity was a moderate political organization within the opposition SMI. The selective MCP and PIRA both used violence against their respective rivals, the MCA and SDLP. The outcome in Malaya was determined by cooperation between the MCA and regime. In Northern Ireland, the SDLP brought all the competing sides to the negotiating table. It will be a critical factor in the resolution or continuation of that conflict.

3. Outcome.

The organizational model is not sufficient to determine the outcome of an insurgency. The outcome varies with the changes in the contextual and task environment.

²⁶⁹ DeNardo, p. 13.

²⁷⁰ See DeNardo, pp. 18 - 32; Gurr, 1983, pp. 245-7.

The organizational model predicts growth, but growth alone will not cause victory or defeat. Within the task environment, the regime, counter regime and neutral organizations all tend to grow during violent conflict. Violence increases the costs of staying neutral and drives individuals into organizations for protection. Relative growth is an indicator of success or failure and influences popular expectations of the outcome.²⁷¹ An influence is not deterministic.

The model's value lies in its ability to determine the relative position and momentum of the various organizations. Organizations must balance actions and organization development. Knowing one's position relative to the environment and the position of the opponent allows for more effective policies. In Malaya, the UK managed to push the MCP steadily away from their support base. The presence of the MCP went from the urban areas, to the squatters, to the jungle fringe, to the aborigines to the deep jungle. Yet, the regime did not reestablish control until after the MCA mobilized and consolidated support in the previous MCP support base.

In Northern Ireland, the PIRA remain established inside their local communities. UK efforts to drive them out failed. Given these conditions, a military solution will not succeed and will only further increase the links between the Provos and their supporters. A better alternative is to isolate the Provos and their supporters within the Catholic community. The SDLP and Sinn Fein are fulfilling this task. The 70 year history of the IRA clearly indicates that they will not voluntarily stop fighting. However, the futility of their situation led Sinn Fein to agree to a ceasefire.

4. Patience.

A common maxim in insurgency is that if the insurgents survive, they will eventually win.²⁷² This is not supported by the evidence. The MCP survived for fifty years and the Provisional IRA has survived for twenty six years. A stalemate does not inherently

²⁷¹ See the Appendix.

²⁷² Bell, 1986, p. 211.

favor either side. A stalemate indicates a situation where a military victory by either side is not possible under current environmental conditions.

The organization must consider alternative strategies if it can not win by military means alone. The insurgents start weaker and smaller than the regime and seek to increase power and capabilities. The alternatives for the insurgents are to grow, to use violence to increase growth, to use violence to defeat the regime, to seek a coalition, or to seek a negotiated solution. These alternatives depend on the situation.

Ideally, the organization mobilizes its support base. If its support base is large enough, full mobilization will bring victory. This is the Marx - Mao - Skocpol approach. The regime can block access and restrict the available space so that mobilization is limited. The organization can use violence to create space to enhance growth. The MCP did this in 1948. This is different than an effort to win through military means alone. The Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968 was a pure military effort to win with available resources. It was not an effort to increase the growth of the organization, but an effort to win in one big push. It was hoped that a bandwagon effect would bring the assistance or at least cooperation of the population. This is different than efforts to increase membership into the organization.

A problem arises if the potential support base of the insurgents is not 100% of the population. The organization can reach an optimal mobilization of its support base and still be too small to win. It can use persuasion and coercion to expand its support base. The MCP managed to shift from its initial urban base to the squatters and later to the non Chinese aborigines. Both sides seek to sway neutral elements to their own benefit. Success would allow a new mobilization effort in a new social group.

In a polarized society it may be very difficult for an organization to expand its support base to other social groups. Very few Malays or Indians joined the MCP. In Northern Ireland, few Catholics are in the security forces and few Protestants are in PIRA. The organization may seek a coalition with other organizations in society. This is common in successful revolutions and occurred in Russia, Iran, Nicaragua, Cuba and other cases. This sets the stage for a post revolutionary struggle for power.

The organization can also accept that it can not win by military means and seek a negotiated solution. This is a common outcome. The regime stays in power, but political and economic power are redistributed. This occurred in Malaya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, El Salvador, South Africa and many other cases. Negotiated solutions are not as well examined as the more glamorous revolutionary victories.

The final option for an organization with a limited support base is to fight harder and hope for an attritional victory. In conventional war between states, this a situation similar to World War I where both sides lose. The problem with this approach is that changes in the contextual and task environment can lead to an unexpected outcome. Eritrea won its independence from Ethiopia after decades of effort. A serious risk is that the organizational efforts to win alone will lead to countermovements of other small groups. Liberia and Somalia are both cases where there is no faction able to defeat the others without outside assistance.

D. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL.

Max Manwaring developed a paradigm on the outcome of internal conflicts. The outcome is determined by six factors.

1. The legitimacy of the government.
2. Organizational unity of effort.
3. Type and consistency of support for the targeted government.
4. Ability to reduce outside aid to the insurgents.
5. Intelligence.
6. Discipline and capabilities of a government's armed forces.²⁷³

²⁷³ Max G. Manwaring, ed., Uncomfortable Wars: Towards a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 20-24. Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, ed., Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 12-16.

1. Discussion of the Manwaring Paradigm.

The Manwaring paradigm addresses outcome while the organizational model in this study focuses on process. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the Manwaring paradigm from the perspective of the organizational model. Manwaring's paradigm will be examined and modified using the model.

a. Legitimacy.

Legitimacy is all things to all people. Sloan calls it "the moral right to govern."²⁷⁴ It is a preference. Preferences are expressed by social groups reflected through organizations. Organizations use assisted preferences to overcome free riding to recruit members. Thus, legitimacy and preferences alone are a contextual environmental factor. They are less important than the nature and type of organizations competing to recruit from the preference base.

A systemic view of the contextual and task environment focuses on the relationship of preferences (legitimacy) to organizations competing for the preference base to organizations competing with each other from other preference bases in society. Legitimacy is an ambiguous concept. The crucial factor is to define the system and identify the contextual and task environment.

b. Organization and Intelligence.

Unity of effort is a function of the command and control design of the organization. Revising organizational structure takes strong leadership and minimum period of 18 months.²⁷⁵ The regime in Malaya under Templer created a highly unified organizational structure that proved decisive in winning the war and providing long term stability. The administration, police, intelligence and military forces were unified at the national, province and district level.

²⁷⁴ Corr and Sloan, p. 12.

²⁷⁵ Organization Theory predicts that it takes three to five years to change organization structure. The pressures associated with military operations compresses this time period, as shown in Malaya and Northern Ireland, by both sides of the conflict. Selective organizations changed in 18 to 24 months in both cases.

Intelligence is a function of organizational presence. Intelligence in internal war is a police function because presence requires a permanent organization enmeshed in local social networks. It is not possible to move the intelligence organization from region to region since it is tied into existing social networks. Military organizations are transitory and not suited for unconventional intelligence operations.

Intelligence is an organizational function dependent on permanent organizational presence. Therefore, it is a job for a host nation police organization. If one does not exist, it must be created which will take years of organizational effort. The United Kingdom in Northern Ireland has created an effective intelligence organization using presence even though the regime has had great difficulty recruiting willing Catholic informants. This shows that intelligence is possible with permanent presence not including members of local social networks, but at a very large expenditure of resources and effort.

c. External Support.

The Manwaring paradigm stresses the role of external support which is expected since it was written for the US Southern Command. "Long term consistent support during and after a low-intensity conflict is critical to success."²⁷⁶ Studies show that moderate support over a period of time significantly enhances the probability of success.²⁷⁷ Yet what type of support matters?

Leites and Wolf examined the role of direct aid.²⁷⁸ Putting additional resources into a society can benefit either side. Aid must be controlled so that it benefits the

²⁷⁶ Corr and Sloan, p. 13.

²⁷⁷ Karl Jackson, "Post Colonial Rebellion and Counter Insurgency in Southeast Asia", in Chandran Johnson, ed., Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1985), pp. 3-52. p. 37. Jackson studied 26 insurgencies in SE Asia. Manwaring found a similar result in his study of 43 insurgencies since 1945. See Corr and Sloan, p. 16, endnote 10.

²⁷⁸ Improving income allows the local population more ability to express their preexisting preferences. So bulk, nonorganizational aid increases capabilities for sympathizers of both sides. In the United States, welfare payments in poor neighborhoods often lead to increased animosity towards the state. Leites and Wolf, pp. 19-21.

organizational and mobilizational struggle. Too much, too fast and it will exceed the capability of existing organizations and increase the likelihood of systemic balancing behavior.

The proper role of aid is to benefit organizations in the task environment. It would require massive amounts of resources to significantly change the contextual environment of even a small country such as Haiti. The external actor can use its influence to overcome host nation resistance to organizational reform. It took years, but the US gradually changed the political structure of El Salvador and reformed the government administration and security forces.

A cautionary note must be sounded with regard to cutting off aid to insurgents. By definition, insurgents are part of the existing social system. They are not caused by external aid, but benefit from it. Cutting aid to insurgents will not stop an insurgency. Malaya, Northern Ireland and Algeria all illustrate protracted insurgencies with minimal external support. The PIRA peak strength in Northern Ireland was 1972, over ten years before Libya started supplying arms.

d. Organizational Efficiency.

Improving the discipline and capabilities of the government's armed forces is only part of the need to improve the efficiency of the regime's organizations. The regime has administrative, police, intelligence and security forces. All of them must be improved to optimal efficiency in an internal conflict.

Improving efficiency means organizational change. This requires systemic planning to obtain optimal results. The Briggs plan in Malaya was an admirable plan that improved the efficiency and unity of effort of the regime's organizations. It is a necessary but not sufficient part of the UK victory. It was not until Templer framed a political solution that the regime was able to eliminate the insurgency. In Northern Ireland it was not until after the 1985 accord that a political solution was possible. This led slowly to the current cease fire.

2. A Revised Paradigm.

This section establishes a revised paradigm in light of the organizational model. It includes methods to maximize efficiency and effectiveness in both the short and long cycles. Insurgency is a system, and contextual differences means that exact tactics and techniques from El Salvador are rarely applicable in Algeria. The focus is on the organization and its relationship to its own context.

a. Think Systemically.

Identify the contextual and task environment and determine the relative permeability of the system boundaries. Identify the degree of external support to organizations within the host nation system. The boundaries of the host nation as a contained system vary with geographic location and ties to external powers.

b. Organize efficiently.

Identify organizational weaknesses and the degree of coordination and cooperation between organizations. Unity of effort should be established between the administration, police and military at national, regional and local levels. New organizations may need to be created or old ones significantly reorganized. Planning must include what actions to take while some organizations are in transition.

c. Act effectively.

Organizational actions have short and long cycle effects. Organization actions may lead to benefits in some parts of the systems and costs in another. Anticipate systemic balancing and reinforcing behavior. For example, the movement and counter movement process in Malaya from 1946 to 1948, Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1975 and Algeria from 1989 to 1995 were all predictable. Organizational actions must address the mobilizational struggle and the organizational struggle.

(1) Organizational Struggle. The organizational struggle occurs over mobilizational space and organizational presence. The regime seeks to maximize the space available to its own organizations and to increase organizational presence. It attempts to minimize space and presence of the opposing organizations. Mobilizational

space represents the geographic and demographic space within the competing social movements. Organizational presence is the location of actual members of the competing organizations.

The difference between the two illustrates the role of discriminate violence in internal war. Destroying mobilizational space means waging war on the geographic and demographic space containing the opposition social movement. The bulk of the individuals in this space are neutrals or free riding sympathizers and only a minority are members. Indiscriminate violence can convert neutrals into sympathizers and sympathizers into members.

A more efficient use of resources focuses on limiting and controlling space and using violence against organizational members. This is easier to say than to do. It requires the establishment of a permanent presence to provide intelligence. Presence also serves as a selective incentive that influences both organizational action and the preferences of the local environment.

(2) Mobilizational Struggle. The mobilizational struggle concerns the preference base that supports the insurgents. In the short cycle there is no solution to this problem. It takes time to change preferences. However, the opposition normally contains several competing organizations. A political solution of reforms and compromise should be designed to aid moderate organizations within the opposing social movement.

In Malaya, the Malaya Chinese Association was founded in cooperation with the regime. It actively collaborated with the regime to defeat the insurgents. In Northern Ireland, the Social Democratic Labor Party started as a moderate organization opposing the regime and gradually reached a position closer to the regime than to the insurgents. The long term solution to these conflicts involves a political compromise.

Preferences are only slightly effected by ideology and propaganda. The small deeply committed group of individuals likely to act on an appeal with little or no social

contact networks will not be swayed by a counter appeal.²⁷⁹ Developing and spreading organizational presence is more efficient and effective. The key decision for the individual is not what side do they prefer but on whether or not to join an organization.

Expectations of who ultimately wins form part of the decision to join. The other part is the selective incentives offered by both sides. A problem with the hearts and minds propaganda school is the belief that expectations and selected incentives are uniform throughout society. They are not. Expectations and incentives vary with every village and community. Organization presence and actions at the local level are crucial to understanding the mobilizational process.²⁸⁰

d. Recognize External and Internal Systems.

The international system of states operates differently than the internal operation of a state. External states can supply resources and manpower to either side in a struggle. However, these external resources interact with the host nation system to produce an outcome. The internal system dominates the external system in internal conflict.

It is a common error for external actors to blame other external actors for causing an internal conflict. In Vietnam, the US believed that the Viet Cong were formed and controlled by North Vietnam. The United States bombed North Vietnam in an effort to deter the actions of the South Vietnamese insurgents. In Bosnia, the US and UN imposed sanctions on Serbia to deter the actions of Bosnian insurgents. This encouraged Bosnian and Croatian attacks on Serbs and a Serbian counter reaction as part of a systemic escalation of the scope and intensity of violence. The methods and theories of international

²⁷⁹ See DeNardo, CH 2 on ideological appeals. See the Appendix in this thesis for an expanded view of this process.

²⁸⁰ Sam Sarkesian identifies the village as a crucial and often misunderstood level of analysis in internal conflicts. see Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993, p. 134.

diplomacy are not applicable to the dynamics of internal conflict. Domestic politics and organizations are influenced more by their own contextual and task environment than the external system of international politics.

e. Adaptation.

Organizations, strategy and tactics must respond to the system of the host nation. Organizational change takes time and effort. The external intervenor's optimal strategy should be to help overcome organizational inertia and bureaucratic politics to reform the host nation's organizations. The US failed to do this in Vietnam and lost, it did this in El Salvador and won.

Large changes lead to systemic balancing. Moderate changes over time can take advantage of systemic reinforcing behavior to help make the environment more munificent for one side or the other. The organization that can adapt systemically has a significant advantage over other organizations in internal conflict.

E. CONCLUSION.

The organizational model is more effective for analyzing the process of internal conflict than existing theories. It can describe the origins or the outcome but it can not predict them. All general theories are limited to describing origins and outcomes due to the many variables and differences between cases.

The organizational model is prescriptive in describing organizational actions. The successful organization seeks to expand potential, space and presence. The organization capable of long cycle adaptation has an advantage over those that do not. A systems view of the relationship of the contextual and task environment provides a guide to organizational action and growth.

The organizational model provides an alternative to existing theories on internal conflict. The concept and nature of the task environment provides a point of departure from structural and individual theories of revolution. The environment does not determine outcome. A specific ideology, strategy or policy will also not determine outcome. The outcome depends on the dynamic actions and reactions of all organizations that exist in society.

APPENDIX. RECRUITMENT, COMMITMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

This appendix examines the relationship between the organization and individuals. The organization behaves as a unitary actor in the process of internal war. Yet, the organization consists of individuals who make their own decision on whether or not to join the organization. This section examines the formation of preferences by individuals and the incentives that cause individuals to overcome free riding behavior and join an organization.

A. CONVERTING PREFERENCES TO MOBILIZATION.

Preferences are influenced by the existing political, economic and social structure of society. The context of a specific country creates horizontal and vertical cleavages in society. Some of these subdivisions gain from the existing status quo while others are net losers. The existence of an opposition organization to the state shifts the existing winner-loser relationships. Some stand to gain more and lose less with one side or the other. This leads to socio-economic groups whose preferences can be identified with one side in the conflict.

Preferences are a necessary but not sufficient cause for joining an organization. A preference requires little commitment and is subject to change. Skocpol views individuals as always ready to revolt if only the repressive power of the state weakens. Gurr's relative deprivation theory states that when preferences become strong enough, mobilization occurs (Skocpol: 1979, Gurr:1970). Neither theory explains why people don't just stay at home and let others bear the risks of conflict.

Organizations use selective incentives to encourage support and commitment. Leites and Wolf called this activity the use of assisted preferences.²⁸¹ Selective incentives offer positive rewards or negative sanctions beyond that of the public good in order to produce

²⁸¹ Leites and Wolf, pg. 13.

participation from the benefitting group. The organization can use selective incentives to overcome free rider problems.²⁸²

The contextual environment cost-benefit relationship produces the base preferences of the supporting group - the social movement or mobilization potential. Likewise, the organization offers benefits and incurs costs for joining or not joining while competing with the government and other organizations. What factors make one organization's incentives more attractive than another?

1. Expectations.

The expectation that the reward or punishment will actually be received is critical. In the contextual environment, the expectation of victory influences preferences. In the task environment, expectations are influenced by the relative presence of the competing organizations. If an organization has members in a village with no other competing organization, its relative influence is high. Additionally, villagers may be coerced into joining an organization even against their preferences.

2. Ideological recruiting.

DeNardo distinguishes between ideological and organizational recruiting appeal. An ideological appeal is the stated goals and policies of the organization. It influences preferences. Leites and Wolf called this the "hearts and minds" approach.²⁸³ Ideological recruiting is most important at the very beginning of an organization. The number of

²⁸² Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 51. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations, (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 200. Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism" in Orbis, Vol. 29, No. 3, Fall 1985, p. 474. Crenshaw lists four types of incentives for recruitment: the desire for action, need to belong, social status and material reward.

²⁸³ DeNardo, pg. 43. Leites and Wolf, p. 33.

recruits who will join purely due an ideological cause is small. Yet, the members who do join based on ideology are extremely committed and form the cadre of the organization.²⁸⁴

Broad appeals have little effect on the bulk of even a sympathetic population. "Impersonal communication alone is insufficient to generate commitment to the organization."²⁸⁵ Except for the few highly committed individuals who wish to join, most people are still driven by free riding behavior.

3. Social network recruiting.

The organizational approach of DeNardo has nothing to do with organizations but represents the fact that most recruiting for an organization is done through preexisting social nets.²⁸⁶ Social networks such as family, friends and associations influence the effectiveness of recruitment. Selective incentives motivate individuals to join, not due to an abstract cause, but by an organization driven cost-benefit calculus. Social network recruiting is the most effective form of recruiting as the organization grows.²⁸⁷

Social networks explain the crucial role of the organization in the recruitment process. "Political organizations are formed in response to structural factors which then attempt to influence social networks so as to achieve mobilization."²⁸⁸ The organization uses social networks to overcome free riding. The organization converts preferences to mobilization through its actions to create positive expectations and selective incentives.

Ideological and social network recruiting influence the decision to join the organization. Ideological factors produce a few highly committed cadres and serve to influence preferences for the rest of the population. The social network factors are more

²⁸⁴ Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements, 2nd edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984), pp. 57-67.

²⁸⁵ Wilson and Orum, p. 283.

²⁸⁶ David Knoke, Political Networks: The Structural Perspective, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 69-74. DeNardo, p. 45-6.

²⁸⁷ Knoke, p. 84. Wilson and Orum, pp. 280-3.

²⁸⁸ Wilson and Orum, p. 285.

relevant for the bulk of the population. Ideology might start an organization, but it is through social networks that an organization grows.

Recruiting through social networks reveals the importance of mobilization space and presence. The organization must be in the community and be able to operate within it. Individuals and entire associations can be recruited. Recruiting associations dramatically increases the social network surrounding the organization and increases the potential contacts for further recruitment. Popkin uses the term contact nets to describe this process.²⁸⁹ The organization mobilizes sympathizers through contact nets by building long term relationships with the community.

How does an organization create presence? It is difficult for the organization to grow if it has no social ties with a potential group. In Peru, various left wing organizations composed of white urban intellectuals attempted to recruit rural Indians. They met with repeated failure until Sendero Luminoso used a university to create associational ties to Indian students. These students returned to their home communities as teachers and used social ties to recruit villagers. It took ten years to produce the desired recruiting objectives.

Presence and selective incentives form the mechanism by which preferences are converted into commitment and membership in the organization. Network factors of recruitment are dependent on presence. This confirms the vital importance of presence. Organizations must establish presence at the village level (Sarkesian, 1993). Presence at this level in society increases the organization's mobilization potential, simultaneously, decreasing the mobilization potential and space for opposing organizations.²⁹⁰ Villages and barrios are crucial targets for presence.²⁹¹ Recruiting through existing associational social networks will be much more effective than trying to create new ones.²⁹²

²⁸⁹ Popkin, p. 224.

²⁹⁰ Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), p.134.

²⁹¹ Popkin, pp. 184-5. Lichbach, pp. 150-1.

²⁹² McCarthy and Zald, p. 191. Knoke, pp. 72-83.

B. LEVELS OF COMMITMENT.

The individual may be committed to the group's goals, to an individual leader or to his fellow members. Studies have shown that an individual's commitment to the organization increases not with rewards but with sacrifices. Cognitive dissonance theory shows that higher initiation costs and personal investments in an organization increase commitment.²⁹³

There are three levels of commitment. Moving from the weakest to the strongest levels these are: sympathizers(free-riders), supporters, and members (leaders/followers). According to resource mobilization theory sympathizers are those individuals and organizations whose preferences favor a given organization. They share the goals of the movement. Supporters are those who provide resources: material, time and indirect physical support. Members are those actively participate in the organization serving as leaders and followers.²⁹⁴

Rational actor theories (Leites and Wolf, and DeNardo)insufficiently explain why individuals decide not to join a given organization. The social network model explains why an individual joins an insurgent organization more effectively.²⁹⁵ Selective incentives provide material rewards, and offer social incentives such as social status, companionship, etc.²⁹⁶ "The pure utility-maximizing egocentric actor of Olson's model does not fare well

²⁹³ Wilson and Orum, p. 278. See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) for studies on sacrifice and commitment.

²⁹⁴ See Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), pp.18-21. and Kenneth L. Wilson and Anthony Orum, "Mobilizing People for Collective Political Action", in George Kourvetaris and Betty Dobratz, Political Sociology, (New Brunswick,NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 280-1. Both use cadre, agents, members and sympathizers. McCarthy and Zald use mass and elite, cadre and worker, bystander publics, adherents and constituents, McCarthy and Zald, pp. 23-5.

²⁹⁵ See Wilson and Orum, pp. 277-8; and DeNardo, p. 43.

²⁹⁶ Crenshaw, p. 474.

in the real world." Individuals make choices not in isolation but as part of social influences.²⁹⁷

Preferences shape mobilization potential. Mobilization requires that preferences be converted into action and commitment. Mobilization also requires presence and mobilization space to reach sympathizers and offer selective incentives designed to recruit or coerce them into the organization. Mobilization involves both individual and collective behavior. The environment shapes individual preferences and social factors which motivates individuals to overcome free riding behavior for collective action.²⁹⁸

C. THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS, COSTS AND BENEFITS.

Growth does not directly lead to victory. It indirectly influences the system through its effect on expectations. This section examines the relationship of expectations on preferences and mobilization. Perceptions are a function of a rational actor cost-benefit calculation, where $E(B) > E(C)$. E is the expectation of receiving a given benefit or cost. B is the benefit received and C is the expected cost. The preference decision between the regime and opposition is based on which organization is expected to provide better conditions for the individual. The benefits and costs are discounted for the future. Individuals expect to receive benefits from, or pay costs to, the insurgent organization after it has succeeded in changing or replacing the current regime. Thus, E represents the expectation of victory for one side or the other.

While preferences exist at the national level of analysis, selective incentives are a local level phenomenon. Expectations of society are influenced by the presence of competing organizational infrastructures--that of the regime and the insurgency. Contact with organization membership allows socialization and affects individual expectations of receiving the attention of the organization. Anonymous support is not likely, given the free

²⁹⁷ Knoke, pp.65-6

²⁹⁸ Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague, "Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure and the Party Canvass", American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, March, 1992, pp. 70-86. p. 84.

rider phenomenon. The organization must know the actions of individuals and seek to influence those acts.

Presence provides this information and increases the ability of the organization to react. The organization must be capable of identifying its supporters and those who oppose it, and then demonstrate the ability to reward and punish. The cost benefit calculus is near term and not discounted for the future, as in expectations. The interaction of these forces can be depicted as:

$$E(EI-ER)(BI-BR) > E(EI-ER)(CI-CR)$$

The decision to join an insurgent organization *I*, is effected by the ruling regime organization *R*. *E* is the expectation of insurgent victory and is the same factor that influences preferences. $(EI-ER)$ equals the expectation of receiving a selective incentive from the insurgent organization discounted against the expectation of receiving a selective incentive from the regime for not joining. $(BI-BR)$ is the actual value of the selective incentive received for joining the insurgent organization, *I*, discounted against the value of the selective incentive from the regime organization, *R*, for not joining. $(CI-CR)$ is the cost incurred for not joining the insurgent organization, *I*, discounted by the cost of joining the regime organization, *R*.

The expectation of victory, *E*, is still a factor. It effects the expectation of further rewards or punishments over time. However, preferences are not vital in the decision to join. Coercion may cause many sympathizers, favoring one side or the other, to remain neutral. A combination of social pressure and coercion may cause members of an organization to refuse to conduct operations or defect for fear of retaliation. This supports Leites and Wolf in their contention that critical factors in insurgency rest with the supply side of internal war, rather than preferences.

Leites and Wolf looked at the organization as a system consisting of inputs, production and output.²⁹⁹ However, an organizational approach is not simply supply and demand. The national supply and demand condition is not the same as supply and demand

²⁹⁹ Leites and Wolf, p. 35.

at the local level. Selective incentives effect both cost and benefit. The organization attempts to influence the supply and demand of its own organization and that of its competitors. This is an insufficient view of the insurgency system.

A better concept designates the state as the system. The organization is part of this system. It acts in and is acted upon by the contextual and task environments. In systems theory, looking at cause and effect is misleading due system dynamics. A benefit in the near term can overlook long term costs. The systems view enables the analyst to look at relationships across the system (cross sectionally) and over time(longitudinally). Positive effects in one part of the system may cause negative effects in another part. Movements lead to countermovements and actions lead to counteractions. What are the systemic relationships in the mobilization calculus?

First, examine the factors the organization can influence to get members to join. Creating benefits and inflicting costs for selective incentives requires the expenditure of resources. The insurgent organization's small size, relative to that of the state, is a disadvantage. The state begins conflict with greater resources. This directly affects the benefits (B) and costs (C) resulting in marginal rates of return.

Since the insurgents have fewer total resources than the regime, they must maximize the rate of return. Expectations (E) has a high payoff. It effects preferences on the competing sides of the selective incentive equation. Expectations provide a high leverage approach for the insurgents. However, influencing expectations is tenuous because they shift rapidly and are only indirectly influenced by the organization.

Unlike expectations, presence is a factor that can be directly applied by the organization. Presence provides high leverage in three ways. First, the organization operating in a political vacuum invests few resources and receives a high rate of return. If ER is zero, the organization is simply trying to overcome inertia and free riding behavior. Second, using resources to eliminate regime presence also is a reasonable strategy which effects both sides of the equation. Third, creating presence where the organization previously had none disrupts the opposition's efforts and increases the opportunity for

future operations. The process is similar to jiu jitsu. One constantly reacts to an opponent, putting strength against weakness to maximum advantage.

The organizational approach described above differs with that of Leites and Wolf, who conflate the local and national levels of analysis. According to their theory, if the cost benefit relationship shifts sufficiently, everyone joins. In this view, revolutions are rapid events occurring in little space and a short time period. Leites and Wolf find the regime's comparative advantage in it's ability to raise the costs of joining. While the insurgent's strength is efficiency in supply and demand functions. This view relies on the preference factor and does not take into account actual processes of recruitment. It also ignores interaction of state and society on both sides of the cost-benefit equation.

The expanded view of the mobilization equation supports the empirical reality of the activation process. John Baylis noted this relationship between organization presence and preferences. Using political, economic and social causes to increase popular support is a preference tactic. Mao and Giap used this tactic successfully when opportunities opened to develop infrastructure. Che Guevera relied on preference alone and paid the ultimate price for failure.³⁰⁰ Although preferences exist in munificent environments, organizations must act to grow.

D. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT.

The recruitment process varies as the organization grows. Political organizations are founded by small groups of ideological motivated and committed members. As the organization grows it exhausts the ideological base and recruits members from its preference base using selective incentives. The process of internal conflict creates a situation where over time, most people who can be recruited have joined an organization on one side or another. The final stage involves not recruiting the previously neutral, but recruiting individual defectors from other groups or forming coalitions with other groups in a band wagoning effect.

³⁰⁰ John Baylis, "Revolutionary Warfare", in Contemporary Strategy, 2nd Edition, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987, pp. 299-232), pp. 218-9.

Mao's three stage process illustrates the changing nature of recruitment and organizational development. The first stage is an initial organization and preparation phase. The second is a guerrilla war to weaken the state and expand control. The third stage is a war of movement where the insurgents overwhelm the stage in a conventional offensive. Mao's phases stress the importance of organization and controlled operations.

The first stage is contingent on the penetration of the target social system by the revolutionary cadre.³⁰¹ Mao believed that mass mobilization started at the local level through local issues. "Mao recognized the need to exploit opportunistically any political issue that might bring about the desired level of mass organization."³⁰² Local issues are used to establish presence and influence preferences. Once established, the organization uses local conditions to establish selective incentives to spur recruitment. The local population serves as a resource base and as an intelligence network for the insurgent organization.

The second stage for Mao is an organization expansion phase. The organization recruits through selective incentives and expands organizational presence. Violence is used to create and expand mobilization space. The goal is to create a dual power situation where the insurgents monopolize the mobilization space in a given area. As the guerrilla organization expands, the government's influence contracts. The guerrillas seek to isolate the government in the cities and control the rural areas before the final offensive.

The third stage involves a conventional offensive. The insurgents mobilize forces within the areas they control and attack the government remnants in the cities. Mao's strategy is a sophisticated blend of political and military action to achieve organizational goals. However, not even Mao ever reached the third stage. In China, the Japanese invasion gave Mao time, space and a nationalist appeal to rebuild and reorganize after crushing

³⁰¹ Sam C. Sarkesian, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1975), p. 8.

³⁰² Chalmers Johnson, "The Third Generation of Revolutionary Warfare", in Sarkesian, ed., 1975, pp 357-374. p. 360.

defeats. The KMT was not beaten by fighting to the last man such as the Russians storming the Reichstag in WWII. Rather, they disintegrated.

In fact, revolutions do not end in Mao's third stage. When expectation of victory shifts in favor of the insurgents, the government disintegrates. Some flee to avoid punishment from the insurgents and others defect. Many other organizations within society bandwagon with the insurgents. The end of the struggle in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran and China all show a similar pattern.

From the perspective of the recruitment process, the bandwagoning is due to the shift in expectations. Expectations reach a crossover point where the dynamism of the environment rapidly increases. Defections and disintegration of the government are matched by a surge in insurgent support. Revolutions may be long and protracted, but the final stage is rapid and decisive.

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ATTN: CAPT. Paul Schmella, USN
MacDill AFB, FL 33608-6001 | 1 |
| 25. | EUR/EE, Room 5220
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520 | 1 |

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|-----|---|---|
| 26. | Mr. Scott Sullivan
ASD SOLIC
The Pentagon, Room 2E258
Washington, DC 20301-2500 | 1 |
| 27. | Mr. Frederick Fleitz
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of European Analysis, 6G21
Washington, DC 20505 | 1 |
| 28. | Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace
Palo Alto, CA 94306 | 1 |
| 29. | Library
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, AL36112-6428 | 1 |
| 30. | United States Special Operations Command
ATTN: MAJ STEVE COX, SOJ5-C
7701 Tampa Point Blvd.
MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323 | 1 |
| 31. | Hurlburt Base Library
16SVS/SVRL
ATTN: Susan Whitson
410 Cody Ave.
Hurlburt Fld, FL 32544-5417 | 1 |
| 32. | USASOC
Directorate of History and Museums
ATTN: AOHS-Dr Stewart
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307-5200 | 2 |
| 33. | Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944
Ft5. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 | 1 |
| 34. | Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command
NAB Coronado
San Diego, CA 92155 | 1 |

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| 35. | Commander Naval Special Warfare Development Group
FCTCL Dam Neck
Virginia Beach, VA 23461-5200 | 1 |
| 36. | Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One
NAB Coronado
San Diego, CA 92155 | 1 |
| 37. | Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group Two
NAB Little Creek
Norfolk, VA 23521 | 1 |
| 38. | United States Special Operations Command
ATTN: CPT William Bender, SOJ5-C
7701 Tampa Point Blvd.
MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323 | 3 |
| 39. | MAJ Craig L. Johnson
c/o Dr. Marvin Johnson
2309 W. 4th Street Terrace
Chanute, KS 66720 | 3 |
| 40. | Commander
Joint Readiness Training Center
ATTN: Chief, SOF Plans
Fort Polk, LA 76545 | 1 |
| 41. | Dr. Larry Cable
414 Church Street
Wilmington, NC 28401 | 1 |
| 42. | BG Philip K. Kensinger
Commander, SOCCENT
MacDill AFB, FL 33621 | 1 |
| 43. | COL Frank J. Toney
USASOC S-3
FT. Bragg, NC 28307-5200 | 1 |